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Introduction

On February 24, 2022, the Russian military launched a hostile operation against Ukraine, leading to a rapid escalation of conflict and instability in the region. In the aftermath of these events, a substantial number of individuals, including civilians, hastily fled the country, crossing international borders in search of safety and refuge elsewhere. The Ukrainian refugee crisis unfolded as people sought to escape the violence, destruction, and precarious circumstances created by the conflict. According to the latest data published by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) on the "Ukrainian Refugee Situation" webpage, as of February 7, 2023, a total of 8,054,405 individuals were registered as being in Europe due to the Ukrainian conflict. (UNHCR, 2023)[1]. This staggering number reflects the magnitude and impact of the crisis, highlighting the immense displacement and human suffering caused by the conflict.

Relevance of Research

The scale of the Ukrainian refugee crisis placed a significant burden on European countries, particularly those near Ukraine, such as Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and Romania. These countries faced the immediate challenge of accommodating and providing support to a large influx of displaced individuals. The arrival of such a substantial number of refugees placed strains on existing infrastructure, resources, and social systems, necessitating the implementation of emergency measures and the reevaluation of migration policies. Host countries and international organizations were confronted with the task of providing humanitarian aid, shelter, and essential services to the Ukrainian refugees. Efforts were made to establish temporary accommodation centres, distribute food and supplies, and ensure access to medical care and educational opportunities. The UNHCR and various non-governmental organizations played crucial roles in coordinating relief efforts and aiding both host communities and displaced individuals. The presence of millions of Ukrainian refugees in Europe not only evaluated the capacity and resilience of receiving countries but also raised important questions regarding integration, long-term solutions, and the protection of refugees'

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[1] Data is updated weekly on Wednesday by 12:00 CET.

rights. While some countries demonstrated compassion and solidarity by implementing inclusive policies and promoting integration, others adopted more restrictive approaches, emphasizing border security, and emphasizing the temporary nature of the displacement.

Goals of Research

1. Analyse the EU's response to the migration crisis triggered by the conflict in Ukraine, including its policy frameworks and measures implemented.
2. Examine the key objectives and goals of the EU's migration policy during the crisis, focusing on factors such as border control, refugee reception, and asylum procedures.
3. Investigate the effectiveness of the EU's migration policy in addressing the influx of Ukrainian refugees and managing the associated challenges.
4. Assess the legal and regulatory frameworks that guided the EU's migration policy during the crisis, including the role of international law and human rights considerations.
5. Explore the financial and logistical support provided by the EU to member states dealing with the arrival and integration of Ukrainian refugees.
6. Investigate the role of EU institutions, agencies, and member states in coordinating and implementing the migration policy response.
7. Examine the political and diplomatic dynamics within the EU and with external actors, such as Ukraine and Russia, which influenced the formulation and implementation of the migration policy.
8. Assess the impact of the migration crisis on the EU's internal dynamics, including public opinion, political discourse, and societal attitudes towards refugees and migration.
9. Identify the lessons learned from the EU's migration policy during the crisis in Ukraine and draw insights for future policy responses to similar situations.

Methodology

In this research, I will employ a comprehensive and multidimensional approach by combining qualitative and quantitative analysis methodologies. This will enable a deeper understanding of the complex dynamics surrounding the attitudes and experiences of both refugees and the host

population towards incoming migrants. The research will draw upon a range of data sources, including existing surveys conducted by reputable international organizations and NGOs, as well as primary and secondary data. Quantitative analysis will involve utilizing statistical data to examine the distribution patterns of refugees across the European Union. This will provide insights into the geographic and demographic aspects of the migration crisis. The data will be carefully analysed using appropriate statistical techniques to identify trends, patterns, and disparities among different regions and countries. Qualitative analysis will be conducted through the examination of various sources, such as case studies, previously conducted research studies, and official documents from relevant states and entities. These sources will provide valuable insights into the social, economic, and political factors influencing the reception and integration of refugees. Moreover, discourse analysis will be employed to analyze the language and rhetoric used by state leaders and policymakers during previous refugee crises, allowing for a comparative analysis of their positions and policy approaches. By employing a mixed-methods approach, this research aims to provide a comprehensive and nuanced understanding of the double standards observed in the European Union's response to previous migration crises compared to the current Ukrainian crisis. The integration of qualitative and quantitative analysis methodologies will enable a more robust examination of the underlying factors and dynamics at play, contributing to a more informed and holistic analysis of the topic.

Research Question and Proposition

"How did the arrival of Ukrainian refugees influence the European Union's migration policy during the conflict in Ukraine, and how did this influence contribute to the formulation and implementation of new migration policies within the EU?" is going to be the central question of my research.

The research proposes that the interplay of a range of factors, such as political, economic, and humanitarian considerations, played a significant role in shaping the European Union's migration policy during the war in Ukraine. The influx of Ukrainian refugees and internally displaced persons emerged as a crucial element that influenced the formation of this policy. However, further investigation is required to gain a deeper understanding of how the EU responded to this influx, the obstacles encountered in ensuring the efficacy and adherence to international standards in migration policies, and the potential implications for future EU migration and asylum practices.

Independent and Dependent Variables

The independent variables in this research encompass the "war in Ukraine," the "influx of Ukrainian refugees," "public and political pressure," "international standards and obligations," and the "economic and social impact of the refugee crisis on EU member states." Dependent variable is "changes in the EU's migration policy (existing policies altered and new policies developed)."

Unit of Analysis

The units of analysis in this research are the changes in the European Union's migration policy as a response to the war in Ukraine. To better assess these changes, the improvement of refugees' living standards will be selected as an indicator, which will be determined through survey data.

Literature Review

According to available data, it appears that a substantial number of refugees, primarily consisting of women, children, and elderly individuals, have entered neighbouring countries such as Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and Romania via their borders as males. Between the ages of 18 and 60 have reportedly been prohibited from leaving the nation (Alvardo & Qiblawi, 2022). However, this influx of refugees brought unfamiliar problems and security concerns, which necessitated new legislation. As Russia has been a long-standing rival of the EU and Western civilization, this war has exacerbated the situation. The EU sees Russia as a threat to its sovereignty, particularly in the Baltic States, and as a result, Poland and other countries have increased their support for Ukraine and refugees throughout the EU. The securitization theory suggests that states can portray certain issues or actors as a threat to their independence, and in doing so, can persuade their citizens that extraordinary measures are necessary to address the perceived (Buzan & Wæver, 2003). The invasion of Ukraine by Russia and the resulting influx of refugees into neighbouring and EU countries have caused many states to view Russia as a threat to their independence. These states have argued that if Russia can invade Ukraine, then they too may be susceptible to Russian aggression. This situation has reminded some people of Zbigniew Brzezinski, who famously warned about the dangers of Russian aggression and the need to contain it in the past (The Lithuanian Tribune, 2014).

Five categories have been identified to evaluate the factors that attract migrants to a particular country. These include medical and demographic stability, social welfare and development, employment and labour market, standard of living, and the economic development of the country (Mulska, Levytska, Zaychenko, Vasyltsiv, & Ilyash , 2021). Due to the large influx of refugees fleeing to the EU, the need arose to implement extraordinary legislation to meet their basic needs. To address this, the EU put into effect the Temporary Protection Directive, which was designed to provide basic needs for refugees. Scholars have investigated the drawbacks of the Temporary Protection Directive and have found instances of racial discrimination by member states and officials. They have discovered that the TPD only applies to Ukrainian citizens, leaving third-country refugees behind (Luyten, 2022). Moreover, the implementation of the TPD or its alternatives in neighbouring countries, such as Slovakia and Hungary, has been found lacking, with these countries not fulfilling their duties. In contrast, Poland and Romania have put in significant effort to meet the needs of refugees and uphold their obligations under the directive (European Committee of the Regions, 2022).

In addition to the concerns about the Temporary Protection Directive and its implementation, there have also been investigations into the security concerns of member states. Deliu (2022) found that some EU countries have implemented border checks, which go against the principles of the Schengen free movement agreement, to regulate the entrance of refugees. These border checks have been put in place to address security concerns and to prevent illegal entry of refugees, but they have also created additional challenges for refugees seeking asylum and have led to criticism of the EU's handling of the refugee crisis (Deliu, 2022).

EU countries have already started considering the possibility of returning refugees to Ukraine once the war ends. Surveys have shown that many Ukrainians themselves wish to return to their home country. However, it is important to note that any decision to return refugees to Ukraine must be done in a safe and voluntary manner, ensuring that their human rights and protection needs are respected and met. The situation in Ukraine must also be stable and secure enough to support the return of refugees (European Union Agency for Asylum, 2022). According to Franck Düvell's research in 2022, six possible scenarios were identified to facilitate the return of refugees after the war in Ukraine. However, it should be noted that not all his predictions may have come true, as the situation on the ground is constantly changing and can be affected by a wide range of factors, including political developments, economic conditions, and social

dynamics. The return of refugees is a complex issue that requires careful planning and coordination among different actors, including governments, international organizations, and civil society groups, to ensure the safety and well-being of all those involved (Düvell, 2022).

After conducting a thorough review of the existing literature, several key findings and gaps have emerged regarding the EU's response to the influx of Ukrainian refugees.

- Firstly, while the EU has taken steps to address the needs of Ukrainian migrants, there have been challenges and drawbacks, including mismanagement, racial discrimination, and a lack of coordination among member states. Despite these challenges, many of the initiatives put in place by the EU have been successful in providing crucial support to refugees.

- Secondly, surveys have revealed that many citizens in EU countries lack a clear understanding of the Ukrainian refugee crisis, leading to the spread of rumours and hate speech. This highlights the importance of accurate and accessible information about refugees to combat stereotypes and promote empathy and understanding among the public.

- Despite research efforts to understand the situation, there still appears to be a lack of integration across several aspects of the crisis, such as social, political, and humanitarian fields. Addressing these issues together could provide a more comprehensive understanding of the challenges facing Ukrainian refugees and their impact on the EU.

- Furthermore, there is a notable gap in the literature regarding the effectiveness of the EU's response to the crisis. While some initiatives have been successful, the literature has not fully assessed the overall impact of EU policies and programs on the situation. Future research could focus on evaluating the effectiveness of the EU's response to the Ukrainian refugee crisis and identifying areas where further improvements can be made.

Hypothesis

By analysing this data with the given methodology this research hypothesis that the war in Ukraine had a significant impact on the EU's migration policy, leading to changes in existing policies and the development of new ones. These changes were driven by a combination of

factors, including increased public and political pressure to respond to the humanitarian needs of refugees, the need to ensure that migration policies were consistent with international standards and obligations, and concerns about the economic and social impact of the refugee crisis on EU member states.

This research comprises several sections, including an introduction, analysis with separate chapters, a conclusion, and a bibliography. The introduction section provides a general overview, methodology, a brief literature review, research questions, variables, and hypotheses. The subsequent chapters delve into theoretical explanations, legal measures, official documents, and the European Union's experience in managing the Ukrainian crisis. The chapters also discuss various surveys, case studies, and potential future implementations. The paper concludes by presenting final findings, answering the research question, and evaluating whether the hypothesis was supported.

Chapter Ⅰ. Understanding the factors influencing the movement of Ukrainian refugees to the European Union: A complex humanitarian crisis

As per the most recent figures from the 7 february 2023, Poland has reportedly received the highest number of refugees with a score of 9,464,510, followed by Hungary with 2,182,519, Romania with 1,95,902, Slovakia with 1,162,862, and Moldova with 765,011 (UNHCR, 2023). However, it is worth noting that some refugees have reportedly continued their journey to other destinations, including Germany and Poland. To understand why Ukrainian refugees do not remain in bordering countries and instead continue to move further, we can examine numerous factors. It is evident that there is a disparity in the development index across various fields among the countries within the EU. The Eastern European countries, which joined the EU relatively recently, lag the Western European countries in terms of economic development and living standards (Savelyev, 2011, s. 6). There are numerous factors that drive people to migrate to other countries. Mulska et al. (2021) identified five categories to evaluate the pull factors of migration: medical and demographic stability, social welfare and development, employment and labour market, standard of living, and economic development of the country (Mulska, Levytska, Zaychenko, Vasyltsiv, & Ilyash , 2021, s. 285). According to their assertion, the social services provided by host countries are a significant factor in attracting refugees. To

evaluate this claim, one could compare the expenditures of governments on the social sector. The map below depicts the countries that allocate a higher amount of funds towards social protection in 2021 (Eurostat, 2023).

Map 1.General government expenditure by function

Source: Eurostat

We can infer from this map that social protection expenditure in neighbouring countries is lower compared to other countries. Addressing the challenges posed by the refugee and forced migration crisis requires a comprehensive and coordinated response from various stakeholders. The magnitude and complexity of the situation necessitate collaborative efforts to develop and implement effective policies and programs. Governments play a crucial role in providing leadership and allocating resources to address the needs of refugees and forced migrants. They should establish clear and inclusive policies that prioritize the safety, well-being, and protection of individuals and communities affected by displacement. This includes providing access to legal protection, healthcare, education, and social services. International organizations, such as the United Nations and its agencies, have a vital role in coordinating global responses and providing technical expertise. They can support governments in developing and implementing strategies, mobilize financial resources, and facilitate cooperation among different countries.

Civil society actors, including non-governmental organizations, community-based organizations, and grassroots initiatives, contribute to addressing the crisis by providing on-the-ground assistance, advocacy, and support to refugees and forced migrants. Their engagement is crucial in ensuring that the specific needs and voices of affected individuals are considered. A comprehensive response should be guided by an understanding of the root causes of forced migration, such as conflict, persecution, human rights violations, and environmental factors. Efforts should not only focus on immediate humanitarian assistance but also on promoting sustainable and durable solutions. This includes supporting peacebuilding and conflict resolution efforts, addressing inequality and social exclusion, and fostering economic opportunities in affected regions. Additionally, fostering international cooperation and burden-sharing is essential to ensure a fair and equitable response. Sharing responsibilities and providing support to countries hosting large numbers of refugees is crucial in preventing the overburdening of specific regions and ensuring the protection and well-being of refugees.

As part of the Eastern Partnership initiative, Ukraine was granted a visa-free travel allowance of 90 days within the Schengen region (The European External Action Service, 2016). However, this measure was deemed inadequate to address the needs of a significant number of individuals seeking refuge, and the European Union was called upon to take decisive action. While the EU had previously faced a steady influx of migrants from the Middle East and Africa, the situation was often not handled effectively by governments, with countries such as Slovakia, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary refusing the quotas allocated to them by Brussels (Stevis-Gridneff & Pronczuk, 2020). In contrast, the trend in Ukrainian migration saw a dramatic shift, and all EU member states showed a willingness to receive Ukrainian refugees. The attitudes and actions of political leaders towards migrants have been diverse and at times seemingly contradictory. For example, the former Interior Minister of Italy, Matteo Salvini, who is affiliated with the far-right party Lega, faced charges of kidnapping for allegedly unlawfully preventing the disembarkation of 147 rescued migrants from a ship and subjecting them to inhumane conditions (News Wires, 2021). However, in a somewhat contrasting move, Salvini travelled to the Poland-Ukraine border and announced his intention to provide assistance to refugees seeking to travel to Italy by arranging for a plane to facilitate their journey (Pettrachin & Abdou, Explaining the remarkable shift in European responses to refugees following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, 2022). The stance taken by Viktor Urban, the anti-immigrant prime minister of Hungary, at the border between Hungary and Ukraine is notable

for its apparent contradiction. While Urban has been a vocal opponent of immigration and has championed restrictive measures to control the flow of migrants into Hungary, his declaration that "we must accept them" suggests a willingness to provide assistance and support to Ukrainian refugees. He further emphasized the distinction between migrants and refugees by stating that while the former would be prevented from entering the country, the latter would receive care and protection (Coakley, 2022).

