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ABSTRACT

Israel's policy toward the South Caucasus: Continuity or Change?

This dissertation analyzes Israel's policy in the South Caucasus and the factors influencing it. Although relations between Israel and the three South Caucasus countries date back to 1991, ethnic Jews living in the Caucasus have historical and cultural ties between the peoples.

The changing geopolitical situation in a very short period of time has tested Israel's regional policy in history. Although these relations have risen to the level of strategic cooperation with some countries, they have weakened with others. Changes in Israel's policy in the South Caucasus must be investigated and explained at the interstate, regional and global levels. Therefore, Israel's policy in the South Caucasus takes into account the interests of the three independent states, as well as the actions and inactions of countries such as Turkey, Russia and Iran in the world system after the collapse of the USSR in 1991 and the terrorist attack in 2001. should be studied. At the same time, the changed regional policy after the Second Karabakh War, the broken old status quo and Israel's current role, future prospects and opportunities to influence other ethno-ethnic conflicts in the South Caucasus must be explored. Israel's changed or continuing policy in the South Caucasus must be developed in the light of all new realities and reflected in Israel's new security and foreign policy strategy.

REFERAT

İsrailin Cənubi Qafqaza qarşı siyasəti: Davamlılıq yoxsa dəyişiklik?

Bu dissertasiya işində İsrailin Cənubi Qafqaz bölgəsi siyasəti və buna təsir edən amillər təhlil edilmişdir. İsrail ilə üç Cənubi Qafqaz ölkəsi arasındakı münasibətlər 1991-ci ildən başlasa da, Qafqazda yaşayan etnik Yəhudilər xalqlar arasında tarixən və mədəni əlaqələrə malikdirlər.

Çox qısa bir müddətdə dəyişən geosiyasi vəziyyət İsrailin regional siyasətini də tarixin sınağından keçirdi. Bu münasibətlər bəzi ölkələrlə strateji əməkdaşlıq səviyyəsinə yüksəlsə də, digərləri ilə zəiflədi. İsrailin Cənubi Qafqazdakı siyasətindəki dəyişikliklər dövlətlərarası, regional və qlobal səviyyədə araşdırılmalı və izah edilməlidir. Bu səbəbdən İsrailin Cənubi Qafqaz siyasəti 1991-ci il SSRİ-nin dağılmasından sonrakı və 2001-ci ildə terror aktı baş verməsindən sonrakı dünya sistemindəki hərəkətləri, Türkiyə, Rusiya və İran kimi ölkələrin bu dünya sistemlərindəki hərəkətləri və hərəkətsizlikləri ilə yanaşı üç müstəqil dövlətin maraqları da nəzərə alınaraq tədqiq edilməlidir. Eyni zamanda, İkinci Qarabağ müharibəsindən sonra dəyişmiş regional siyasət, pozulmuş köhnə status-kvo və İsrailin bugünkü rolu, gələcək perspektivləri və Cənubi Qafqazdakı digər etnosiyasi münaqişələrə təsir imkanları araşdırılmalıdır. İsrailin Cənubi Qafqazdakı dəyişmiş və ya daha da təkmilləşərək davam edən siyasəti bütün yeni reallıqlar işığında inkişaf etdirilməli və İsrailin yeni təhlükəsizlik və xarici siyasət strategiyasında öz əksini tapmalıdır.

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INTRODUCTION

Some of the regions in a political world map have an influence over the rest of the world and control it. South Caucasus is one of the hot regions where geopolitical wars happen between regional and global actors. After the dissolving of the USSR, forms of world politics were modified and as result new countries were created in South Caucasus. Three South Caucasus countries- Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia changed the form of a region and reduced Russian dominance in East and West roads. This new geopolitical position had a spillover effect in the post-Soviet regions and new realities were emerged. All of them made South Caucasus new hub for transition and energy.

Over two hundred years ago, wars were over new land and colonies but nowadays energy hubs are more essential geopolitical issue. South Caucasus countries such as Azerbaijan is famous for its energy resources and other two countries are popular with their transition power. Currently, energy policy and energy security are used in two main ways. One of them is to alternate classical policy for energy to renewable one and the other is the continuity of available pipelines' security. Although energy supply and diversification policy are vital for South Caucasus regions, reshaping the model of region and gaining power by using this potential are more necessary.