1.1. Theoretical Framework

From a securitization theory perspective, the conflict in Ukraine has been framed by the EU and Western nations as a security threat. This framing has portrayed the conflict as a source of regional instability, aggression, and a violation of international law. The securitization of the conflict has been reinforced through media coverage and political discourse, which have emphasized the urgent need to address the situation to protect national and regional security interests. The securitization theory, as proposed by the Copenhagen School of security studies, views securitization as a process whereby a particular issue or phenomenon is constructed and presented as a security concern. This process serves to legitimize extraordinary measures, such as the invocation of emergency powers or the imposition of restrictions on civil liberties, to effectively address the identified security threat.

In the case of the conflict in Ukraine, the securitization process has been facilitated using language, narrative, and symbolic representation. By framing the conflict as a security issue, policymakers and political actors have sought to garner public support for specific actions and policies aimed at addressing the perceived threat. The use of powerful rhetoric and symbolic representations, both in political speeches and media portrayals, has contributed to shaping public perceptions and generating a sense of urgency and concern. The securitization of the conflict in Ukraine has had significant implications for the responses of the EU and Western nations. It has led to the implementation of various measures aimed at mitigating the perceived security threat, including economic sanctions, military assistance to Ukraine, and diplomatic efforts to seek a resolution to the conflict. Additionally, securitization has influenced public opinion, shaping attitudes towards the conflict, and affecting the level of support for specific policy responses.

However, it is important to note that securitization is a socially and politically constructed process. Different actors may have varying interpretations of the security implications of the conflict, and the securitization of the issue may be subject to contestation and debate. While securitization has played a significant role in framing the conflict in Ukraine as a security concern, it is essential to critically examine the motivations, interests, and power dynamics that underlie such securitizing moves. This can help to foster a more nuanced understanding of the conflict and the policy responses that have been pursued in its wake. (Emmers, 2013, p. 133).

The securitization framework suggests that the mere act of framing an issue as a security threat is sufficient to transform it from a policy matter to a security concern. This process of framing involves creating a narrative that emphasizes the urgency and gravity of the issue and linking it to the survival and well-being of the political community. This framing serves to mobilize political actors and the public around the issue, and to legitimize the use of exceptional measures to address it (Buzan & Wæver, 2003, p. 491). By emphasizing the importance of framing and discourse in the construction of security threats, the securitization framework challenges traditional notions of security as objective and fixed. Instead, it suggests that security is a contingent and dynamic concept that is constantly being redefined and renegotiated in response to changing political and social contexts. The conflict between Ukraine and Russia has been securitized by Western nations and the EU, framing it as a source of regional instability, aggression, and violation of international law. This framing has been reinforced by media coverage and political discourse, which have emphasized the urgent need to address the conflict to protect national and regional security. The securitization of the conflict has justified exceptional measures such as sanctions, diplomatic efforts, and military support to Ukraine, as well as heightened border security and immigration policies in Europe. The perceived security threat posed by the influx of Ukrainian refugees has the potential to impose additional burdens on the European Union, which may require leaders to convince the populace of the urgency of addressing this issue. As the conflict in Ukraine has resulted in significant displacement of civilians, the movement of refugees across national borders has the potential to exacerbate economic and social challenges within the EU. Moreover, the fact that many military-aged men in Ukraine are serving in the army means that there are two primary options for reuniting families separated by the conflict: either the soldiers will travel to their relatives in the EU, or vice versa. This process of family reunification has the potential to contribute to the broader issue of migration and refugee resettlement, as well as to create additional challenges for the

EU in terms of security, integration, and social cohesion. Thus, while the issue of Ukrainian refugees may be framed as a security concern, it is also important to recognize the potential economic, social, and political challenges associated with migration and refugee resettlement. As such, any policy response to the issue of Ukrainian refugees must consider the complex and multi-faceted nature of the challenges associated with migration and refugee integration. Leila Hadj Adou and Andrea Pettrachin (2022) provided an explanation of why the present situation is handled differently than the one from 2015. They distinguish four things:

- Geographic proximity: Because of their proximity to the country, migrants from Bosnia and other former Yugoslavia were welcomed. However now Tunisia and Libya are closer to Italy rather than Ukraine, but rapprochement is completely different.
- Cultural and ethnic differences: Anti-migrant sentiment is driven by perceptions of cultural and ethnic differences, which are shaped by communication. Historical examples, such as the Irish, Italian, and Polish immigrants in Western Europe, demonstrate that these perceptions can be constructed and changed over time. There are parallels between historical debates and modern arguments against newcomers from outside of Europe.
- The invasion of Ukraine by Russia has been extensively depicted as a war against Europe, and both the actual conflict as well as the experiences of refugees and their tragic circumstances have been effectively mediated.
- Presenting Ukrainians as heroes defending their nation from a powerful military shapes beliefs of stability, security, and national identity, which are often conservative and can influence skepticism towards immigration (Pettrachin & Abdou, 2022).

The framing of the Ukraine conflict as a security concern was also facilitated by deeper cultural, religious, and ethnic ties between Ukraine and some European countries. These ties helped to portray Ukrainians as heroic figures who were bravely defending their nation against one of the most formidable military forces. Additionally, the support for the military services and the prioritization of issues related to stability, security, and national identity, which are fundamentally conservative beliefs, were frequently adopted by people and political figures who were more likely to be skeptical about immigration. Overall, these factors contributed to the portrayal of the Ukraine conflict as a security issue and influenced the public perception and policy responses towards the Ukrainian refugees. Since the securitization was successful,

the Cophenhagen School advocates using "Extraordinary measures" as a following step (Emmers, 2013, pp. 134-135).

Considering the onset of the Ukrainian crisis in 2014, particularly with the annexation of Crimea, it became evident to the West that Russia's actions were indicative of a shift in its ambitions. The events in Crimea raised alarm bells, signaling that Russia was no longer the same as it had been in the past. With a majority of EU countries and non-EU countries being members of NATO, it is essential to analyze the securitization process between Russia and NATO in the context of the Ukrainian war. The securitization process can be traced back to the beginning of the Ukrainian conflict and has since escalated to the current situation. The annexation of Crimea was a significant turning point that heightened concerns among NATO members about Russia's intentions and actions. It underscored the need to reevaluate the security landscape and assess the implications for NATO's collective defense. Despite the Minsk 1 and Minsk 2 agreements being reached, it was widely recognized, as articulated by Angela Merkel, that they were merely temporary measures aimed at buying time for Ukraine to modernize its military capabilities (Gagni, 2023). The agreements reached between Russia and NATO did not provide a long-term solution to the conflict in Ukraine and failed to address the underlying tensions between the two parties. As a result, the securitization process between Russia and NATO has had significant and wide-ranging consequences. One of the notable outcomes of this securitization process is the escalation of military activities and heightened tensions along the borders. The Baltic states, Poland, and the Black Sea region have experienced increased military presence and manoeuvrers. These actions have raised concerns about territorial integrity, national security, and potential aggression. In response to the growing tensions, NATO has taken steps to reinforce its defence posture. This includes the implementation of various measures aimed at enhancing deterrence and collective security. NATO member states have increased their military presence in the region, conducted frequent military exercises, and improved their capabilities to ensure a credible deterrent. As tensions continued to escalate, the conflict moved beyond symbolic military drills and speeches by leaders. In 2022, the situation entered an active phase of war, where both parties became fully engaged in a large-scale struggle. The fear of war breaking out was no longer a hypothetical concern but a harsh reality on the ground. The situation reached a critical point when the Senate declared Vladimir Putin a war criminal (Dasgupta, 2022) and the International Criminal Court

issued a ruling stating that 123 member states should arrest Putin if he sets foot on their soil and transfer him to The Hague for prosecution (Deutsch & Sterling, 2023).

1.2. Legal Aspects and Implementation of Temporary Protection Directive

During the migration crisis in the European Union (2015), the existing system for managing asylum seekers was still in the process of being reformed. This system, referred to as the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), comprises a set of Directives and Regulations designed to standardize asylum procedures and provide appropriate reception conditions for asylum seekers. The main objectives of the CEAS are to ensure consistency in assessing asylum claims, establish clear criteria for granting international protection, and outline the responsibilities of member states in processing asylum applications. Key components of the CEAS include the Asylum Procedures Directive, which sets out the rules for handling asylum applications, the Reception Conditions Directive, which establishes minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers, the Qualification Directive, which defines the criteria for granting refugee status, the Dublin Regulation, which determines the member state responsible for examining asylum applications, and the Eurodac Regulation, which establishes a fingerprint database for identifying asylum seekers. These measures were implemented to create a more unified and effective asylum system across the EU, although further improvements and adjustments are still being pursued to address the evolving challenges of migration and asylum (European Commission Statistical Office of the European Union., *Asylum Seekers in the European Union*).

On March 4, 2022, in response to the conflict that erupted in Ukraine only 8 days prior, the European Union took the decision to implement the Council Directive 2001/55/EC or with its wellknown name Temporary Protection Directive (TPD)[2] as an exceptional measure. When this directive first was adopted many even accused the EU to create TPD to avoid international responisbilities. Even this directive was approved in 2001 in response to Yugoslavian refugees

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[2] The TPD serves as a mechanism for granting immediate protection to displaced persons who are unable to return to their country of origin due to a mass influx of refugees, a situation that poses a significant challenge to the country's existing infrastructure and resources.

and has since been referenced countless times but never actually implemented, came into effect right away. Even it was aimed to ease burden of states, the target group faced several restiriction. They specified certain people that can enjoy TPD privilages. In a document addressed to the Members of the European Parliament *(Article 2)* those certain people were grouped as these:

- "Ukrainian nationals, as well as their family members, who resided in Ukraine before or on 24 February 2022.
- Stateless persons and nationals of third countries other than Ukraine who benefited from international protection or equivalent national protection in Ukraine before or on 24 February 2022, as well as their family members.

- Nationals of third countries other than Ukraine and stateless persons who can prove that they were legally residing in Ukraine before or on 24 February 2022, on the basis of a valid permanent residence permit issued in accordance with Ukrainian law and who are unable to return in safe and durable conditions to their country (of origin) or region (within their country) of origin, are eligible for either EU temporary protection or adequate national protection, depending on the EU country to which they travel (European Commission, 2022, p. 14)."

In the Proposal (2022) it was found that the European Commission explicitly referenced certain legal documents in its approach to the migration crisis in Ukraine. Specifically, the Commission drew upon the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951, as well as the amendment by the New York Protocol of 31 January 1967, which outline fundamental rights of refugees (European Commission, 2022, p. 8).

Despite the financial challenges associated with responding to the migration crisis, the European Commission has acknowledged the difficulty in accurately predicting the final cost of addressing the situation. As a result, the Commission has decided to maintain the current budget of existing EU funding instruments in the field of migration, asylum, and border management under the periods of 2014-2020 and 2021-2027. By keeping the budget intact, the Commission aims to ensure that there are sufficient funds available to tackle the migration crisis effectively. However, the Commission has not ruled out the possibility of activating flexibility mechanisms within the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 2021-2027 if the need arises.

This means that additional financial resources can be allocated to address the evolving challenges of migration, asylum, and border management. In line with this, on the 16th of March 2022, the Council decided to allocate ten billion euros from the Recovery Assistance for Cohesion and the Territories of Europe fund. This funding will be utilized for necessary expenditures related to the migration crisis. The decision to tap into this fund highlights the seriousness of the situation and the commitment of the European Union to support member states in managing the migration flow effectively. It is important to note that the Commission remains committed to providing further updates on the budget allocation, as necessary. This allows for a dynamic approach to address the evolving needs and challenges associated with migration (Council of the EU, 2022).

The Final report on the Study conducted in 2016, which focused on the Temporary Protection Directive, provided a detailed analysis of the directive's objectives. The TPD was designed with a dual purpose in mind, and this was reflected in its two-folded structure. The primary intention of the TPD, as described in the report, can be summarized as follows:

- "To establish minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons from third countries who cannot return to their country of origin, and.
- To promote a balance of effort between Member States in receiving and bearing the consequences of receiving such persons" (Beirens, Maas, Petronella, & van der Velden, 2016, p. 8)

The specific aims of the Directive are listed in the Commission's proposal for the TPD and include the following: "To avoid a total blockage in national asylum systems in the event of a mass influx, which would have negative effects on the Member States, the persons concerned and other persons seeking protection outside the context of the mass influx, and thereby support the viability of the common European asylum system" (Beirens, Maas, Petronella, & van der Velden, 2016, p. 8). The Proposal establishes the existence of a mass influx into the Union of displaced persons who have had to leave Ukraine because of an armed conflict (Article 1). The European Union has established measures to ensure administrative cooperation among member states in managing migration crises, as per Article 27 of Council Directive 2001/55/EC (The Council of the EU, 2001, p. 8). One of the measures implemented to address the migration crisis is the establishment of the Migration Preparedness and Crisis Management Network. This

network serves as a platform for member states to coordinate their efforts and share information regarding the migration situation. By exchanging relevant data with the European External Action Service, member states contribute to a shared situational awareness, allowing for a more comprehensive understanding of the challenges at hand.

The European Commission plays a crucial role in coordinating cooperation and facilitating information exchange among member states. The Commission also issued a set of practical guidelines to assist EU member states in managing the influx of individuals seeking refuge from Ukraine. Since Ukraine has an Association Agreement with the EU, Ukrainian citizens are not classified as irregular arrivals and can legally enter EU member states without a visa. Consequently, the typical approach of registering and containing protection-seekers at or near the border, which the EU usually employs, does not apply to the current circumstances. Recognizing the political readiness to receive Ukrainian refugees and the distinct legal framework, the Commission's guidelines focus on minimizing barriers to arrival by proposing specific measures. Those measures are:

- "Simplification of border controls for certain categories of persons, including vulnerable persons, such as children, and other categories, such as transport workers that find themselves in Ukraine while conducting their services.
- The possibility to organise border controls outside of border crossing points; • Special arrangements for crossing the borders by rescue services, police, fire brigades and border guards, seafarers regardless of their nationality.
- The establishment of emergency support lanes, to ensure access and return of organisations providing humanitarian aid to people in the Ukrainian territory.
- Outside the scope of the Schengen rules, the waiving of customs duties and measures to facilitate the entry of pet animals travelling with their owners from Ukraine (Rasche, 2022, p. 4)."

In particular, the Commission closely monitors the reception capacities of member states and identifies the need for additional support. This involves continuous assessment of the migration situation and working in collaboration with agencies such as Frontex (the European Border and Coast Guard Agency), the European Union Asylum Agency, and Europol. Frontex, as the agency responsible for border management, actively supports member states in managing their external borders and ensuring their security. The agency collaborates with national authorities

to enhance border control and surveillance, preventing irregular migration and managing the flow of people effectively. The European Union Asylum Agency plays a crucial role in supporting member states in processing asylum applications and ensuring the protection of asylum seekers' rights. It provides expertise and technical assistance to help member states establish efficient asylum procedures, improve reception conditions, and strengthen their capacity to manage asylum-related matters. Europol, the European law enforcement agency, contributes to the overall effort by providing operational support and facilitating information sharing between member states. It focuses on combating organized crime networks involved in human trafficking and smuggling, thereby disrupting irregular migration routes, and enhancing security.