There are five parts of the policy of Israel toward South Caucasus and these are historical, cultural, economic, political, military ones. These types of affairs develop regularly and have a foundation above mentioned factors. Among other factors, historical and cultural make more substantial foundation between Israel and South Caucasus. Moreover, anti-Semitism in Caucasus and historically inhabited Jews in the region had a considerable role for creating bilateral relations. Although there are confessional differences between two regions, historical and pragmatic approach assist to overcome those obstacles and cooperate. Secularity of Caucasus also helped bilateral relations. Economy and energy projects are the main indicators for cooperation. Since, Israel is situated in a blockade region and carefully chosen

partnerships have a vital role for survival. Caspian Sea has a potential for oil and gas not only to save Europe from dependence of Russia but also prevent Israeli energy security from dependence of Arab world and Iran. That is the reason why BTC and other energy policy projects effect Israel energy policy. The foundation of Israeli policy toward SC is protecting ethnic Jews here and cooperation in military area. Israel has good relations with countries in the region except Armenia. It is a paradox that despite Israel has the best relations with Azerbaijan in the region only Georgia has an embassy in Tel-Aviv and Armenia create diplomatic relations Israel and opened embassy in Tel-Aviv. This complicated policy was formed thanks to regional powers. Israeli policy toward South Caucasus is not limited by only visible structures. Conflicts in Caucasian region such as Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia and Abkhazia are the main sign for reshaping the policy of Israel in the region. Nagorno-Karabakh is significant because it involves two countries, others are essential since Russia is the most powerful regional country. Israel acts carefully before having relations with these countries and considers the global and regional balance of power. After Second Karabakh war, military cooperation between Israel and Azerbaijan harmed Armenia-Israel relation. It tended to cooperate with all three countries but Azerbaijan is the strongest one. Armenian affairs with Iran effect Israel's policy toward Azerbaijan as well. Armenia is in the blockade in the region and only one way of cooperation is through Iran. As well as Israel supports Azerbaijan and Georgia against Russian, Turkish and Iranian influence in South Caucasus.

Middle East and South Caucasus security and prosperity plans should be calculated simultaneously for studying and solving those abovementioned problems. Even though there are some problems, new cooperation opportunities are created by new realities in the region.

Methodology

This thesis's basis for methodology and theoretical framework are based on international and domestic research. Domestic research was investigated in international relations, geopolitics and history area and some other similar fields which reshape the policy of the region in the world politics. In the foreign literature,

there is an essential in theoretical and practical aspects of the investigating process. Some philosophical and systemization and structuration approaches as well as scientific cognition methods such as synthesis, modulation of historical and logical, analysis were applied during the investigation process of research.

Research question and hypotheses

The key issue of this topic is Israel's policy on South Caucasus countries. For a detailed understanding problem, of the issue researching and studied the Israel's region policy, history and additional factors in Israel policy. Each chapter separately contains comparative, descriptive and cause-effect questions and analytical reviews for better understanding issue. The key words and questions affect the study are the geopolitical, national interests of countries and soul of international environment.

The appeal to the problems of qualitative research is relevant due to the world political trends in social science, as well as, from the expanding its cognitive horizons. This research is based on qualitative methodology and the main pivot is the answer to the following question: Does Israel's South Caucasus policy change or continue?

For a deeper understanding of the problems in this study, there will pose and analyze in detail following aspects:

1. The history of relations between Israel and South Caucasus countries
2. Geopolitical formations of regional policy in Israel
3. Changeable political trends and preparation of South Caucasus countries
4. USSR's collapse and 11 September issues influence bilateral relations
5. Additional factors (Russia, Iran, Turkey) influence Israel's policy
6. The Second Karabakh War and the influence of the region

For a deeper understanding of the problematic and objectivity of the study, I will use different in nature and understanding of the article, e-books, analytical journals on the subject, the official statement of the parties and analysts. For the description of the matter, I will be given historical background of relations and changeable nature of Caucasus policy.

Research objective

The thesis aims at analyzing and reveals the Israel's South Caucasus policy and its space on Israel foreign policy. Identify problems and prospects for their solution. The purpose of this thesis is to research and analyze in detail Jews and Caucasian nations' historical roots, relations and influence state's policy. Also, research and analyze in detail Israeli-Iran, Turkey and Russia attitude.

Research novelty

This research based on various approaches to the problems and contains historical, economic, political aspects. The thesis will mention Jews who compact live in Caucasus and its socio-cultural influence politics. The scientific novelty is that the relationship was systematic and generalized between Israel and South Caucasus states. That is, it was created new opportunity for solving problems and understanding Israel's policy in changeable world. It describes modern realities in the region and give the futuristic more predictable landscape of policy and helping to understand Israel's regional approach in word politics.

Literature Review

Despite that this subject is appealing for investigation that is why a lot of school of thoughts, institutes and organization researched it, the most distinguished ones are Michael Bishku, Alexander Murinson, Dr. Anna Geifman, Dima Course, Gallia Lindenstrauss and others.

The basic sources that identifying the theoretical background of mechanism were the works of Kenneth Waltz, John Mearsheimer, Barry Buzan and Alexander Dugin. In these sources considered in detail the fundamentals of international relations and polarization of modern world politics. The above authors explain the world political scene in its own way. Waltz is an eminent scholar who argue that how works balance of power, security and survive of states in systems. Waltz's defensive realist school advocate that system is essential for survival, because every state is poor than against system. This theory helped us to identify Israel's security chamber, South Caucasus balance of power. Waltz's defensive realism explain that state should not get the maximum power in the system. However maximum power is the only essential thing for state, but due to Waltz, if state get the maximum power in the

system, then all existence power fight against it. He explains all the theory with Germany in WWII. Another prominent structural realist is John Mearsheimer who defense new approach which called offensive realism. In this approach is mostly similar defensive realism. Offensive realism argue that state should get the maximum power for survive in system. Mearsheimer's offensive realism explain Europe's weakness and Ukraine's annexation from Russia. In two different approach of the structural realism explain and helped us, both South Caucasus reality and Middle East balance of power. Middle East and South Caucasus are the perplexed and essential region in IR. Offensive realism and defensive realism helped understanding limits of power and maximum power in two regions. The cooperation is between the offense and defense balance. If we try to understand Israel's South Caucasus policy, then we understand geostrategy game in regions. The other essential scholar is Barry Buzan who advocate regional complexity approach in international relations. Buzan's research explain security issue and polarity in IR. Super power, regional power and other point of view used by Buzan. His masterpieces explain trends of IR, as well as English school. Buzan's security theory argue that military threat is not only threat for state. This theory helps us understanding South Caucasus conflicts and Israel's approach on it. Dugin's approach of IR based on euroasianism concept. It helped us to focused not only South Caucasus region but also Asia. He argues that South Caucasus is not independent region, it is also Asia. Euroasianist approach covers Russia, Turkey and Iran's foreign policy towards. Because of that, all regional powers pay attention Asia and South Caucasus-Israel relations are depends on either regions' approach.

Some researchers such as: Nasib Nasibli, Shamkhal Abilov, Ilgar Gurbanov, Anar Veliyev, Aynura Bashirova and others gave extensive place to this investigation. They examined affairs between two countries with all aspects. One of the well-known among them is Rauf Huseynov who investigated inhibited Jews in Azerbaijan and divided them into three parts. Those are mountain Jews, Ashkenazi, Ebrales. He also explained resettlement aspects of Jews in the Caucasus. Other researcher- Nasib Nasibli get into details of Azerbaijan relations with Georgia in

economic fields and it makes a new reality in South Caucasus. Shamkhal Abilov interpreted in his works the strategic importance of Azerbaijan Israeli relations. All of the abovementioned researchers elucidated the various sides of the affairs between Azerbaijan and Israel. Another well-known Turkish scholar explained strategic side of these relations in the partnership context. Israel has complicated relations with Caucasus countries and they are hard to understand. Despite it is pragmatic relation, the anti-Semitic manner of Caucasus effects it considerably. Because of the spreading of Jews, Muslim and Christianity in the region, only way to maintain peace and stability of it is multicultural and confessional approach.

Thesis structure

This thesis is organized three chapters and every chapter divided into sections which covering in detail.

The first chapter analyzes Scientific and strategic foundations of Israel's South Caucasus policy. Mountain Jews and their historical move to Caucasus after WWII. Preserving Jews identity in region and ancient cultural root between region and Israel mentioned this chapter. Not only historical, at the same time cultural, religious relations explained in it. This chapter divided into three part and explain separately historical and geographical; Sociological and Demographic roots; and Strategical roots of Israel's South Caucasus policy. 21st century's political trends based on some historical background and this chapter explain historical roots how influence and diverse modern international relations.

The following chapter contains *External factors in Israel's South Caucasus policy*. In this chapter, researching regional powers' impacts bilateral ties. Turkey, Iran and Russia are the essential regional powers and they influence South Caucasus republics' foreign policy shape. Israel should consider regional power and their potential. Each of the regional powers create strengthen relations in countries. Therefore, Israel behaves professional and insecure way to establishing new relations.

In the first section, Turkey's influence the existence relations. It covers Turkey-Georgia-Azerbaijan relations, Nagorno-Karabakh issue, Georgia's border integrity and Palestine issue. Turkey and Azerbaijan's three lateral relations with Georgia and

economic projects mentioned in this section. At the same time, Armenia's blockade policy of Turkey, "Armenian genocide" issue mentioned in it.

The following section mentioned Iran's approach in Israel-South Caucasus relations. Iran's Israel policy based on enmity thus Iran strongly against Israel's relations in Caucasus. Therefore, Iran uses Muslim policy for deterrence Azerbaijan and established economic relations Armenia and Georgia for lessen Israel's power in region. Iran's Caucasus policy based on expansionist policy and control Caucasus and Caspian Sea's region.

The last section contains Russia's policy in region. Russia is a successor of USSR and it becomes most powerful actor in region. Russia's South Caucasus policy based on conflict policy and interstate conflicts helps to rule the whole of region. At the same time, Russia is against Israel's Caucasus policy, because Russia's military industry reduces market value in Caucasus.

The last chapter of this thesis contains *Stages and sequences in Israel's policy in the southern Caucasus*. In this chapter, after disintegrating USSR and gain the independence of South Caucasus republics established new multilateral relations with the world. Each three new state calculate new reality and searched new allied for understanding world and fighting independence in perplexed Caucasus. Therefore, Israel understood that Iran and Turkey regional but Russia was global rival in the region. Thus, Israel is interested in South Caucasus for preventing expansionist policy in the region. This chapter divided three sections and each section explain that unipolar world's reality how shapes bilateral relations.