To ensure a coordinated response, the Commission collaborates closely with these agencies, leveraging their expertise and resources to monitor and review the migration situation effectively. By doing so, the Commission can identify emerging challenges and provide member states with the necessary support and assistance when needed (The Council of the EU, 2001, p. 3). Moreover, the Commission proposed 25 points on "establishing the existence of a mass influx of displaced persons from Ukraine within the meaning of Article 5 of Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001, and having the effect of introducing temporary protection" (The Council of the EU, 2001, p. 4). Additionally, in response to the food shortage, the European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations mechanism was implemented, which was activated through the participation of both EU and non-EU states, such as Norway. Commissioner for Crisis Management, Janez Lenarcic, commented on the situation regarding the invasion: "Russia's war in Ukraine is amounting to a humanitarian catastrophe not seen in decades in Europe. People inside Ukraine, but also hundreds of thousands fleeing to the neighbouring countries are seeking safety. The EU, through its Civil Protection Mechanism, is coordinating 24/7 with Ukrainian authorities, as well as Moldova, Poland and Slovakia receiving the displaced people. Thank you to all European countries that already offered their support. The EU stands in full solidarity with Ukrainian people at this horrific time" (ECHO, 2022). According to the EU, this operation has been classified as the largest civil protection operation to date. It has been reported that all 27 EU member states, as well as Norway, Turkiye, North Macedonia, Iceland, and Serbia, have provided in-kind assistance to aid the situation. The assistance provided includes medical supplies, shelter items, vehicles, and energy equipment, among other things (European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations,

2023). To aid refugees in Moldova, the EU has allocated a budget of €90 million (European Commission - Press release, 2022). The rapid increase in daily inflows necessitates prompt and adaptive decision-making to effectively respond to emerging challenges. However, due to the inherent bureaucratic processes of the European Union, it may not always be feasible to update policies and procedures in a timely manner, presenting significant challenges. The challenges can be broadly classified into two distinct categories: those that are primarily of a theoretical nature and those that are more practical in nature, occurring on site. The theoretical challenges primarily involve gaps in legal frameworks, the need for additional laws and regulations, and other aspects related to bureaucratic paperwork. In contrast, the practical challenges centre around the absence of essential provisions such as accommodation, transportation, and other related necessities. Despite this distinction, it is important to acknowledge that the practical challenges on site have had a notable impact on relevant documentation and bureaucratic processes. One of the legal challenges pertains to the status of third country nationals who resided in Ukraine prior to the onset of war. The TPD has explicitly stated that this directive can only be applied to Ukrainian nationals, and some countries such as Hungary only offer support to those with dual citizenship. This exclusion of third country nationals residing in Ukraine from international protection may potentially conflict with various provisions of international law. For instance, Article 3 of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees mandates that refugees must be afforded protection without discrimination based on factors such as race, religion, or country of origin (Office of UNHCR, 1951, p. 17). Furthermore, this exclusion challenges the principle of non-refoulement, which is a fundamental aspect of international asylum and refugee law. The principle prohibits states from returning individuals to a country where there is a genuine risk of persecution, torture, inhuman or degrading treatment, or any other form of human rights violation. Article 3 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms has also been interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights as implicitly forbidding the return of individuals to a place where they would be exposed to a "real and substantiated" risk of ill-treatment that violates the prohibition of torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (European Court of Human Rights, 1950, p. 7). The TPD is designed to guarantee "an area of freedom, security, and justice open to those who, forced by circumstances, legitimately seek protection in the European Union. However, the decision by the Council to exclude third-country nationals from such protection appears to contradict the primary objective of the directive, as well as the international and European commitments of EU Member States. It undermines the very essence

of the TPD and could potentially result in significant ramifications for the EU's reputation as a bastion of human rights and its commitment to providing protection to individuals in need (Motte-Baumvo, Frota Mont'Alverne, & Guimarães, 2022). The process of handling refugees is fraught with numerous challenges that impact various areas of governance, including human rights, public services, security, and civil society support. One of the major issues facing the refugee crisis is the prevalence of human rights abuses, which include human trafficking, forced prostitution, and child protection deficiencies. The protection of the rights of refugees is enshrined in international law, and violations of these rights can result in significant legal and moral consequences.Another major challenge in the handling of refugees is the preparedness of public services, including health services, education, housing, and social protection. Refugees often require extensive support in these areas, and failure to provide adequate services can lead to further hardship and insecurity.Internal security concerns are also a critical challenge in the refugee process. The movement of large numbers of people across borders can create significant security risks, both for the refugees themselves and for the countries receiving them. Ensuring the safety and security of all parties involved is a critical priority in the handling of refugees.Registration and processing of people at borders is another challenge facing the refugee process. The sheer number of people involved can often overwhelm existing infrastructure and create long waiting periods, which can exacerbate the challenges already faced by refugees.Support for civil society is also a key challenge in the handling of refugees. Civil society organizations play a critical role in providing support and advocacy for refugees, and ensuring that these organizations are adequately funded and supported is critical to the success of the refugee process.Long-term funding and integration are additional challenges facing the refugee process. The needs of refugees can persist for years, and ensuring that adequate funding is available to support them over the long term is critical. Additionally, ensuring that refugees are effectively integrated into their host communities is essential to promoting long-term stability and security.Despite these challenges, the handling of refugees has been generally successful in recent years. Governments and civil society organizations have worked together to provide support and protection to refugees, and while there have been significant challenges along the way, the overall process has been largely effective in meeting the needs of those forced to flee their homes. Katrien Luyten, in her briefing to the European Parliament (2022), highlights that the majority of refugees displaced from Ukraine are women, children, and elderly people. These vulnerable groups are particularly susceptible to human trafficking, sexual and labor exploitation, and other forms of abuse (Luyten, 2022, p. 9).

Moreover, the weakened healthcare sector due to the COVID-19 pandemic has further exacerbated the difficulties in addressing the health issues of refugees.In addition to the challenges posed by health and safety concerns, Luyten also points to the issue of racism faced by refugees. European countries have historically welcomed white, Christian migrants and given them advantages over non-European, non-white migrants (Luyten, 2022, pp. 9-10). For instance, countries tend to prefer accepting Ukrainians as refugees, viewing them as an opportunity to meet the demand for labor in their countries. This preference for accepting white, Christian refugees and migrants creates a sense of double standards and unfairness (Dubois, 2022).

Reports from the borders of Ukraine indicate that non-Ukrainian migrants from Africa, the Middle East, and Asia are facing humiliating behavior and are being targeted by soldiers (Pikulicka-Wilczewska, 2022). The prioritization of white migrants over non-European migrants in certain incidents and the statements made by some European leaders highlight a concerning issue in the context of the EU's commitment to human rights, non-discrimination, and the principle of non-refoulement. The incidents mentioned suggest that there may be a disparity in how migrants from different regions are treated and perceived. This raises questions about the principles of fairness, equality, and non-discrimination within the European Union's migration policies and practices. Such disparities can undermine the principles of human rights and non-discrimination that the EU purports to uphold. The statement made by Bulgarian Prime Minister Kiril Petkov: "These are not the refugees we are used to… these people are Europeans" (The Associated Press, 2022) reinforces this concern. This statement implies that there might be a bias or preferential treatment based on the migrants' ethnicity or national origin, which goes against the principles of equal treatment and non-discrimination. The EU's commitment to human rights, non-discrimination, and the principle of non-refoulement should apply to all individuals in need of international protection, regardless of their ethnicity or nationality. The selective readiness to receive Ukrainian refugees while rejecting other non-European migrants raises questions about the consistency and fairness of the EU's approach to asylum and refugee issues.

1.3. Addressing Security Concerns: Evaluating the Potential Risks of Ukrainian Refugee Influx for the European Union

Defining security can be a complex task, as it can be approached from various perspectives depending on different schools of thought. However, a common understanding of security is that it pertains to the absence of threats or the reduction of threats to values that are considered significant (Degaut, 2015, p. 7). These viewpoints are practical and reasonable in characterizing the concept of security. However according to securitization theory, security is a social construct and a process by which issues are constructed and framed as existential threats to a community, requiring extraordinary measures and the suspension of normal politics to address them. In other words, security is not an objective condition, but rather a subjective perception shaped by the way that issues are presented and interpreted by political actors and society. Securitization theory emphasizes the role of power and discourse in shaping security, as well as the potential for securitization to be used as a tool to justify the use of exceptional or authoritarian measures in response to perceived threats (Buzan, Wæver, & de Wilde, 1998, pp. 21-23).

The arrival of Ukrainian refugees presents significant security challenges for host countries, particularly in relation to border control, identification, and integration processes. One key concern is the potential use of fake identification documents by refugees, which can undermine the host country's security measures and screening procedures. This poses a risk as it becomes more difficult to verify the identities and backgrounds of individuals entering the country, potentially allowing criminals or individuals with malicious intent to exploit the situation. Additionally, the vulnerability of refugees to various forms of exploitation, such as human trafficking and forced labour, poses further security risks. Exploitative networks may take advantage of the desperate circumstances faced by refugees, subjecting them to illegal activities that can undermine the host country's security and social fabric. Moreover, the arrival of many refugees can exacerbate existing social tensions within host communities. Cultural and language barriers can lead to misunderstandings and mistrust, creating fertile ground for social unrest and potential conflicts. The strain on resources and services, such as housing, healthcare, and education, can also contribute to social discontent and heighten security concerns. Despite the comparatively warmer reception given to Ukrainian refugees compared to previous waves of refugees, concerns about potential security risks persist. The European Union and its member

states recognize the need to balance humanitarian considerations with security considerations, ensuring that thorough screening processes are in place to identify and address any potential risks associated with refugee populations. In a broader context, the establishment of the Schengen Area in 1995 by five countries marked a significant development in European integration. This arrangement allowed for visa-free movement among participating nations, facilitating travel, and enhancing economic and social cooperation. Over time, the Schengen Area has expanded to include twenty-seven countries, streamlining travel, and fostering closer ties among member states.

While the Schengen Area promotes the free movement of people within its borders, it also necessitates robust security measures to ensure the integrity and safety of the area. The challenges posed by the arrival of Ukrainian refugees highlight the ongoing importance of effective border control, identification protocols, and integration efforts to manage potential security risks while upholding the principles of humanitarian protection and European unity. Although there may be a visa-free policy in place for certain situations, countries still have the authority to implement border control measures:

- in the case of a foreseeable threat (e.g., a special event such as a sporting competition).
- in the case of an immediate threat such as terrorism or even the outbreak of a pandemic like it was the case of Covid-19; and
- in the situation of persistent serious deficiencies relating to external borders (Deliu, 2022, p. 16).

The Schengen countries adhere to the regulations outlined in the Dublin Regulation concerning their asylum policies. According to this regulation, the country where an asylum seeker first enters is responsible for registering and processing their asylum application. To ensure the security of Schengen area citizens and address issues such as terrorism, organized crime, human trafficking, and illegal migration, border and local police forces collaborate closely with one another. This cooperation aims to safeguard the integrity of the Schengen area and address potential security threats (Popa, 2016, p. 97). Border checks have been implemented by certain states in response to reports of dozens of illegal migrants entering the country. The Swedish government has decided to reintroduce border controls as the number of migrants entering the

country from Ukraine has increased (The Local, 2022). Governments claim that these border checks are of a temporary nature and are only put in place under specific circumstances.

The European Union is indeed concerned about the potential return of approximately ten million Ukrainian refugees to their home country. While this topic is not extensively discussed by officials, government-funded think tanks are actively researching the implications of a post-war scenario and the repatriation of refugees. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) recently conducted a sociological study that sheds light on the perspectives of Ukrainian forced migrants. According to the study, a significant majority of Ukrainian refugees, 86%, identify the ongoing war in Ukraine as the primary reason for not returning to their country. The danger and instability associated with the conflict are major deterrents to their repatriation. While the end of the conflict may alleviate some safety concerns, there are other significant factors that contribute to the reluctance to return. Unemployment is a major concern, as cited by 32% of Ukrainian migrants. The war has disrupted the economy, resulting in limited job opportunities and financial insecurity. Inadequate housing is another prominent issue, mentioned by 13% of migrants. The destruction of infrastructure and the displacement of populations have left many without proper housing or the means to rebuild their lives. Additionally, 12% of migrants express concerns about the lack of necessities in Ukraine. The war has disrupted essential services such as healthcare, clean water, and electricity, making it challenging for returnees to access these vital resources. Education for their children is also a pressing concern, with 10% of migrants highlighting limited access to quality education as a barrier to returning. These findings highlight the complex challenges and multifaceted factors influencing the decision of Ukrainian refugees to return home. Addressing these concerns will be crucial in facilitating a safe and sustainable repatriation process. The European Union and relevant stakeholders will need to work together to support the rebuilding of infrastructure, the creation of employment opportunities, and the provision of essential services in Ukraine to encourage the voluntary return of refugees and ensure their successful reintegration into society (Kravchenko & Zhuk, 2022, p. 466).

Franck Düvell (2022) generated six potential war scenarios, but some of these predictions have already been disproved by current events, despite only a few months having passed since they were proposed. Nevertheless, some of the scenarios may still hold validity:

1. Russia will withdraw its troops and relinquish the territory annexed in 2014, returning Ukraine to its pre-2014 status quo. The country will receive significant western aid for rebuilding, leading to a fast economic recovery, but achieving this scenario without western intervention is unlikely in the foreseeable future (Düvell, 2022, p. 4).

Although the first part of the prediction did not come true, the EU and other nations have successfully managed to secure funds to aid in the rebuilding of Ukraine. A proposal has been made to seize the assets of the Russian government and wealthy individuals, known as oligarchs in the West, and redistribute them to Ukraine and refugees (Erlanger, 2022).

2. The conflict between Ukraine and Russia will continue until autumn/winter, with the Russian army being pushed back and withdrawing its troops. Only small parts of Ukraine, in addition to Crimea, Donetsk, and Luhansk, will be under Russian control, and most of Ukraine will remain sovereign. The security situation in Russian-occupied parts will be precarious, but western aid will be available for rebuilding the country, leading to a fast economic recovery in the government-controlled territory. This forecast was correct, although there were some slight inaccuracies.

The European Union and the Western countries, in general, have consistently voiced their support for Ukraine's territorial integrity and sovereignty. They have unequivocally condemned Russia's annexation of Crimea and have continuously advocated for a peaceful resolution to the conflict in eastern Ukraine. The principle of respecting borders and territorial integrity stands as a fundamental pillar of international relations, and the EU has remained steadfast in upholding this principle. It is important to note that the EU's stance on the conflict in Ukraine goes beyond immediate geopolitical considerations. While it is true that an outcome where Ukraine loses the war would result in a longer border between Russia and the EU, the broader implications and consequences must be taken into account. Upholding the principles of international law, respecting the desires and aspirations of the Ukrainian people, and ensuring regional stability are all factors that must be carefully considered in any deliberation regarding the potential separation of the eastern regions from Ukraine. The EU would indeed face increased challenges in terms of border security and resource allocation if Ukraine were to lose the war. Safeguarding the eastern borders would require additional efforts and resources to maintain stability and protect the EU's interests. However, any contemplation of altering territorial boundaries should be approached with caution and in full consideration of the

aforementioned principles and implications. In a CNN interview, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky expressed his resolute stance on the matter, stating that Ukraine is not willing to relinquish territory in the eastern part of the country to bring an end to the conflict with Russia. He emphasized the importance of standing their ground and preventing Russia from capturing the Donbas region. Zelensky's position underscores Ukraine's commitment to defending its territorial integrity and highlights the significance of safeguarding its borders (Herb, 2022). So, it seems that giving up the eastern territories is not a realistic option for Ukraine at this time.