The first section explains Israel's South Caucasus policy from collapse of USSR to 11 September 2001 act. It mentioned USA based international relations and balance policy of Azerbaijan. Nagorno-Karabakh, Israel-Palestine conflict and two different regions' states' pragmatic relations covered in this section. Balance of threat in the region and needs help two countries to establish healthy ties. Israel's Armenia policy contains bilateral diplomatic, economic relations between two states. At the same time, Jews and Armenian diaspora explained in this section. However, Armenia and Israel established diplomatic relations, they have rivalry in diaspora issue,

massacre issue and Palestine issue. Israel's Georgia policy covers bilateral relations in the world political arena. Georgia's new geostrategy for becoming part of Europe and Israel's approach. Georgia-Israel relations are stable than other Caucasus republics. In this section explain how it happened and continuing.

The second paragraph of this section is *Israel's policy toward South Caucasus After 11 September act*. In this chapter, after the 9/11 and Arab spring events, world political system's changings and South Caucasus republic and Israel's relations covers. New world established new powers and strengthen geostrategy for rivalry. Israel after this act wants to regional power and influence bilateral relations with regions. At the same time, South Caucasus republics reshaped their previous foreign policy and strategy. It happened either based on national interests, or choosing one side way in foreign policy.

The last paragraph is analyzing the South Karabagh war and establish new solutions. After pandemic and Second Karabagh War, South Caucasus republics create new reality in the region. In this chapter, we explain Israel's foreign policy continued or changed. If changed which directions lessen or strengthen in it.

CHAPTER I. SCIENTIFIC AND STRATEGIC FOUNDATIONS OF ISRAEL'S SOUTH CAUCASUS POLICY

1.1 Historical and Geographical bases of Israel's South Caucasus policy

In the science of international relations, relations between states are analyzed on the basis of various theories. These are analyzed either through collaborative theories or through conflicts. Israel's South Caucasus policy has also been formalized in accordance with the spirit of the time and the world of international relations, both scientifically and strategically. In order to understand Israel's South Caucasus policy, we need to understand how Israel views the world and regions, and in what context it deals with them. Is Israel looking at the world as a collaborator or as a threat, we need to understand this at first. In this context, although Israel looks at various regions in terms of threats, it has approached the South Caucasus as a cooperative region against the Iranian threat.

Since Israel is a country of immigrants, while calculating the foreign policy of the country, foreign Jews, geographical proximity, energy and economic relations, and measures against the fear of extinction may take the lead in this foreign policy at various times.

The region that Brzezinski calls the "Eurasian Balkans" is the place where conflicts take place today as it has been in history¹. The main reason for this is that the Caucasus is called 'cebel-i elsine', that is, 'mountain of languages', as the Arabs say. One factor for the lack of such conflicts and stability in the Caucasus is the cultural, social and historical division. Seen as the Greater Middle East by some experts, the Caucasus is a very important region because of the fiction for world domination. Again, according to Brzezinski, there are important regions and countries in the world system as 'geostrategic axis' and 'geostrategic players'. Southern Caucasia is also one of the sensitive areas that may change the balance of power in such a world order. For this, Israel approaches the South Caucasus in terms of common values and balances in terms of Jews.

¹ Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Grand Chessboard", 1997, p 123-124.

Historically, the Jews immigrated to the Caucasus region during their great migration. Caucasian Jews arrived in this land from Middle East exile of ten tribes (720 B.C.E)². Their population in Caucasus approximately 30 thousand. Caucasian Jews' origin and language is quite different Israeli jews. Israeli Jews are named Ashkenazi, but Caucasus Jews mostly mountain Jews and they speak Persian dialect. Caucasus Jews lived and established Khazaria empire in Caucasus which covers Uzbekistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russia and Georgia. Khazaria people speak a few languages Turkish, Hebrew, Slavic. Khazara and Turks' religious customs are very similar, but a few centuries later it changed. Ancient Khazarian mentioned somewhere Alan people, but it is not proofed by historians.

Mountain Jews are located in Caucasus moved from Iran and mixed Khazarians. Therefore, their language like farsi and Hebrew. Mountain Jews and Ashkenazi mixed after WWII. USSR's regime did not love Jews, thus Jews moved to Caucasus and after established new state in Middle East. From the 1940s, Soviet regime strengthen their anti-Semitic manner and closed Hebrew language schools or transformed into Russian³. After collapse USSR, South Caucasus republics permit Mountain Jews speak and learn their own language as a second language.

Judaism has been historically represented by mountain Jews in Azerbaijan. Moses Kalankatli mentioned his records Jews came to Caucasus in B.E.A first century. Historians argue that different thought that mountain Jews settle in Azerbaijan in 19th century. Azerbaijan is the only place in USSR, mountain Jews settled in compactly. However, Azerbaijani Jews settled in Azerbaijan and live peacefully, indeed Mountain Jews are not the same Israel Jews. Its show us Israel's external jews policy. Ashkenazi Jews are the real Jews for Israel state but at the same time, Israel uses Mountain Jews and Khazarian paradigm for political means and participation in the Caucasus.