3. The war in Ukraine will continue until autumn/winter 2022, with Russia occupying a stretch of Ukraine up to 100 km from its border. Economic recovery in unaffected areas will be fast, while the conflict will result in yet another frozen conflict. Two high GRP provinces will be lost to Russia, diminishing the country's capacity to absorb IDPs. Western aid will be made available to rebuild the sovereign parts of the country, and some limited reconstruction will take place in the occupied parts.

This proposed option has been deemed unrealistic due to the resumption of military operations by both sides following the winter period. Similar to the historic battle of Verdun, the Ukrainian war saw renewed clashes in the city of Bakhmut. Russian officials claim that their forces have taken control of the city, while the Ukrainian side asserts that they still maintain control over a portion of it (Kullab, 2023). If Russia were to take control of Donetsk Oblast, it would likely prolong the conflict in Ukraine and make a swift resolution more challenging to achieve.

4. The war in Ukraine is predicted to continue until winter 2022 or summer 2023, with Russia occupying large parts of the country, including most major cities and economic hubs. The occupation may even extend to the southern coast, which would cut sovereign Ukraine off from the Black Sea and international trade. The country will be divided, with only a small part of it remaining sovereign. In the occupied parts, the security situation will be precarious, and there will be widespread civil disobedience and persecution of pro-Ukrainian actors. The western parts of Ukraine will remain sovereign, but they will be below average in terms of GRP and will have limited capacity to absorb IDPs. While reconstruction efforts will focus on unoccupied western Ukraine, the occupied parts will only see limited strategic reconstruction due to the lack of Russian resources. However, this scenario is seen as less likely as Russia's resources

for sustaining the war and occupation of such a vast territory with a hostile population are limited.

The war in Ukraine is far from reaching its conclusion, and the outcome remains uncertain. Ongoing developments suggest a continued state of conflict. There are allegations of a Ukrainian army-backed group called the "Legion of Freedom of Russia" and "Russian Volunteer Corps"-defectors of Russian army entering the Belgorod oblast in Russia and engaging in military operations, prompting a response from the Russian army (22 May 2023). While the Ukrainian side claims that these are Russian opposition militias, it is evident that Russia is prepared to take stronger measures to protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity. This raises concerns about the potential for further escalation, indicating that the war may persist rather than being resolved in the near future (Brugen, 2023).

5. The war in Ukraine may continue until winter 2022 or summer 2023, with an outcome being that Russia takes the capital and defeats the Ukrainian army, resulting in a pro-Russian administration controlling the whole country. Civil disobedience and guerrilla activities may continue, and the security situation in the entire country will be precarious for a long time. Most major cities will be heavily affected by the war, and military and civilian casualties will be high. Western aid will only provide limited humanitarian assistance, and economic recovery will be slow.

This scenario is less likely because Ukrainian resistance continues to receive western military aid, and the people in the west are unlikely to accept Russian rule. Additionally, Russian resources are limited, making a complete takeover of the country less feasible.

6. The war in Ukraine is expected to become protracted, with continued attacks by Russia on parts of Ukraine still under government control, guerrilla fighting in occupied territories, widespread and violent repression, and a weak economy (Düvell, 2022, pp. 4-5).

However, this scenario is unlikely due to lack of resources on both sides.

While the accuracy of these predictions regarding the return of refugees to Ukraine remains uncertain, it is crucial to acknowledge that diverse war scenarios have shaped potential outcomes. Numerous factors can influence the decisions made by refugees, including the

duration of the conflict, the extent of destruction to their homes, familial considerations, the legality and duration of their stay in Europe, and various other circumstances. Considering these complexities, it is essential to approach the issue of refugee returns with a nuanced understanding of the multifaceted factors at play (Düvell, 2022, p. 14). In the various scenarios presented, the possibility of refugees returning to the Ukrainian government-controlled territories is considered. However, it is noteworthy that none of these scenarios suggest the possibility of refugees returning to the Russian-occupied territories. Let us examine these scenarios.

- In the first scenario where no part of Ukraine is under occupation, it is still expected that the eastern part of the country will be heavily destroyed, and 93% of refugees would return to the government-held territories. However, some refugees may choose to relocate to the neighbouring countries of Ukraine. Overall, it is estimated that 1.65 million refugees would stay within the borders of the European Union.

- In this scenario, there is little or no additional territorial occupation beyond the current areas of Donetsk, Luhansk, and Crimea. However, there is considerable damage to some parts of eastern Ukraine. Like the previous scenario, most refugees would return to their homes, but an estimated 1.65 million or more Ukrainians would remain and settle within the EU.

- In the third scenario, Russia occupies some parts of Kharkiv province, the remainder of Donetsk and Luhansk, and the provinces forming a land bridge between Russia and Crimea. This would affect 7.9 million people, of whom 4.5 million would be displaced. Of these, 1.44 million would flee to the EU, and a total of 3.48 million Ukrainians could settle in the EU longer term.

- This scenario was described before Russia withdrew from Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Sumi provinces. It would affect up to 24.8 million Ukrainians, with 12 to 14 million becoming displaced and 4.84 million becoming international refugees. Of those who flee to the EU, only 563,000 could potentially return to the occupied territories, and 20% would aspire for family reunification, bringing in at least another 900,000 Ukrainians. This would result in a total of 4.8 million Ukrainian refugees in the EU.

- In this fifth scenario, Ukraine is completely under Russian control with a pro-Russian puppet regime in the west. The entire population of Ukraine, thirty-seven million people, is affected with an estimated 20.9 million Ukrainians aspiring to flee the

country, including army and territorial defence personnel. Up to 10% of the population, or 2.2 million people, who are more resilient or tolerant towards Russian rule, may choose to return. This leaves more than 18.8 million Ukrainians seeking a new home abroad. The precarious economic situation, continuous guerrilla warfare, and occasional fighting will result in several tens of thousands of Ukrainians seeking refuge in the EU annually.

- In this final scenario, it is suggested that Ukraine is fully occupied by Russia, and most Ukrainians do not have the aspiration to return. However, no specific numbers or details are provided about the scale of displacement or migration (Düvell, 2022, p. 9).

As previously highlighted, the condition of refugees' private property plays a crucial role in determining their willingness to return to their home country. If Ukrainian refugees, who are currently residing in the European Union, learn that their homes have been destroyed, potentially because of Russian occupation, they may be reluctant to go back. Therefore, one of the top priorities is the reconstruction of these damaged settlements to facilitate the return of refugees. According to the Second Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA), an extensive amount of financial resources is now required for the process of rebuilding and recovering from the full-scale Russian invasion. The assessment estimates that a staggering $411 billion is needed, indicating a significant increase compared to the findings of a similar study conducted in June 2022. Additionally, the report reveals the far-reaching consequences of the invasion, with 7.1 million individuals in Ukraine being pushed into poverty. Furthermore, the progress achieved in terms of development over the past 15 years has been undone by the conflict. The poverty rate in Ukraine has dramatically risen from 5.5 % to 24.1 % within a span of just one year, as outlined in the report. Moreover, the country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has experienced a substantial decline of 29.2 %. These statistics paint a grim picture of the socio-economic consequences of the Russian invasion on Ukraine (UNDP, 2023). The financial burden of reconstruction is immense, and the alarming rise in poverty levels highlights the urgent need for comprehensive recovery efforts. Rebuilding infrastructure, revitalizing the economy, and addressing the needs of the affected population are crucial steps in mitigating the long-term impacts of the conflict and restoring stability to Ukraine.

A survey conducted in 2022 among Ukrainian refugees in Poland revealed interesting insights into their future. Among the respondents, 42% expressed a powerful desire to return to Ukraine

once the war ends. On the other hand, 17% of the respondents expressed a preference for settling permanently in Poland, possibly seeking better economic opportunities and stability. Another 11% of the respondents aimed to earn enough money in Poland to eventually return to Ukraine, highlighting their intention to support their families and rebuild their lives in their home country. The survey also indicated that a sense of urgency existed among some respondents to return to Ukraine as soon as possible due to the challenging living conditions they were facing as refugees. This urgency suggests a longing for stability and a desire to rebuild their lives in their familiar surroundings. Interestingly, only a small number of respondents showed interest in obtaining Polish citizenship or applying for official refugee status. This could be attributed to their view of their displacement as temporary and their goal of returning to Ukraine. A huge portion of the respondents, approximately 16%, did not provide a clear plan for their future, indicating uncertainty or a lack of concrete decisions regarding their next steps. Additionally, a small percentage of respondents chose the "Other" option, suggesting a diverse range of individual circumstances and preferences (Długosz, Kryvachuk, & Izdebska-Długosz, 2022, p. 2). When surveyed about their future plans in Slovakia, a majority of Ukrainian refugees, approximately 65%, expressed their intention to return to Ukraine once the situation improved. Around 21% of respondents did not have clear long-term intentions, suggesting uncertainty or a lack of concrete decisions regarding their future. A smaller percentage, about 9%, stated their intention to remain in Slovakia, possibly seeking better opportunities or stability in the host country. These responses highlight the varied aspirations and considerations of Ukrainian refugees regarding their future in Slovakia (IOM, 2022, p. 4). The survey conducted among Ukrainian refugees in Romania unveiled their diverse plans regarding returning to Ukraine. Almost half of the respondents, around 47%, expressed a strong desire to return to Ukraine as soon as possible, indicating a strong attachment to their home country and a hope for improved conditions. On the other hand, 28% of the refugees stated their intention to remain in Romania for a longer period, possibly due to the stability and opportunities offered by the host country. Interestingly, approximately one-fifth of the refugees expressed their intention to continue migrating to other countries, highlighting their search for better prospects and a willingness to explore different opportunities beyond Romania. These findings reflect the complexity of the refugee situation and the varied aspirations and considerations of Ukrainian refugees in Romania (Zymnin, et al., 2022, p. 16). According to another survey conducted in Hungary, most respondents expressed a desire to stay in Hungary for an indefinite period (44%). Meanwhile, 31% of the respondents reported not knowing how long they wanted to stay in

Hungary, and 15% expressed a desire to stay in Hungary permanently. Only a minority of respondents (10%) reported wanting to stay in Hungary for a fixed period. These findings suggest that a sizeable proportion of Ukrainian refugees in Hungary may have long-term settlement aspirations in the country (HIA, 2022, p. 3).

1.4. Double Standards: Contrasting EU Migration Policies in Past and Present Migration Crises

The principles that form the foundation of the European Union are centred around upholding human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law, and respect for human rights, including those of minorities and migrants (Treaty on European Union, 2008). The EU has an obligation to uphold the principles of human rights and dignity, which includes protecting the rights of refugees who fall under its jurisdiction. According to Article 3 of the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, the EU and its member states must apply the provisions of the convention to all refugees without discrimination based on race, religion, or country of origin (Convention relating to the Status of Refugees , 1951). The EU's position towards Ukrainian refugees has significantly improved compared to that towards previous refugee groups, and this is well-known. For instance, while D. Tusk has suggested that refugees might be held in detention for up to 18 months in 2015 (Traynor, 2015), now Ukrainian refugees are allowed to move freely within the EU without any such restrictions (Schengen Visa Info, 2022). While it has not been officially acknowledged, there are growing concerns that the EU has applied double standards when it comes to refugees.

Countries such as Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and Romania have indeed faced criticism for their perceived anti-migrant sentiment and restrictive migration policies. A notable case that sheds light on Poland's stance is its recent response to the border crossing of migrants from Belarus. In 2021, Poland experienced a surge in migrants attempting to cross the border from Belarus. The treatment of refugees and migrants by Polish border guards during this crisis has been widely condemned. Reports emerged of brutal actions by border guards, resulting in serious injuries for many individuals. Upon their arrival at the Belarusian border, thousands of migrants found themselves stranded in dire conditions, lacking access to necessities like food, shelter, and medical care. Tragically, at least nineteen migrants lost their lives due to the harsh winter temperatures (Tondo, 2022).

Poland's response to the situation was characterized by a focus on border security and deterrence. The government deployed soldiers to the border, erected razor-wire fencing, and initiated the construction of a 186-kilometer wall to prevent asylum seekers from entering the country. Furthermore, legislation was passed to enable the expulsion of anyone who crossed the border irregularly, with provisions prohibiting their re-entry. This recent crisis at the Belarusian border further exacerbated existing concerns regarding the treatment of refugees in Poland. Even prior to the events involving Belarus, refugees faced challenges in being warmly received in the country. Critics argue that Poland's migration policies have been restrictive, and there have been accusations of discriminatory practices and limited support for integration efforts (Bachman, 2016).

The actions taken by Poland in response to the migration crisis from Belarus have sparked debates within the European Union and drawn international attention. Human rights organizations, civil society groups, and some EU member states have expressed strong concerns about the treatment of migrants and refugees, calling for more compassionate and inclusive approaches to migration. The situation at the Belarusian border serves as a stark illustration of the complexities and controversies surrounding migration policies in countries like Poland. It highlights the tension between national security concerns, sovereignty, and the responsibility to protect and uphold human rights obligations. The ongoing discussions and debates surrounding these issues will continue to shape the migration policy landscape in Poland and other countries in the region (Reilly & Flynn, 2022, pp. 2-3). These actions clearly contradicted the fundamental principles on which the EU was founded, and they also constituted a violation of the international convention that the EU has pledged to follow.

Greece has gained notoriety for being a country that is generally perceived as unwelcoming towards migrants. "I was more scared of the Greek police than the military in Syria," recounted a Syrian boy describing the situation at the border. (Amnesty International, 2014, p. 18). The Tragedy of Farmakonisi in which 8 people died due to " Greek coastguards were towing their vessel towards Turkey during a push-back operation" was echoed as an anti-migrant policy of Greece. Two Afghan refugees, Ehsanulla Safi, aged 39, and Sabur Azizi, aged 30, who survived the sinking told Amnesty International what happened that day. They said that Greek coastgurds opened fire upon them and caused death of those people. Even the greek government denied this claim, UNHCR has called for an investigation to the incident. Nils Muiznieks, the Council

of Europe's Commissioner for Human Rights has requested an investigation into the incident which "appears to be a case of a failed collective expulsion'' and the EU Commissioner for Home Affairs has also asked for an independent investigation (Amnesty International, 2014, pp. 15-17).