Georgian Jewish people speak Judea-Georgia dialect, their language is similar Georgian language. Georgian Jews sometimes named Gurjim and they exiled ancient

² http://www.eki.ee/books/redbook/mountain_jews.shtml

³ <http://haruth.com/jw/JewsAzerbaijan.html>

time from Middle East and moved to Tbilisi. After 1801 annexation of Georgia by Russian empire, Jewish people endure anti-Semitic manner. After a while, Jews' population increased in Tbilisi and USSR's census showed us Georgian Jewish reduced or exile by communist regime. When Jews exile from the Sacrifice Land, they moved to Yerevan and create their community. After a few centuries, Khazarian turks moved Yerevan and they change their language hebrew⁴. Collapse of USSR, Jews identity and Armenian identity crashed in Armenia and therefore, Georgia and Azerbaijan's Jews are more than Armenian Jews.

Both geographically and historical roots shows us that Jews community in the South Caucasus, does not considered Jews, but at the same time Jewishness identity is also beyond the nation and country. In the huge lens, Mountains Jews are Jews, but in the Israel's foreign policy Caucasus Jews are the initial tie and means for interests. Israel's scholars sometimes argue that Crimean Krymchaks is Jews origins and its geostrategic approach for world policy.

The other essential argument is Khazar ancestry of Ashkenazi Jews. According this thought, some Israeli Ministers like the first Prime Minister of Israel is Khazarian. This thought based on Khazarians' moved to Israel area and some of them helped Ashkenazi Jews diaspora spread Eastern Europe. However, historical and geographical roots exist South Caucasus and Israel, but it is not arbitrary power on Israel's policy. Because some Georgian Jews are Ashkenazi, but Israel-Azerbaijani relations are higher than Israel-Georgia.

1.2 Sociological and Demographic bases of Israel's South Caucasus policy

South Caucasus Jews are located in the region for the various threat and causes. One of them, USSR's antisemitism policy against Jews caused Jews forcefully moved southern borders of empire. In this period, South Caucasus nations and Jews mixed and some Jews gain Caucasian or Mountain identity. The other one faced confrontation of identity in the region. Thus, Jews demography became higher after

⁴ "Khazaria Info Center," <http://www.khazaria.com>

Lenin term of USSR in the Caucasus. Till 1948, Israel getting the independence and Stalin's force policy against ethnic Jews, caused Jews moved to Israel.

Israel's socio-demographic policy based on Mountain Jews in the region. There are two essential factors in foreign policy of Israel. One of them identity of Jewishness, the other one is diaspora and its role and influence to the region. Identity confrontation occurred between mono ethnic Armenians and Jews. At the same time, Muslim Azerbaijanis and Jews are the other confrontation issues. Lebanese Jews and Muslims case and Azerbaijani Muslim and Jews are different but at the same time similar. Azerbaijani sectoral policy is different than Lebanese and Lebanese Muslim community is radical than Azerbaijanians. The other factor is diaspora, which influence Azerbaijani' and Georgians' good manner but Armenian's bad manner. Jews diaspora and identity are close and helped Israel's foreign policy diversifications.

Israel community in South Caucasus countries and at the same time South Caucasus countries' Jews community in the Israel is the essential for all countries. Jews community of Azerbaijan lived in Guba and approximately 11 thousand. Azerbaijani and Israeli people established strong ties with mountain Jews. During Armenia-Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Azerbaijani Jew Albert Agarunov fight against Armenia and died for his country. This event shows us ethnic jews consider their identity is related Azerbaijan. Albert's courage and motherland love combined and create strengthen tie between Israel and Azerbaijan. After the restoration of Azerbaijan's independence in 1991, opportunities for the activities of the Jewish community here increased, relations with international Jewish organizations expanded, and Jewish religious schools - Yeshiva, cultural centers, societies, clubs, and media - were established in the republic. "Joynt" and "Vaad-l-Hetzola" Jewish committees work to preserve Jewish traditions and organize cultural events among Azerbaijani Jews⁵.

Azerbaijani communities abroad have relations with Jewish diaspora organizations. It is possible to use the potential of Jewish communities in countries

⁵ Azərbaycanca Yəhudi İcmaları Haqqında Məlumat - scwra.gov.az

where Azerbaijani communities are weak and have limited opportunities to influence socio-political processes. The centuries-old friendly relations between the two peoples open wide opportunities for this cooperation. In modern times, there is serious support for the Jewish and Azerbaijani diasporas in foreign countries. The joint activities of Azerbaijani and Jewish organizations in different countries are mainly directed against the anti-Azerbaijani policy and baseless claims of Armenia and the Armenian lobby.

In the early 1920s, hundreds of Mountain Jews moved from Azerbaijan and Dagestan to Palestine and Tel Aviv with their families. The next wave of migration began with the USSR's decision in 1972 to legalize the migration of Jews to Israel⁶. After this law, the number of Jews in Azerbaijan decreased sharply. In the 1970s, when there were 41,288 Jews in the country with the largest number of Azerbaijani Jews, 3,000 of them immigrated to Israel in 1972-1978. Today, this number is known to exceed 80,000⁷.

Azerbaijan, which see itself as its "diaspora," has worked hard to keep Jewish immigrants from severing ties with Azerbaijan. Because this Jewish group not only represents the country voluntarily, but also has a very strong mechanism of economic and political influence. Realizing all this, official Baku announced that it would grant dual citizenship to those with economic and trade ties between Azerbaijan and Israel⁸. In 1991, the Haifa-Baku Society was established by Azerbaijani Jews. The main reason for the establishment of the organization was to keep in touch with Azerbaijani Jews living in Haifa and to keep in touch with Azerbaijan. Based on all this, the organization has prepared various types of cultural meetings and held frequent meetings⁹. Arye Gut, one of the most famous members of the Jewish community in Azerbaijan: "Very few people know the main role of Jews in

⁶ <http://www.visions.az/en/news/1031/6b025e20/>

⁷ Haydar Aliyev's Heritage International Online Library, Azerbaijani-Israeli Relations, <http://library.aliyev-heritage.org/en/8269149.html>, (12.05.2011).

⁸ İNS Resource Informations Center, Azerbaijan: The Status of Armenians, Russians.

⁹ Azərbaycan-İsrail Münasibətləri, Azərbaycan Respublikasının Xarici İşlər Nazirliyi, <http://mfa.gov.az/images/stories/Countries/israel/01.pdf>, (10.02.2011).

Azerbaijan¹⁰." This statement was confirmed by President Ilham Aliyev, who said, "This is the visible side of the iceberg, and there is an invisible side."¹¹

According to the data of the 1959 Soviet census, there were 51,582 Jews in Georgia. According to the data of the subsequent Soviet census of 1970, the number of Jews in the republic had increased to 55,382, i.e. by 7.4%. Between the 1970 and 1979 Soviet censuses, a huge number of Jews left Georgia, chiefly for Israel¹². In Mark's notes, Soviet Jewish moved Israel under pressure of USSR government. Georgian Jewish and Ashkenazi people have quite close relations at the beginning of 20th. After 1905th revolution, alienation process began between two Jewish group¹³.

After independence of Georgian Republic in 1918, Jewish obtained a few freedoms, even if they founded Hebrew school in Georgia. After Soviet invade, Jews hold protests a few times in Moscow but regime exile or imprisoned them. In 1990, Rachamim Society was established and helped to restoration cemeteries and synagogues in Georgia. Georgian Jewish established some international organizations which helped them moving Israel. One of them is American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee (JDC), this committee helped South Ossetian Jews moved Israel for voluntarily. Russia's annexation of Northern Georgia, Ossetian Jewish moved and thus Jews population reduced late ten years.

Collapse of USSR, Jews identity and Armenian identity crashed in Armenia and therefore, Georgia and Azerbaijan's Jews are more than Armenian Jews. Armenia is a monoethnic country and they have all diaspora. I.e. Specifically, this reality comes to life in the fusion of Armenian homeland with the Armenian Diaspora, characterizing Jewish existence in Armenia as a presence of one Diaspora people in another

¹⁰ Arye Gut, "Why Azerbaijan's Relations with Israel Are So Close?", Azerbaijan in the World ADA Biweekly Newsletter, Vol. 2, No. 8, 15 April 2009; (<http://ada.edu.az/biweekly/issues/vol2no8/200904>)

¹¹ Mark Perry, "Israel's Secret Staging Ground", Foreign Policy, [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/03/28/israelsecret_staging_ground.\(09.04.2012\)](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/03/28/israelsecret_staging_ground.(09.04.2012))

¹² MARK TOLTS, "The Jews in Georgia in the Late Soviet Period: A Demographic Profile" p.102 https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Mark-Tolts/publication/262377534_The_Jews_in_Georgia_in_the_Late_Soviet_Period_A_Demographic_Profile/links/02e7e5379a364787b9000000/The-Jews-in-Georgia-in-the-Late-Soviet-Period-A-Demographic-Profile.pdf

¹³ <https://www.anumuseum.org.il/jewish-community-tbilisi/>

Diaspora people's homeland, which gives birth to a multiplicity of outlooks and frames of reference in the Armenian conscience¹⁴. This shows that two identity creates problems but polyethnic countries accepted Jews easily. Armenian and Jews population is quite similar. They have unique identity, religious and diaspora. Synagogue and Armenian church are an identity for foreign population. Stateless period of some nations used similar way and collect people side an aim. This issue has become so deep that many Armenians think that the Jews used Armenian blood on the Feast of Unleavened Bread¹⁵.

Armenian Jews established a few community organizations. The Jews Community of Armenia (JCA) is a most famous one of them. Armenia-Israel cultural groups held a few events. Even if modern Hebrew language teaches in Yerevan university from 1995¹⁶.

Armenia is the only Caucasus country that anti-Semitic approach increases in it. Israel-Turkey and Israel-Azerbaijan relations and Holocaust policy of Israel influence to increase anti-Semitic manner in Yerevan.