The mistreatment of migrants was not limited to the period before the Ukrainian war; it also extended to non-Ukrainian migrants who fled the conflict along with Ukrainian refugees, and who had previously been residing in Ukraine. Testimonies from these individuals reveal that both Ukrainian border guards and officials in host countries treated them unfairly and showed preferential treatment to Ukrainian refugees (Kreickenbaum, 2022). According to Francesco Rocca, the president of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, there is no distinction to be made between an individual fleeing the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine and one escaping from the extremist group Boko Haram in Nigeria (Independent, 2022). A student from Kharkiv, Jean-Jacques Kabeya reported experiencing racism from both Ukrainian civilians and soldiers, indicating that the reality on the ground may be different from what is commonly believed. He was told that "You're going to stay here, you're fleeing the war, stay here; you are going to fight with us — you're not leaving, least of all you blacks" (AFP, 2022). The actions in question were denied by EU officials (Rédaction Africanews, 2022), but the tense situation was acknowledged by the United Nations, and Filippo Grandi, the organization's High Commissioner for Refugees, acknowledged the difficult situation faced by refugees. He said: "You have seen reports in the media that there are different treatments – with Ukrainians and non-Ukrainians. Now our observations, and we possibly cannot observe every single post yet – but our observations are that these are not state policies – but there are instances which it has happened" then he added "There has been a different treatment (...). There should be absolutely no discrimination between Ukrainians and non-Ukrainians, Europeans, and non-Europeans. Everyone is fleeing from the same risks" (White, 2022).

In 2021, British Prime Minister B. Johnson, Danish Immigration Minister Tesfaye, and International Development Minister Flemming Møller Mortensen jointly announced their plans to transfer a portion of migrants to Rwanda for the purpose of receiving training, vocational education, and subsequent relocation (Ali, 2021). Bu till now there has been no advancement in this regard. Probably Ukrainian war interrapted this plan. Also "selective solidarity" and "selective hospitality" of the EU became a subject to discussion. According to Yousef M.

Aljamal (2022), the European Union (EU) practices what he refers to as "selective solidarity" when it comes to Palestine and Ukraine. The acceptance of refugees has increasingly been influenced by factors such as race, color, and religion. In one interesting case Ukrainian Deputy Chief Prosecutor David Sakvarelidze expressed his response to the question asked by BBC by stating, "It's very emotional for me because I see European people with blue eyes and blonde hair being killed, children being killed every day by Putin's missiles, helicopters, and rockets (Mehta, 2022)" Ibrahim Kilani offered a different perspective by highlighting that some individuals from Palestine who possess physical similarities to Europeans, such as fair skin and blue eyes, are still being denied acceptance. He further stated that there is a lack of understanding on how to fulfill the criteria set by the European Union regarding physical apperance (Aljamal, 2022). During a live stream from Kyiv, CBS News correspondent Charlie D'Agata commented on the war in Ukraine, saying, "(Ukraine)... isn't a place, with all due respect, like Iraq or Afghanistan, that has seen conflict raging for decades. This is a relatively civilized, relatively European—I have to choose those words carefully, too—city, where you wouldn't expect that or hope that it's going to happen." While D'Agata later apologized for his statement, it serves as a stark reminder that discrimination and racism remain deeply rooted in European society, indicating that overcoming these challenges will not be an easy task.

Chapter Ⅱ. Migration Policy Approaches towards Ukrainian Refugees: Case Studies from Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania

As of March 06, 2023, the UNHCR reports that the number of individuals currently receiving temporary protection is 4,881,590 (UNHCR, 2023). After the war, neighbouring countries found themselves faced with an influx of Ukrainian refugees seeking safety and a better future. The implementation of the Temporary Protection Directive, which grants national governments the discretion to apply equivalent regulations, became crucial in managing this situation. Each country had to determine how to oversee the influx of refugees within their borders.

Among the neighbouring EU states, Poland emerged as the country accommodating the largest number of Ukrainian refugees compared to others (Table 1). However, it is important to note that not all refugees chose to apply for temporary protection in their first host country. Many opted to continue their journey and apply for protection in their desired destination countries,

such as Germany and Sweden. In certain countries, like Poland, some refugees may choose to live independently instead of seeking temporary protection in designated centres. This is especially true if they have relatives or their own accommodations. These refugees may feel more comfortable and supported by their existing networks, allowing them to establish themselves more quickly in their unfamiliar environment. The decision to live independently can present both benefits and challenges. On the positive side, refugees who choose to live independently may have a stronger sense of autonomy and self-sufficiency. They can rely on their own resources and establish a more stable life, potentially contributing to the local economy and society. Additionally, living with relatives or in their own accommodations can provide a sense of familiarity and a smoother transition into the new country. However, there are also potential drawbacks to this approach. Refugees living independently might face additional challenges in accessing social support systems and integration programs provided by the government or NGOs. They might have limited access to language courses, employment opportunities, and healthcare services, which can hinder their integration process.

The implementation of the Temporary Protection Directive provides national governments with the flexibility to manage the influx of refugees according to their specific circumstances. The decision of Ukrainian refugees to apply for protection in their first host country or continue their journey to other destination countries, coupled with the choice to live independently or seek temporary protection in designated centers, highlights the complex nature of the refugee situation. It is crucial for governments and relevant organizations to adapt their policies and support systems to ensure the successful integration and well-being of these refugees, regardless of their chosen path.

Table 1 provides data on the number of Ukrainian refugees hosted by various neighboring EU countries on March 6, 2022. The influx of refugees has had a significant impact on these countries, causing disruptions in different aspects of their societies and systems. Poland, in particular, has accommodated the largest number of refugees compared to other neighboring countries. However, it's worth noting that not all refugees chose to apply for temporary protection in their first host country. Some opted to continue their journey and seek protection in countries like Germany and Sweden, which are often popular destinations for refugees.

Table 1.Number of refugees in distinct categories in neighbouring countries

Country	Date	Ukrainian refugees registered for TPD or similar national protection schemes	Number of Ukrainian refugees in country	Border crossing from Ukraine
Poland	14.02.2023	1563386	1563386	9604232
Romania	12.02.2023	113086	109871	1967211
Slovakia	14.02.2023	108985	109185	1162862
Hungary	14.02.2023	34248	34248	2215943

Source: Operational Data Portal, Ukraine Refugee Situation

Dobias and Homem (2022) contend that refugees who cross into Poland and Czechia exhibit a preference for extended stays while awaiting safe return, in contrast to those who cross into Hungary, Slovakia, and Romania, who tend to use these countries as transfer points before moving on to other destinations. The migration patterns observed suggest that cultural proximity and economic benefits play significant roles in the decision-making process of migrants (European Committee of the Regions, 2022, p. 7). These findings underscore the importance of carefully analysing and understanding the several factors that influence the migration behaviour of refugees in the European context.

2.1. Poland's Response to Ukrainian Refugee Influx

As of November 15, 2022, it is noteworthy that a majority of forced migrants, comprising 50.6% of the total migrants, have reportedly been residing in Germany or Poland (UNDP, 2023). When it comes to Poland, there are additional factors to consider, such as the historical and cultural ties between Ukrainian and Polish people that date back in time. These factors are undeniable, and they play a significant role in why many Ukrainians choose to remain in Poland rather than moving to Western countries. The situation in Poland regarding the influx of migrants is delicate, particularly with the continued arrival of people from Ukraine. Even before the current conflict, there was already a significant Ukrainian community in the country, which may explain why many migrants choose to come here. Presently, Poland has been receiving a regular weekly influx of just over 20,000 migrants. However, the circumstances were distinct during the 2014 invasion of Crimea. While numerous Ukrainians were compelled to flee the Crimean Peninsula, many relocated to other regions within Ukraine. Nonetheless, it is approximated that approximately 60,000 to 100,000 individuals were displaced, and a portion

of them sought refuge in the European Union. Germany received 2,400 applications for residency, but only approved 20 Ukrainian migrants in 2014. Similarly, Poland followed a similar course, granting shelter to 930 Ukrainians through rigorous judicial rulings. Célia Le Noé (2022) attempted to clarify the differing response of Poland and other EU countries to the conflicts in 2014 and 2022. The distinction lies in the current situation where the entire territory of Ukraine is under attack from Russia, leaving no safe haven for Ukrainians seeking shelter from the Eastern oblasts. Disturbing reports indicate that the Russian army is engaged in combat within Kyiv and targeting the western oblasts with missiles and naval bombardment. As a result, the European Union made the decision to open its borders to Ukrainians, recognizing the urgent need for refuge. In some cases, even COVID-19 restrictions were relaxed to facilitate the swift movement of refugees (Noé, 2022).

The survey conducted by Długosz et al. (2022) among Ukrainian refugees yielded a table of results, which outlines the assorted reasons why Poland is the preferred migration destination for these individuals (Table 2).

Table 2.Why Poland?

Reasons for Choosing Poland as a Migration Destination for Ukrainian Refugees	Amount of people that answered
Family or friends in Poland	44 %
Similar culture and language to Ukraine	42 %
Quick and easy to move between Poland and Ukraine	25 %
Proven aid provided to Ukrainians in Poland	20 %
Perception of safety due to Poland being a NATO member	15 %
Easy to cross the border	13 %
Convenient road and railway connections between Poland and Ukraine	9 %
Considering moving to Poland before the war	4 %
Previously worked in Poland	4 %

Source: (Długosz, Kryvachuk, & Izdebska-Długosz, 2022, pp. 2-3)

As seen from the table slightly under the half of refugees chose Poland due to family ties. The country has implemented "The Special Act of 12 March 2022", which helps and special protection status to Ukrainian nationals and their non-Ukrainian spouse and family members who have fled because of the ongoing conflict (Kancelaria Sejmu, 2022). The Act specifically targeted Ukrainian residents who arrived in Poland after the outbreak of the 2022 war,

excluding those who were already residing in the country prior to the conflict. It is estimated that there were approximately 1.3-1.5 million Ukrainians living in Poland before the war erupted. Poland has consistently found itself in a unique position when it comes to accepting refugees. As a former socialist country, it did not experience the same economic boom as other European Union members. Additionally, Poland joined the EU at a later stage, which meant that it attracted European investment later on. Consequently, the majority of migrants in Poland come from neighboring countries, particularly Belarus, Russia, Ukraine, and more recently, Asian countries. Due to the unique circumstances and close proximity of neighboring countries, Poland has implemented distinct migration policies towards them. For instance, an agreement called the Agreement on Local Border Traffic between Poland and Ukraine allows individuals living within a 30-kilometer radius from the Polish border to cross without a visa since 2009. Instead, they require local permission to enter Poland multiple times. A similar rule was also applied to Russia; however, it was terminated in 2017, indicating a change in policy regarding Russian migrants (Adamczyk, Trojanowska-Strzęboszewska, Kowalewska, & Bartłomiejski, 2022, pp. 4-5). It became evident that the previous ties between Poland and Ukraine allowed a significant number of Ukrainians to cross into Poland. The majority of these migrants concentrated in major cities. The Union of Polish Metropolises utilized accumulated data from the GSM signals of Ukrainian migrants to assess their concentration areas. The research found that the estimated Ukrainian population residing in Poland was 3.2 million in March 2022, accounting for 8% of the total population. By April 2022, this number rose to 3.85 million (9%), but then decreased to 3.37 million (8%) in May 2022. Most of them were in Warsaw, Krakow, or Wrocław (Górny & Kaczmarczyk, 2023, pp. 3-4).

Legislation has been implemented to address the needs of vulnerable migrant groups. Warsaw in Poland accommodated majority of the total number of registered refugees in the country between mid-March and the end of May 2022 (Duszczyk, 2022). Most of these refugees were women of working age, and the government and NGOs are working to manage the influx of refugees. Volunteers are playing a vital role in assisting refugees by providing accommodation and helping them relocate to other cities within Poland (Kozlowska, 2022). The survey conducted in Poland offered insights into the housing circumstances of refugees, uncovering that most of them either rent their own apartments or have their rental expenses covered by someone else. It appears that the level of government involvement in this aspect is relatively minimal. This implies that refugees in Poland primarily rely on their own resources or support

from private individuals or organizations to secure housing (Długosz, Kryvachuk, & Izdebska-Długosz, 2022, p. 2).

The findings suggest that the responsibility for providing direct housing assistance to refugees in Poland may not lie heavily on the government. Instead, it seems to be borne by the refugees themselves or other external parties. This could be attributed to numerous factors such as limited resources, policy priorities, or the prevailing approach to refugee integration in the country. Renting their own apartments indicates that refugees in Poland can access the private rental market and navigate the housing system independently. It reflects their capacity to contribute financially and engage in the local housing market. Alternatively, having someone else cover their rental expenses highlights the existence of support networks or sponsorship arrangements within the refugee community or with host individuals or organizations.

The limited involvement of the government in providing housing assistance to refugees in Poland could be seen as both a challenge and an opportunity. On one hand, it may place additional burdens on refugees who may already face various challenges in their integration process. It could potentially lead to housing insecurity or inadequate living conditions if refugees struggle to find suitable and affordable housing on their own. On the other hand, the reliance on private resources and networks may foster community engagement and self-sufficiency among refugees. It may encourage the development of informal support networks and connections within the host society. Additionally, this approach could free up government resources to focus on other areas of refugee support and integration, such as language acquisition, employment opportunities, and access to education and healthcare. The information regarding the accommodation preferences of refugees is presented in the following table.

Table 3. Accommodating refugees

Accommodation Type	Percentage of Respondents
Renting apartments/houses	28%
Living in places with free rent	16%
Living with Polish families	17%
Living with Ukrainian relatives	12%
Accommodation provided by Poles	11%
Free accommodation in lodging houses	8%
Living in local clinics, etc.	3%

Sleeping in gyms or market halls	<1%

Source: (Długosz, Kryvachuk, & Izdebska-Długosz, 2022, p. 2)

The government of Warsaw has implemented various measures to support new arrivals, ensuring their smooth integration into society. These initiatives include provisions such as free public transportation, access to kindergarten, school, and hospital services, as well as the availability of psychological and legal assistance and interpretation services. To further facilitate assistance to refugees, the government has established a dedicated platform known as the "Warsaw 19115 City Contact Centre for Refugee Assistance." This platform serves as a centralized resource, providing comprehensive information and support to refugees. It offers valuable guidance on migrants' rights, emergency hotlines, procedures for obtaining necessary services, and other essential information related to refugee assistance. Through these efforts, the government aims to ensure that refugees receive the necessary aid and information to effectively navigate their new lives in Warsaw. (Secretariat General of the Committee of the Regions, 2022, p. 19)

Refugee children often encounter difficulties in accessing education, primarily due to language barriers and limited resources. Recognizing this challenge, the government takes measures to support refugee children in their educational pursuits. These include providing language instruction tailored to their needs, ensuring access to school supplies and textbooks, and offering online learning programs. As a significant portion of the refugee population consists of children, with approximately half falling into this category, addressing their educational needs becomes crucial. Despite the obstacles they may face, the government is committed to ensuring equal opportunities for all. In line with this commitment, the Special Act in Poland guarantees equal job rights to Ukrainian citizens, including those seeking refuge, thus creating employment opportunities for Ukrainian refugees. By offering support in education and employment, the government strives to enable refugees to rebuild their lives and contribute positively to their new communities (Arnt, 2022). The Service Point for Ukrainian Citizens offers translation services and job registration assistance, and "WorkSpace – Ukraine" provides office equipment and services to refugees seeking employment (European Committee of the Regions, 2022, p. 35). These measures aim to overcome language barriers that Ukrainian refugees may face while seeking employment in Poland.

Despite the significant support extended to refugees and the generally welcoming attitude of Polish citizens, it is unfortunate that instances of hate speech, discrimination, and bullying towards refugees do occur. False information circulating on the internet plays a detrimental role in exacerbating these issues. Some of this false information wrongly portrays refugees as being privileged compared to Polish citizens or implies that Ukrainian refugees are responsible for crimes in Poland. Additionally, false narratives may target non-European refugees or promote racist behaviours against refugees in general. An investigation conducted by Demagog, a Polish fact-checking project, has uncovered links between the spreaders of such false information on social media and the internet and Russian-affiliated domains. This suggests a deliberate effort to propagate misinformation and influence public opinion. These actions contribute to further division and hostility towards refugees in Poland (Demagog, 2022). In addition to the examples mentioned earlier, there have been instances of false information circulating that make various claims about special treatment provided to refugees in Poland. Some of these false claims include:

1. Refugees obtaining a PESEL identification number: False information suggests that refugees receive a PESEL number, which is a unique identification number assigned to Polish citizens and permanent residents. This claim falsely implies that refugees are granted the same legal status as Polish citizens.

2. Access to free flats intended for Poles: False narratives suggest that refugees receive free housing that is designated for Polish citizens. This misrepresentation creates a perception of preferential treatment for refugees in terms of housing allocation.

3. Access to free medical care and education funded by Polish citizens: Misinformation asserts that refugees have unrestricted access to free healthcare and education, with the implication that these services are solely funded by Polish citizens. This claim misrepresents the reality of the funding and support systems in place for refugee assistance.

4. Free travel on selected highways, trains, public transport, and free prepaid phones: False information suggests that refugees enjoy free travel privileges on certain transportation networks, including highways, trains, and public transport. Additionally, it falsely claims that they are provided with free prepaid mobile phones. These claims create a perception of excessive benefits for refugees that is not based on factual information (European Digital Media Observatory, 2022).

2.2. Navigating Slovakia's Complex Policies and Attitudes Towards Ukrainian Refugees

As an EU member state, Slovakia is obliged to adhere to the regulations set by the European Union concerning the treatment of Ukrainian nationals residing within its borders. However, the Slovakian government has the authority to determine how these regulations are implemented. It is worth noting that individuals who plan to stay in Slovakia for a brief period and then travel to another country are allowed to do so without a visa, given that they possess a biometric passport. In exceptional cases, the Ministry of Interior has the discretion to grant entry to individuals who do not possess a valid travel document or visa. Such cases are assessed individually, taking into consideration the specific circumstances of the person involved. However, if someone intends to stay in Slovakia for a longer period, there are several options available. These include obtaining a residence permit, applying for TPD, applying for asylum, or seeking subsidiary protection. These various pathways provide individuals with different legal statuses and rights, depending on their specific circumstances and the nature of their stay in Slovakia. It is important for individuals to familiarize themselves with the relevant procedures and requirements to make informed decisions and ensure compliance with Slovakian immigration regulations (Valentová & Ondrušková, 2022). The easiest option for individuals escaping the conflict in Ukraine to receive protection in Slovakia is through temporary protection, which does not involve complicated bureaucratic procedures. This type of protection enables Ukrainian citizens to promptly access the labor market, healthcare, and education for their children, without any limitations. The application process for temporary protection is relatively fast, and if approved, the individual will receive a tolerated stay document marked 'Odídenec'[3] or 'Dočasné útočisko.'[4] Ukrainian refugees can apply for asylum in Slovakia and can also be granted a residence permit. However, the option of subsidiary protection is only available if there is a perceived serious threat to the individual if they were to return to their home country (Valentová & Ondrušková, 2022).

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[3] Displaced person

[4] Temporary refugee

According to the report of Commission for Citizenship, Governance, Institutional and External Affairs on "EU cities and regions welcoming Ukrainian refugees – mapping multilevel coordination" (2022) the primary border crossings between Slovakia and Ukraine are situated in the eastern regions of Prešov and Košice. Košice, one of Slovakia's eight self-governing regions, has a population of approximately 782,000 people and contains the Vyšné Germané, Veľké Slamence, and Čierna nad Tisou border crossings (European Committee of the Regions, 2022). Between March 9 and April 21, 2022, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) conducted 481 interviews with Ukrainian refugees and third-country nationals in Slovakia. These individuals (third-country nationals) represented only 1% of the total refugee population in the country and primarily originated from Uzbekistan and Algeria. The objective of the interviews was to assess their displacement patterns, needs, and intentions. The interviews were conducted at various locations, including two Border Crossing Points in Vyšné Německé and Ub'la, as well as the Michalovce Registration Centre, Gabčíkovo Reception Centre, and Červená Hvězda Hotspot in Košice. These sites are significant entry points and registration centres for refugees and migrants arriving in Slovakia. Most refugees interviewed were from eastern regions of Ukraine, with notable percentages from Kharkiv (22%), Donetsk (15%), Dnipropetrovsk (11%), and Kyiv (20%). These individuals were likely forced to flee due to conflict, economic challenges, or other factors affecting their safety and well-being. Regarding their intended duration of stay in Slovakia, 58% of those interviewed expressed uncertainty about how long they planned to remain in the country. Around 30% indicated their intention to stay for less than a month, suggesting a temporary or transit nature of their presence. However, 8% of respondents expressed their intention to stay in Slovakia for more than three months, indicating a desire for a longer-term settlement (IOM, 2022, p. 4). Understanding the displacement patterns, needs, and intentions of refugees and migrants is crucial for authorities and organizations involved in managing their reception, assistance, and integration. This data provides insights into the specific challenges and requirements of the interviewed population, facilitating the development of targeted support programs and policies.

In the survey, most respondents expressed their intention to settle in Slovakia as their destination country. However, a noteworthy percentage of respondents also indicated their desire to move to other European countries as well as non-European countries. Among those who specified their destination country, Germany emerged as the most reported choice, followed by Czechia, Italy, and Poland. Reasons for selecting these countries as final

destinations varied, with family reunification and pre-existing accommodation being prominent factors influencing the decision. Some respondents also mentioned other countries as their intended final destinations, including Australia and various European nations. This data indicates a diverse range of preferences and aspirations among the respondents, with varied factors and personal circumstances guiding their choices. It underscores the dynamic nature of migration patterns and the importance of considering individual motivations and opportunities when studying migration trends. The table below depicts more precious data.

Table 4. Destination of refugees in Slovakia

Intended Final Destination	percentage
Slovakia	57%
Other country in Europe	18%
Other countries	15%
Germany	37%
Czechia	24%
Italy	7%
Poland	7%
Australia	5%
Other European countries	<5%

Source: IOM survey 2022

Slovakia has been on of the first countries to andress this war immediately and put several regulations into force and activated Act No. 55/2022 and in § 29, paragraph 2 reads as follows: "The government in accordance with the decision of the Council of the European Union shall declare the provision of temporary refuge and at the same time determine the beginning, conditions and termination of the provision of temporary refuge and set aside funds to cover the costs associated with the provision of temporary refuge; the government may declare the provision for temporary refuge, even without a decision of the Council of the European Union" (The National Council of Slovak Republic, 2022).The aformentioned report says that, it is possible for third-country citizens to experience a lack of parity with other citizens regarding rights, while the implementation of the TPD exhibits similarities to that of other countries albeit with distinguishing features. Notably, adult refugees are eligible to receive a governmental disbursement of eight euros per person and four euros per child, in addition to receiving meal rations from the government. Furthermore, migrants have the option of applying for the material

need program, where they are granted equitable treatment to Slovak citizens, and intriguingly, they do not forfeit this privilege should they secure employment later on. Children are also afforded the right to attend kindergarten. Private individuals who offer housing to new arrivals in apartments, guesthouses, hotels, or charitable accommodations can receive an allowance. The allowance amount is 105 EUR per month for accommodating a child and 210 EUR per month for accommodating an adult. The municipalities in charge of the area where the housing is provided will distribute the allowance payments (European Website for Integration, 2022).

At border crossing points, transportation from the border to temporary residency is arranged for Ukrainian citizens. They are granted free travel on trains and suburban buses to facilitate their journey. Furthermore, healthcare services are available, although individuals who are merely passing through Slovakia on their way to another country are only entitled to emergency medical care. Those who have settled in Slovakia can access cost-free healthcare by obtaining a prescription from a Slovak doctor. Temporary protection beneficiaries in Slovakia have the right to access employment opportunities on equal terms with Slovakian citizens, except for public service positions. However, the language barrier poses a significant obstacle to labour market integration. Efforts are being made to address this challenge, with organizations like the International Organization for Migration (IOM) providing targeted language instruction to help alleviate the language barrier and facilitate integration into the labour market.

Furthermore, the quality of life for refugees is significantly dependent on the host country. Even if the government is inclined to accept refugees for political reasons, the sentiments of the local population may differ. Therefore, understanding the stance of the Slovak people is crucial for gaining a comprehensive understanding of the situation in Slovakia. The ethnic composition of the Slovak Republic is predominantly composed of Slovaks (83.8%), along with other European nationalities such as Czechs (0.5%), Hungarians (7.7%), Ukrainians (0.2%), and various others (Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic, 2021). According to data of 2021 "377 asylum applications by refugees were received in 2021 in Slovakia — according to UNHCR. Most of them came from Morocco, Afghanistan and from Algeria. A total of 147 decisions have been made on initial applications. Around 21% of them were answered positively. 79 % of asylum applications have been rejected in the first instance. The most successful have been the applications of refugees from Iran and from Yemen (WorldData, 2021)." According to the available data for 2023, Slovakia is hosting approximately 109,000 Ukrainian refugees

(UNHCR, 2023). Comparing the data from different years can indeed provide insights into how the stance towards refugees has evolved over time. In this case, it appears that there has been a significant shift in the Slovak government's approach to accepting refugees, particularly in the context of Ukrainian refugees. While the government may have been sceptical about accepting refugees in general, the situation with Ukrainian refugees seems to have prompted a more favourable response. This change in stance could be influenced by numerous factors, such as the proximity of Ukraine to Slovakia, historical ties between the two countries, or specific political considerations. According to a research done by the Slovak Academy of Sciences (2022) the war in Ukraine changed minds of Slovak People and it ads " Slovaks are much more compassionate and willing to open borders to people in danger, with whom they share a common history, geographical space and values (Slovak Academy of Sciences, 2022)." May be this quote can explain why previous refugees from especially from Morocco , Afghanistan and other Middle East countries were not answered positivly. Magdalena Adamus a researcher in the Academy who contrubuted to this research said that attitudes towards migrants and refugees remained largely unchanged, with persistent levels of xenophobia and anti-immigration views. Surprisingly, there was no significant shift in these attitudes compared to the previous year. However, one notable change was observed: the usual relationship between negative attitudes towards migrants and a preference for an exclusive migration policy weakened during the war. This suggests that the ongoing conflict had an impact on people's perceptions and the association between negative attitudes and acceptance of migrants became less pronounced (Slovak Academy of Sciences, 2022). It can be inferred that the decisions of the Slovak government regarding refugees are influenced by public opinion. In the past, when the general sentiment was not favorable towards accepting non-European refugees, the government opted to do so. However, in the current situation, where there is sympathy towards war-affected Ukrainians, both the public and the government are more inclined to provide assistance and accept them as refugees. However, it is important to note that despite the increased positive attitude towards refugees, this sentiment is shared by only 42% of the total population. This percentage is the lowest among the Visegrád Group (V4) countries.

2.3.   Humanitarian Assistance and Romania's Support for Ukrainian Migrants

Romania has played a welcoming role for Ukrainian refugees, and their processing begins at the border, where registration takes place and documents are verified. Those holding biometric

passports have the freedom to move within the European Union without restrictions. However, due to limitations on Ukrainian males aged between 18-60 leaving the country, most refugees entering Romania are women, children, and the elderly. With a considerable number of migrants entering Maramureș County, the local authorities have taken initiative-taking measures to address the situation. A Crisis Management Working Group has been established to effectively manage the influx. The local authorities have collaborated with various local and international non-governmental organizations, as well as United Nations agencies such as UNICEF, the Red Cross, and the Romanian Child Protection Institution. Together, they have set up an integrated assistance and support centre for refugees and their children at the Sighetu Marmatiei border point. This facility, known as the "Blue Dot," is the first of its kind to be established at the Romania-Ukraine border. The "Blue Dot" facility serves as a comprehensive resource centre, aiding and support to refugees during their stay. It offers numerous services and resources to meet the needs of refugees and their children, ensuring their well-being and facilitating their integration into the local community. The collaborative efforts between local authorities and international organizations demonstrate a commitment to providing effective support and assistance to the refugees entering Romania (Sprijin de urgență, 2023). According to IOM Romania, if an individual has no valid passport still, they are elgible to apply to asylum only either at border or with the presence of authorities. And the government cancelled Covid 19 requirement for them. Regarding the third country nationals they need a visa to enter the country on arrival if they enter directly from Ukraine but if they come through Moldova, they must obtain visa in Romanian consulates in Moldova. Children if are accompanied by their one parent still they are allowed to enter even without another pair's notarized declaration. If he or she is over fourteen they can apply to asylum on their own (International organization for Migration, 2022).

The accommodation process for Ukrainian refugees in Romania has been streamlined, with a combination of individuals, government agencies, and NGOs taking the lead in providing accommodations. Those offering to accommodate Ukrainians are required to report this arrangement within three days and may be eligible for reimbursement of their food expenses. Financial assistance is also available to individuals and legal entities who provide accommodation, with a daily allowance of €4 per person for food expenses and €10 per person for accommodation costs. This serves as an incentive to encourage support for Ukrainian refugees in need. In addition to accommodation, transportation support is also being provided.

Flixbus, a transportation company, has launched a program called "Help Ukraine Ticket" to facilitate the travel of individuals fleeing from Ukraine. This program offers a means for refugees to travel more easily, ensuring their safe transportation to Romania and other destinations. (Flixbus, 2022). These efforts reflect a collaborative approach involving various stakeholders to address the needs of Ukrainian refugees in Romania. By simplifying the accommodation process, providing financial assistance, and offering transportation support, Romania aims to provide a supportive environment for those seeking refuge from Ukraine.

In a recent investigation conducted by Zymnin et al. (2022) in collaboration with the Centre for East European Studies at the University of Warsaw, the EWL Migration Platform, notable insights were unveiled regarding the Ukrainian refugee population in Romania. The study revealed that the largest refugee group, comprising 37% of respondents, originated from the northern region of Ukraine, while 32% came from the southern region that shares a border with Romania. This distribution differed from the patterns observed in Poland and the Czech Republic, where the refugee populations showed distinct characteristics. Notably, the refugees surveyed in Romania expressed that their choice of Romania as their destination was influenced by the country's membership in NATO. A significant majority, 64% of respondents, indicated this as a contributing factor in their decision to seek refuge in Romania. This finding highlights the geopolitical considerations that shape migration patterns and underscores the perceived stability and security offered by Romania's NATO membership. (Zymnin, et al., 2022, p. 16). The survey results provided valuable information about the demographics and familial connections of the Ukrainian refugees who participated in the study. The findings indicate that most of the refugees were women, comprising 96.5% of the total respondents, while men accounted for 3.2%, and a small percentage, 0.3%, refused to answer. This gender disparity suggests that there may have been specific factors or circumstances that led to a higher proportion of women seeking refuge in neighbouring countries. The average age of the participants was 40%, which implies that younger male refugees might have been drafted into the military or involved in the conflict. This could explain the lower representation of younger men among the surveyed population. The male refugees who arrived in Romania, on the other hand, are likely to be either disabled or elderly individuals who may have faced greater challenges in their journey or decided to seek safety and support in Romania due to distinct reasons.