According to Sedat Laciner, the main reason why there are no Jews left in eastern and southeastern Anatolia today is the political pressure on Jews by the Dashnaks and other Armenian committees. There are many Ottoman documents about Muslims and Jews killed by Armenians between 1914 and 1916¹⁷. It is clear from these documents that the Jews approached the Muslim-Turks in order not to be defeated by the Armenians and the Greeks. Even the Ittihad and several other parties did not spare their extensive financial support when they were formed. Talat Pasha's

¹⁴ Vartan Akchyan: "Jews in Armenia: The Hidden Diaspora", : Georgetown Journal of International Affairs , Winter/Spring 2003, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Winter/Spring 2003), pp. 81-86
<https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/43134445.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Ab99bb7ba520bcba42b4b960357637014>

¹⁵ Zaur Shiriyev, "İsrael-Azerbajjan:Firms Alliance-1" Today's Zaman,[http://www.todayszaman.com/mobile_detailic.action?newsId=277748,\(26.07.2012\)](http://www.todayszaman.com/mobile_detailic.action?newsId=277748,(26.07.2012)).

¹⁶ <https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/armenia-virtual-jewish-history-tour>

¹⁷ Laçiner, S . (2001). Ermeni – Yahudi Anlaşmazlığı ve İsrail – Türkiye İşbirliği'nin Ermenistan'a Etkileri . Selçuk Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi , 9 (3-4) , 125-148 . Retrieved from <https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/pub/suhfd/issue/26628/280698>

Jewish origin is also considered to be one of the factors that increased his hostility towards Armenians.

Thus, all of identity problems exist but Armenians in Israel preserving their Armenian identity and helped to Armenian diaspora. Another essential misunderstanding issue between two community is Jerusalem. Armenians lived in Jerusalem and argue that they are first Christian nation in the world. All of them created new rivalry for these nations.

1.3 Strategic interests of Israel policy toward South Caucasus

Israel's strategic interests in the South Caucasus are divided. Although we have explained the roots and basis of some of these interests in the previous sections, Israel's strategy in the South Caucasus is not limited to historical, social, demographic and geographical interests. Israel has other interests in the South Caucasus, such as energy and security. However, Israel's strategy for the South Caucasus is in fact designed not only as a region, but also to cover Iran in a big way. Researchers call this coverage policy a new periphery policy. This ring includes the countries of the South Caucasus and partly the Turkic world. Therefore, Israel is also indirectly interested in the creation and development of platforms among the countries of the Turkic world in a controlled manner.

Another important interest is to meet energy needs in a cheaper and alternative way. Israel used to supply energy from Iran before the White Revolution, but after its enmity with Iran, Israel, which could not reach an agreement with the Arabs on the Palestinian issue, was forced to need an alternative South Caucasus region and Caspian oil. As a result, Israel has recognized the independence of all three South Caucasus countries and gained access to these energy resources, using the means provided in the previous sections.

It is no coincidence that Bzerzinski saw Azerbaijan as a cover for the riches of the Caspian Basin, and if Azerbaijan lost its independence, Russia would regain

control of the entire region¹⁸. Therefore, Israel's policy in the South Caucasus is based more on world political trends and Israel's national interests than on ethnic and religious grounds. Addition of this, Israel's Azerbaijan relations based on either geostrategic interests and key of the Caucasus is Azerbaijan. That's why, Jews lobby try to help Azerbaijan against Armenia in the region and in the world political centers. One of the main concerns of Armenia in the Azerbaijani-Israeli relations is related to the Jewish lobby. There are objective reasons for the Azerbaijani leadership to call the Jews leaving Azerbaijan for Israel the "Azerbaijani Diaspora", and everything about Azerbaijan is native to them. The Jewish lobby in the United States also played an important role in the freezing of the well-known 907th amendment passed by the US Congress. Leaders of the Jewish religious communities in Azerbaijan visited the United States from November 16 to 21, 1998, informing the public about the realities of Azerbaijan, the "907th Amendment" was a wrong decision, as well as Jewish organizations with strong positions in the United States called to defend their interests. Taking a more active position in this direction also depends on the mutual efforts of both countries. As a result, US President Bill Clinton promised to do his best to help President Heydar Aliyev in this matter, and in October 2001, he kept his word and decided in favor of Azerbaijan. At the same time, Jews who emigrated from Azerbaijan live in Israel. Despite the fact that Azerbaijan does not have an official representation in Israel in modern times, the main role in increasing economic and political relations between the two countries is played by Jews who emigrated from Azerbaijan to Israel. This group has assumed a kind of representation of Azerbaijan in Israel¹⁹.

At the same time, however Israel used Mountain Jews for cooperation and security issues in regional level. South Caucasus republics used its diaspora in Israel for various theme in Israel. This confrontation occurred sometimes `Armenian genocide` recognition issue in every year Israel. Armenian and Azerbaijani community who lived in Israel protests against each other. Azerbaijan, which see

¹⁸ Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Grand Chessboard", 1997, p 46.