Regarding family dynamics, half of the surveyed refugees arrived with at least one child, indicating the presence of families among the displaced population. Additionally, 15% of the respondents arrived with two children, further highlighting the sizeable number of families seeking refuge in neighbouring countries. The presence of children underscores the need for specific support systems and resources to ensure their well-being and integration into the host communities.

Interestingly, the survey found that a considerable percentage, 78%, of the refugees reported having family members still residing in Ukraine. This suggests that there are ongoing family connections and ties to their home country. It is noteworthy that more than half of the respondents, 51%, expressed the desire to join their family members in Ukraine in the future. This desire for family reunification underscores the importance of considering family unity and ensuring opportunities for safe and legal reunification processes in the future. Moreover, 10% of the total refugees identified themselves as being of Romanian descent. This indicates that a portion of the surveyed population had ancestral ties or Romanian heritage, which might have influenced their decision to seek refuge in Romania specifically. Understanding the specific needs and cultural background of these individuals can assist in providing targeted support and facilitating their integration into the host country (Zymnin, et al., 2022, pp. 4-5). The table shows the responses of Ukrainian refugees in Romania regarding the factors that influenced their choice to stay in Romania during the war.

Table 5.What had the greatest influence on your choice of the Czech Republic as a country to stay in during the war?

Reason for Choosing Romania	Percentage of Respondents
Romania is a member of NATO	64%
Romania is the closest cultural neighbor of Ukraine	23%
It is easier to get to other Western countries from Romania	22%
Information that Romania has many facilities for refugees from Ukraine (reception points, free transport, emergency assistance)	20%
Romania is relatively far from Russia	17%
Romanians are friendly towards Ukrainian citizens	14%
I have friends and acquaintances in Romania	13%
It is easier to find a job in Romania	10%
Information that many citizens of Ukraine work in Romania	9%

I had no choice	8%
I have family in Romania	7%
I have worked in Romania before	3%
Our languages are similar	2%

Source: Ukrainian Refugees In Poland, The Czech Republic And Romania

According to the survey (2022) conducted among Ukrainian refugees, it was found that a significant percentage of respondents had clear preferences for their desired destination. Among the respondents, 16% expressed a preference for Germany, indicating a fervent desire to seek refuge and build a new life in the country. This choice could be influenced by factors such as Germany's reputation for providing robust support systems for refugees, employment opportunities, and a welcoming environment.

Surprisingly, 8% of the respondents chose Moldova as their preferred destination. Moldova, being a neighbouring country, may have been seen as a relatively accessible option for these refugees. It is worth noting that Moldova itself faces various socio-economic challenges, and the reasons behind this preference might vary among the respondents. Some may have had family ties or connections to Moldova, while others may have considered it a more familiar cultural and linguistic environment.

Another notable preference expressed by 6% of the respondents was the United Kingdom. This choice might be linked to historical ties between Ukraine and the UK, or perceptions of better opportunities and support available in the country. However, it is important to mention that the UK's immigration policies and the practicalities of reaching the country might pose challenges for refugees seeking asylum there. Interestingly, the survey also revealed that 17% of the respondents had previously worked in Romania before the war. This suggests that they had established connections and possibly had some level of familiarity with the country. It is possible that these respondents considered returning to Romania as a viable option, possibly due to existing social networks and potential employment prospects.

Moreover, most of the respondents, 59%, indicated that they had no intention of seeking work and only intended to apply for refugee asylum. This indicates that their primary focus was on finding safety and stability rather than immediate employment opportunities. This choice might be driven by the urgency of the refugee situation and the need for protection from the aftermath of the war (Zymnin, et al., 2022, pp. 8-10).

2.4. Public Perception and Political Discourse: Hungary's Response to Ukrainian Migrants

Hungary has been a topic of frequent discussion in the news due to its stringent stance against EU migration policies and its efforts to keep migrants out. Nontheless, Beregsurany, a town known for its anti-migrant views, recently welcomed Ukrainian refugees. The mayor, Istvan Herka, stated that the war had profoundly affected them, as they knew the people who were fleeing (Coakley, 2022). However, Hungary's government continues to refuse refugees from other parts of the world, leading to ongoing debate and controversy. In his speech, the Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban expressed sympathy for refugees, affirming that "nobody will be left uncared for." Nevertheless, in the same speech, he announced plans to assist in the resettlement of Ukrainian refugees and forcibly return refugees from "third countries" such as India and Nigeria, regardless of their wishes to return home or not (O'Brien, 2022). the Hungarian government's selective acceptance of refugees from certain regions while rejecting others, regardless of the reasons for their displacement, raises ethical concerns about the unequal treatment of refugees. The Prime Minister's assurance that "nobody will be left uncared for" is at odds with his plans to forcibly repatriate refugees from third countries, regardless of their wishes. Moreover, the thorough border checks imposed on Ukrainian refugees suggest that Hungary's immigration policies remain stringent, even for those it welcomes. It is indeed accurate that even Ukrainian refugees have been subjected to Hungary's strict immigration policies, including thorough screening at the border (Anews, 2022).

According to the survey conducted by the Centre for Democracy & Resilience in 2022, a significant majority of respondents, approximately 82%, expressed a positive view of Hungary's decision to provide refuge to Ukrainian nationals. This indicates a general sentiment of support and empathy towards those seeking safety and protection. However, despite this overall agreement, around 65% of respondents admitted that they had not personally offered any assistance to refugees. This percentage is the highest among the Visegrad Group (V4) countries, suggesting a potential gap between the positive attitudes expressed and the actual engagement in providing support.

The survey findings highlight the perception that it is primarily the responsibility of the government to provide support to Ukrainian refugees, with about 54% of respondents suggesting that the current level of support should be maintained. This sentiment may stem

from the belief that government institutions are better equipped to manage the complexities of refugee integration and ensure a fair distribution of resources.

Interestingly, a narrow majority of 50% of respondents expressed the view that allowing Ukrainian refugees to take jobs that are not desired by others would not be beneficial for society. This perspective reveals some concerns about the potential impact on the labour market and competition for employment opportunities. To address this concern, it is crucial to highlight the economic benefits that refugees can bring to the host society. Studies have shown that refugees often fill labour market gaps and contribute to economic growth through their skills, entrepreneurship, and productivity. Efforts to educate the public about the positive contributions of refugees and the potential benefits for society can help dispel misconceptions and promote a more inclusive view. In terms of perceptions of behaviour and safety, the survey indicated positive trends. A large majority of respondents, approximately 86%, reported not observing any inappropriate behaviour from Ukrainian refugees. This finding reflects the peaceful coexistence and respectful integration of Ukrainian refugees within Hungarian communities.

Furthermore, about 81% of respondents stated that they did not feel less safe with the presence of Ukrainian refugees in Hungary, suggesting a general sense of security and absence of significant concerns. This demonstrates that the fears and stereotypes often associated with refugee populations are not necessarily reflected in the actual experiences of the local population.

Additionally, nearly 88% of respondents claimed that they had not experienced any significant changes in their lives due to the arrival of Ukrainian refugees in Hungary. This indicates that the presence of refugees has not had a substantial impact on the daily lives of most respondents, emphasizing the importance of effective integration policies that promote social cohesion and minimize disruptions (Szicherle, Kazaz, & Centre for Democracy & Resilience, 2022, p. 4). To foster positive perceptions and ensure successful integration, it is crucial for the government and relevant stakeholders to continue implementing comprehensive integration programs that address language learning, education, employment, and social support for refugees. Building bridges between communities and fostering intercultural dialogue can contribute to a more inclusive and harmonious society.

Despite the compassion and support shown by some Hungarian communities towards Ukrainian refugees, Hungary's government's overall approach to immigration and refugee issues has faced widespread criticism. It is challenging to determine an accurate number of Ukrainian refugees due to the lack of registration, and diverse sources such as the UNCHR, the Government, and The Helsinki Committee have provided varying figures. There are five points where Hungary and Ukraine intersect, which are Dzvinkove, Kosino, Luzhanka, Tiszabecs, and Tysa (Acaps, 2022, p. 1). According to Vaskor Máté (2022), the Hungarian government claims that over 1.3 million Ukrainian refugees have entered Hungary through Romania till June 2022, even though they have implemented rigorous immigration policies at their borders (Máté, 2022).

As of June 7th, 2022, 24,231 Ukrainian citizens have applied for provisional protection in Hungary, of which 16,188 have been approved (Operational Data Portal, 2022, p. 1). However, the Hungarian Helsinki Committee has pointed out that the number of Ukrainian refugees registered for temporary protection in EU countries exceeds 3.2 million, meaning Hungary's efforts to participate in the EU's refugee assistance program are less than 1%. It is estimated that up to 100,000 Ukrainian refugees, including those with dual Hungarian citizenship, may be residing in Hungary. According to the Hungarian Helsinki Committee, migrants with a "provisional protection" status, known as "menedékes status," can receive financial assistance of 22,800 HUF (55 euros) for adults and 13,700 HUF (33 euros) for children (European Committee of the Regions, 2022, pp. 17-19; Rédl, Sarkadi, & Zubor, 2022).It's worth noting that this status is different from that of refugees and is granted through a less complicated procedure. To apply for this status, individuals must submit their application in person to the immigration authority, which is the National Immigration Directorate (NID). When applying for "provisional protection" status in Hungary, individuals must inform the authorities if they have a place to stay, such as with family or friends, or require assistance with accommodation. Medical care is provided regardless of where they are staying. The cost of translating personal documents, such as birth and marriage certificates, is covered by the NID upon request. However, employment is not permitted during the application process.

Children in Hungary are eligible for a range of benefits and support services when it comes to education. They have access to free education, including preschool and nursery programs. Additionally, for a period of six months, children can receive free meals, ensuring their nutritional needs are met. When it comes to transportation, discounts are available for children

holding the necessary certificate. Ukrainian refugees can travel for free or at a reduced cost on Hungarian trains and public transport, provided they have a valid Ukrainian passport, identity card, or residence permit. Once refugees obtain the status of "menedékes" (refugee), they are entitled to countless benefits. These benefits include accommodation, meals, medical care, employment opportunities, translation services, and support for their children's education. This encompasses access to preschool and nursery placement, ensuring young children receive appropriate care and education. Additionally, they can continue to receive free meals during this period. Furthermore, refugees are eligible for travel discounts, allowing them to navigate the country more affordably. In cases where families are separated due to the migration process, family reunification is possible if the migrant has relatives in another EU member state who have received provisional protection. To receive the living allowance, refugees must register with the employment department at the district office and actively seek employment. This emphasizes the importance of self-sufficiency and integration into the labour market. The living allowance aims to support refugees financially during their integration process (Hungarin Helsinki Committee, 2022).

The Centre for Democracy & Resilience in Bratislava conducted a survey in 2022 in the V4 countries, which included questions for Hungarian citizens regarding the Ukrainian refugees to understand their stance. A table has been provided below, which shows the detailed answers to the questions asked in the survey.

Table 6. Survey among Hungarian citizens regarding Ukrainian refugees

Questions	Answers (%)		
	Positive	No change	Negative
How does Hungary see Ukrainian refugees?	82		15
Would you agree to allow Ukrainian refugees enter to (country)?	90		10
Have there been any changes to your life because of Ukrainian refugees coming to [country]?	2	88	9
Our country (Hungary) benefits from Ukrainian refugees who are taking jobs no one wants	32		50
Support to Ukrainian refugees should be reduced	29		54

Source: GLOBSEC

The survey results provide insights into the attitudes and perspectives of Hungarian citizens towards refugees and the origins of the war in Ukraine. While a massive portion of the population holds positive attitudes towards refugees, it is important to acknowledge that negative perceptions still exist among a considerable number of individuals.

The survey findings reveal diverse perspectives on the origins of the war, with 43% of respondents attributing responsibility to Russia, 27% to the US or NATO, 9% to Ukraine, and 21% choosing not to answer. This indicates a range of interpretations and viewpoints among the Hungarian population regarding the causes of the conflict. It is worth noting that these perceptions might be influenced by several factors, including political ideologies, media narratives, and individual perspectives.

The survey also highlights the sources from which respondents obtained their information, with the majority (60%) relying on television channels and 47% using online sources. This suggests that media portrayals, particularly through television and online platforms, play a significant role in shaping the perceptions and understanding of the Ukrainian conflict among the Hungarian population. Despite the existence of negative views held by some individuals, it appears that the overall portrayal of both Ukraine and Russia in the media tends to be positive.

When examining political affiliations, interesting patterns emerge in relation to attitudes towards the causes of the war and the reception of Ukrainian refugees. Fidesz voters, for example, tend to avoid blaming Russia for the war, indicating a potential alignment with the government's stance on the issue. However, despite this, they generally hold positive attitudes towards hosting Ukrainian refugees fleeing the conflict. On the other hand, Aliancia voters, who share similar views with Fidesz regarding the responsibility for the war, express less favourable attitudes towards hosting Ukrainian refugees. This suggests that political affiliations and ideologies can influence attitudes towards both the causes of the war and the reception of refugees.

These findings highlight the complex interplay between political beliefs, perceptions of conflict, and attitudes towards refugees. Political parties and leaders play a significant role in shaping public opinion and influencing the narratives surrounding geopolitical events. The alignment between political affiliations and attitudes towards hosting refugees may stem from the influence of party messaging, media representation, or ideological frameworks. It is

important to recognize that political affiliations are not the sole determinant of individual attitudes. There can be significant variation within political parties, and individuals may hold nuanced views that do not align perfectly with the general party stance. Societal factors, personal experiences, and exposure to diverse perspectives also contribute to the formation of attitudes towards refugees (Szicherle, Kazaz, & Centre for Democracy & Resilience, 2022, p. 10). Understanding the relationship between political affiliations and attitudes towards refugees can inform policymakers and stakeholders in developing strategies to bridge ideological divides and promote greater empathy and understanding. By fostering dialogue and promoting evidence-based information, it may be possible to encourage more nuanced and compassionate perspectives towards those seeking refuge. These findings demonstrate the complexity of public opinion in Hungary regarding the war and the acceptance of Ukrainian refugees. While a significant proportion of Hungarian citizens maintain positive attitudes, there are still segments of the population with negative perceptions, particularly in relation to the origins of the conflict. Media sources play a significant role in shaping these perceptions, highlighting the need for balanced and accurate information to foster a more nuanced understanding among the population.

Another survey was conducted by the Hungarian Interchurch Aid organization between 23 June - 25 July 2022 with the objective of assessing the needs of Ukrainian refugees who are currently residing in Hungary. The survey was conducted in an academic context and aimed to gather data that could inform policy decisions and interventions aimed at improving the living conditions and welfare of the refugee population. The survey was conducted during a period in which Ukraine was experiencing a protracted conflict that had resulted in the displacement of thousands of individuals. The survey therefore provided a unique opportunity to gain insights into the experiences and needs of refugees in the context of an ongoing conflict. According to the survey results, many respondents were female, accounting for 78.3 % of the total survey population, while males accounted for 21.7 % of the total sample. The survey findings revealed that 43% of the respondents reported having a chronic illness, with the most reported conditions being cardiovascular disease, affecting 44% of those with a chronic illness, followed by thyroid disease, affecting 23% of the respondents with a chronic illness. Additionally, 17% of those with a chronic illness reported having multiple chronic conditions. These findings suggest that a sizeable proportion of the Ukrainian refugee population in Hungary may require specialized health care services to manage their chronic illnesses. The survey findings indicate that most

refugees in Hungary were from the eastern regions of Ukraine. Specifically, 20% of the respondents were from the Kharkiv region, 17% were from the Dnipropetrovsk region, and 13% were from the Zaporizhzhia region. Other regions of origin identified included the Zakarpattia region (10%), the Kyiv region (10%), and the Odessa region (8%). The remaining 22% of respondents reported being from other regions of Ukraine not specified in the survey (HIA, 2022, pp. 1-3).

The cases discussed highlight the challenges faced by refugees in the EU and the efforts made by governments, civil society, and NGOs to assist them. Despite these efforts, accommodating, feeding, and protecting such many people is a practical challenge. Therefore, it is crucial for the war to end quickly, enabling these individuals to return to their homeland. The discourse analysis of EU leaders reveals varying stances towards Ukrainian refugees, indicating a departure from previous migration crises. It is evident that compared to earlier instances, new regulations were introduced, and existing ones were modified. The underlying reason for this notable shift can be understood through the lens of securitization theory. In the past, the migration crisis primarily impacted Mediterranean countries such as Greece, Italy, and Spain. However, as these nations were not leading powers within the EU, their concerns were not perceived as posing a threat to the entire union. Additionally, the number of refugees arriving during those periods was relatively smaller. Consequently, the leaders of these countries struggled to securitize the situation effectively and activate extraordinary measures such as the Temporary Protection Directive.

The difference in the response to the Ukrainian refugee crisis can be attributed to several factors. Firstly, Ukraine's geographical proximity to EU member states in Eastern and Central Europe, including Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and Romania, made the situation more immediate and directly relevant to these countries. This proximity increased the sense of urgency and the perception of the crisis as a potential security threat.

Secondly, the scale of the Ukrainian conflict and the subsequent displacement of a sizeable number of people added weight to the situation. The sheer magnitude of the refugee influx prompted a reassessment of migration policies and the need for a coordinated EU-wide response. Leaders recognized the potential implications of a large-scale influx of Ukrainian refugees, including social, economic, and security considerations. This realization likely contributed to the securitization of the issue and the activation of exceptional measures.

Furthermore, the evolving geopolitical context, with Russia's involvement in the Ukrainian conflict, further heightened concerns among EU member states. The perceived threat posed by Russia's actions and the potential for spill over effects fueled the securitization of the Ukrainian refugee crisis. This framing enabled leaders to justify extraordinary measures to address the situation and protect the stability and security of the EU.

The discourse analysis of EU leaders reveals a shift in their stance towards Ukrainian refugees compared to previous migration crises. The securitization theory provides insights into the factors that influenced this change. The geographical proximity of affected countries, the scale of the Ukrainian conflict, and the evolving geopolitical context played significant roles in perceiving the crisis as a security threat. As a result, new regulations were introduced, and existing ones were modified to address the challenges posed by the influx of Ukrainian refugees.

2.5.   Surveys among Ukrainian Refugees

The EU Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Reform in Ukraine (EUAM) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) jointly conducted a survey project titled "Surveys of Arriving Migrants from Ukraine" from April 11 to June 7. The survey aimed to gather information on the experiences and motivations of migrants from Ukraine who had already arrived at their desired destination country. A total of 2,369 eligible responses were received during this period. The survey revealed that most of the respondents were well-educated and employed prior to the start of the conflict in Ukraine. This finding suggests that the ongoing conflict in Ukraine may be causing the displacement of highly skilled individuals, which could have a significant impact on the country's economy and society. Moreover, the survey found that many respondents had already arrived at their intended destination country when they participated in the survey. This finding implies that the survey may not have captured the experiences of those who were still in transit or who had not yet reached their destination country. Therefore, the survey results should be interpreted with caution and should not be considered representative of all migrants from Ukraine (European Union Agency for Asylum, 2022, p. 3).

The interviews conducted with some refugees provide important insights into the motivations and challenges faced by individuals who have been forced to flee their homes due to conflict

and violence. One woman mentioned that her husband had advised her to go to Europe and that she knows English well, which suggests that the decision to migrate may have been influenced by her family's circumstances and their perception of opportunities available in Europe. Additionally, her proficiency in English may increase her chances of finding employment, which could be a crucial factor in her decision to migrate. On the other hand, another person stated that he cannot stay in the EU because he has not been entitled to TPD. This highlights the challenges faced by refugees in obtaining legal status and access to social and economic rights in their host countries (European Union Agency for Asylum, 2022, p. 3). The lack of legal status can limit their ability to access healthcare, education, and employment opportunities, which can further exacerbate their vulnerability and marginalization.

Survey found that a significant number of respondents had a high level of education and were employed before the conflict in Ukraine. Out of the 2,369 respondents, 42% held a master's degree, and 31% held a bachelor's degree. This indicates that the ongoing conflict in Ukraine may be causing the displacement of highly skilled individuals, which could have a significant impact on the country's economy and society. Moreover, the survey revealed that a substantial proportion of respondents, 1,461 individuals, reported that they know English. This finding may have important implications for the ability of refugees and migrants from Ukraine to integrate into host societies, particularly in English-speaking countries. English proficiency can be a significant advantage in accessing education, employment, and other social services, which can help refugees and migrants rebuild their lives and contribute to their new communities. Additionally, the survey found that 77% of respondents were employed before the conflict in Ukraine (European Union Agency for Asylum, 2022, pp. 6-8).

The survey results indicate that most respondents, 84%, expressed their intention to remain in their current location. However, 16% of respondents reported plans to move to another country. Among those planning to relocate, the United Kingdom emerged as the top choice. This finding underscores the significance of factors such as language proficiency and employment opportunities in their decision-making process. The preference for the United Kingdom suggests that refugees and migrants prioritize destinations where they can potentially find suitable work and where the English language is widely spoken. The UK's strong economy and diverse employment prospects may be attractive to individuals seeking to establish themselves and secure a stable future for themselves and their families. Another notable finding from the

survey is that over 50% of respondents entered the European Union through Poland, with Romania being the second most common point of entry (European Union Agency for Asylum, 2022, pp. 9-15). This finding suggests that these countries serve as important transit points for refugees and migrants aiming to enter the EU. Factors such as geographical location, transportation networks, and potentially less stringent border controls could contribute to the higher influx of individuals through these countries. Understanding these patterns of entry can assist policymakers and relevant stakeholders in developing effective strategies and policies to manage migration flows, ensure the well-being of refugees and migrants, and facilitate their integration into the host countries. It highlights the need for collaboration among countries in addressing the challenges associated with migration and establishing comprehensive support systems to meet the diverse needs of refugees and migrants.

Table 4 of the survey report provides valuable insights into the priorities of refugees and migrants when choosing a preferred destination country. The options for answers included work opportunities, family and friends, benefits and support, language spoken, and meeting specific health needs. The results show that work opportunities and language spoken were the top two priorities, with 78% and 69% of respondents respectively indicating that these factors were very important or important. Family and friends were also important for many respondents, with 62% indicating that this factor was very important or important.

Table 7.Purpose for choosing host country.

Reasons for Choosing a Preferred Destination Country	percentage
Work opportunities	50%
Family and friends	49%
Benefits and support	23%
Language spoken	21%
Meeting specific health needs	9%

Source: SAM - UKR Factsheet 14 June 2022

The survey results shed light on the several factors that play a crucial role in the decision-making process of refugees and migrants. While benefits, support, and specific health needs were recognized as important, they were deemed less significant when compared to other factors such as work opportunities, language spoken, and the presence of family and friends. These findings highlight the economic, linguistic, and social aspects of integration for refugees

and migrants. The prioritization of work opportunities underscores the fundamental economic aspect of integration. Access to employment and the ability to support themselves and their families are pivotal for the successful integration of refugees and migrants into the host society. It indicates that individuals seeking refuge or migration actively desire opportunities to contribute to the workforce and become self-sufficient. Employment not only provides financial stability but also promotes a sense of purpose, dignity, and empowerment. Language spoken was also identified as a key factor in the decision-making process. Language proficiency plays a vital role in effective communication, accessing services, and building social connections. A strong command of the local language enables refugees and migrants to navigate their unique environment, interact with residents, and fully participate in the community. It enhances their ability to establish relationships, seek employment, and access educational and healthcare resources, thus facilitating their overall integration. The significance of family and friends underscores the importance of social support networks. Having existing connections in the host country, such as family members or friends, provides a sense of belonging, familiarity, and emotional support. These relationships help alleviate the challenges associated with adjusting to a new culture and environment. They offer guidance, assistance, and a support system that can aid refugees and migrants in navigating their new lives, accessing resources, and building social connections within the host community. The survey results highlight the multifaceted nature of the decision-making process for refugees and migrants. While factors such as benefits, support, and specific health needs are important, work opportunities, language spoken, and the presence of family and friends emerged as critical considerations. Recognizing and addressing these factors can contribute to the successful integration of refugees and migrants into their new societies, fostering their overall well-being and enabling them to contribute positively to their host communities.

Table 5 of the survey report provides information on the protection status of refugees and migrants. The survey asked respondents about their current protection status and provided several options for answers, including asylum/international protection, registering in a different country, obtaining a residence permit, and other options. Some respondents indicated that they haven't registered yet but plan to do so, while others stated that they do not know or prefer not to answer.

Table 8.Protection Status

Option	Percentage
Asylum/International protection	2%
Residence permit	2%
I plan to register in a different country	2%
No, I did not	4%
I have not but I intend to register	5%
Temporary Protection	66%
Other	8%
I do not know	9%
I prefer not to say	N/A

Source: SAM - UKR Factsheet 14 June 2022

The survey findings provide insights into the satisfaction levels of refugees regarding various aspects of their current circumstances. The survey employed a five-point scale to measure satisfaction, ranging from very dissatisfied (1) to very satisfied (5). The aspects investigated included living conditions, access to legal guidance, medical care, and education for children. Encouragingly, more than 50% of respondents expressed contentment with all these aspects. This indicates that a substantial number of refugees are satisfied with their living conditions and the availability of essential services in their host countries. However, it is important to consider that the survey did not differentiate between different countries or regions. Therefore, it is possible that satisfaction levels may vary depending on the specific context and conditions in each location. Additionally, while more than 50% of respondents reported being content, it is crucial to acknowledge that an outsize proportion of refugees may still experience dissatisfaction in these areas. Understanding the unique needs and challenges faced by refugees is essential in ensuring that appropriate support and resources are provided to help them rebuild their lives in their host countries. By addressing any areas of dissatisfaction and focusing on improving the quality of living conditions, access to legal assistance, healthcare, and education, policymakers and organizations can better meet the needs of refugees and contribute to their successful integration and well-being.

Conclusion

Following the Ukrainian-Russian conflict, over eight million individuals were forced to flee their homes in eastern Ukraine, with many losing their possessions in the process. These

displaced persons sought refuge in EU territories, prompting the activation of the Temporary Protection Directive, which had been approved in 2001 but had never been implemented until the onset of the crisis. It is evident that the EU had to contend with the refugee crisis, but the bloc's leaders exhibited divergent views and were generally not optimistic about the situation. Indeed, this time around, the EU was willing to welcome and support the refugees.

In my research, objectives were to explore how the presence of Ukrainian refugees influenced the migration policy of the EU. To accomplish this, I utilized the securitization theory as a theoretical framework to understand the process. According to the securitization theory, state leaders can securitize a particular issue by framing it as a threat to their country's existence and by narrating the problem in a way that persuades the public that the issue will have a significant impact on them (Emmers, 2013). This process involves constructing a discourse that portrays the issue as a matter of national security and justifies exceptional measures to deal with it. In response to the threat posed by Russia, the EU activated extraordinary measures to address the issue, which included welcoming Ukrainian refugees who were displaced because of the conflict. Neighbouring countries to Ukraine, particularly Poland, were among the first to feel the pressure of accommodating the influx of refugees. The activation of these measures was largely driven by the securitization of the refugee crisis, which was framed as a matter of national security. By portraying the arrival of refugees as a threat to the EU's security and stability, state leaders were able to justify exceptional measures to deal with the crisis, such as:

- the EU activated the Temporary Protection Directive in response to the arrival of Ukrainian refugees, which allowed member states to provide essential assistance to refugees in need. Alongside this directive, certain member states also implemented their own national crisis response options. The objective of these measures was to ensure that refugees had access to necessities such as healthcare, employment opportunities, and freedom of movement with proper documentation.
- Governments across the EU took different approaches to assisting refugees, but many provided financial support and temporary accommodation to those in need.
- Ukrainian refugees were eligible to apply for international asylum protection or local protection in the countries they arrived in. Even if their asylum claims were denied, they were still able to benefit from the privileges granted by the Temporary Protection Directive.

- Since most Ukrainian refugees were women and children, the EU paid special attention to the protection of these vulnerable groups. To prevent instances of child abuse and missing children, the EU established special hotlines. Additionally, education opportunities were provided to refugees in local languages, as well as in English and sometimes even Russian or Ukrainian.

To evaluate the effectiveness of the EU's policy towards Ukrainian refugees, surveys and interviews were conducted with refugees. The findings indicated that overall, the situation was deemed acceptable, and refugees were able to exercise their rights under the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951). However, instances of discrimination against non-Ukrainian refugees were also reported in the EU. Surveys about the repatriation of refugees to Ukraine after the war showed that the majority were eager to do it immediately.

The research conducted on the influence of the conflict in Ukraine on the migration policy of the European Union provides substantial evidence supporting the proposed hypothesis. The collected data indicates that the conflict had a profound impact on the migration policies of the EU, leading to significant alterations in existing policies and the establishment of new ones. One of the key factors driving these changes was the heightened political and public pressure to address the humanitarian necessities of the refugees affected by the conflict. The images and stories of the suffering population fleeing the conflict zone sparked widespread empathy and calls for action. Policymakers within the EU were compelled to respond to these concerns by revising their migration policies to aid and protection to those affected by the conflict. Additionally, the EU felt a need to ensure that its migration policies were in line with international commitments and norms. The refugee crisis resulting from the conflict in Ukraine presented a test of the EU's adherence to its own values and principles, such as human rights and humanitarian obligations. To maintain its credibility and reputation as a promoter of these values, the EU implemented changes to its migration policies to align them with international standards.

Moreover, there was apprehension among EU member states about the potential socio-economic consequences of the refugee crisis. The influx of refugees from Ukraine raised concerns about the strain on public services, housing, and employment opportunities in host countries. In response, the EU implemented new policies aimed at managing and distributing

the influx of refugees more effectively, ensuring that the burden was shared more evenly among member states.

Finally, the research findings strongly support the notion that the conflict in Ukraine had a considerable influence on the migration policy of the EU. The collected data highlights the reasons behind these changes, including the political and public pressure to address the humanitarian needs of the affected population, the importance of aligning policies with international commitments, and concerns about the socio-economic impact of the refugee crisis. By analysing and responding to these factors, the EU was able to adapt its migration policies to effectively address the challenges posed by the conflict in Ukraine.

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