¹⁹ Arye Gut, "Why Azerbaijan's Relations with Israel Are So Close?", Azerbaijan in the World ADA Biweekly Newsletter, Vol. 2, No. 8, 15 April 2009; (<http://ada.edu.az/biweekly/issues/vol2no8/200904>)

itself as its "diaspora," has worked hard to keep Jewish immigrants from severing ties with Azerbaijan. Because this Jewish group not only represents the country voluntarily, but also has a very strong mechanism of economic and political influence. Realizing all this, official Baku announced that it would grant dual citizenship to those with economic and trade ties between Azerbaijan and Israel²⁰. In 1991, the Haifa-Baku Society was established by Azerbaijani Jews. The main reason for the establishment of the organization was to keep in touch with Azerbaijani Jews living in Haifa and to keep in touch with Azerbaijan. Based on all this, the organization has prepared various types of cultural meetings and held frequent meetings²¹. Arye Gut, one of the most famous members of the Jewish community in Azerbaijan: "Very few people know the main role of Jews in Azerbaijan²²." This statement was confirmed by President Ilham Aliyev, who said, "This is the visible side of the iceberg, and there is an invisible side."²³

Thus, all of identity problems exist but Armenians in Israel preserving their Armenian identity and helped to Armenian diaspora. Another essential misunderstanding issue between two community is Jerusalem. Armenians lived in Jerusalem and argue that they are first Christian nation in the world. All of them created new rivalry for these nations.

1.1 Historical and Geographical bases of Israel's South Caucasus policy

²⁰ İNS Resource Informations Center, Azerbaijan: The Status of Armenians, Russians.

²¹ Azərbaycan-İsrail Münasibətləri, Azərbaycan Respublikasının Xarici İşlər Nazirliyi, [http://mfa.gov.az/images/stories/Countries/israel/01.pdf,\(10.02.2011\)](http://mfa.gov.az/images/stories/Countries/israel/01.pdf,(10.02.2011)).

²² Arye Gut, "Why Azerbaijan's Relations with Israel Are So Close?", Azerbaijan in the World ADA Biweekly Newsletter, Vol. 2, No. 8, 15 April 2009; (<http://ada.edu.az/biweekly/issues/vol2no8/200904>)

²³ Mark Perry, "Israel's Secret Staging Ground", Foreign Policy, [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/03/28/israelsecret_staging_ground,\(09.04.2012\)](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/03/28/israelsecret_staging_ground,(09.04.2012))

CHAPTER II. EXTERNAL FACTORS IN ISRAEL'S POLICY IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS

2.1 Israel and Turkey's rivalry for South Caucasus

Defining Israel's South Caucasus policy does not focus only on the Caucasus countries and the international system. Regional powers and their ambitions in the Caucasus influence Israel's regional policy as well. The South Caucasus covers three independent republics and three regional powers. Turkey, Iran and Russia are the main dominant powers in the region. There are various means to reshape and control the regions and change them. Sometimes the cooperation of two regional powers changed the regional balance of power in history. Even if two regional states' allies directly influence and limit the independent republics of the South Caucasus. Therefore, regional powers do not want non-regional powers to join actively in South Caucasus politics. In the tough and perplexed landscape of the Caucasus, we see how bilateral relations are broken and reshaped by other regional powers.

All regional powers invaded the South Caucasus and they had an impact on the region in history. Russia used Christianity, the Ottoman and Safavid used Islamic strategy for ruling the South Caucasus region. Modern South Caucasus republics have various problems each other and regional powers used conflicts to influence the regions. The collapse of the USSR, the South Caucasus region faced a geopolitical vacuum. In this term, Russia is an ambiguous poor regional state, Turkey depends on both economically and politically on the West and Iran finished war with Iraq. All regional states were in poor conditions in the region, and Israel used this vacuum to establish relations with the regional states. After approximately 10 years later, the world changed global power distribution and regional powers improved their capacities. It further differs from a unipolar system which consists of just one great power (or 'hyper power'¹), 'whose capabilities are too great to be counterbalanced' by any other state in the system²⁴. Therefore, after 2001, the USA faced a new threat or lost its dominance all over the world.

²⁴ William C. Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World", *International Security* Vol. 24, No. 1 (Summer, 1999), pp. 9.

Arising of regional powers and formulating new powers against unipolarity influence Israel's South Caucasus policy.

The free status of Jerusalem from the Ottoman period and the free spread of all three religions brought the two nations closer. However, even though Turkey is one of the key links to the success of Israel's "new enclosure" or "new circle" policy, they have also been rivals in the struggle for regional power. Although Turkish-Israeli relations have been successful in many areas, we can note the impact of the Gulf War in the 1990s as a result of changes in the world order and the location of both countries in the Middle East. The international situation after the Cold War, the PKK terror, the security factor and the important role of the United States brought the two countries closer²⁵.

However, the end of the Gulf War and the reluctance of the United States to bring the parties closer brought the countries back to their non-common national interests. During the US intervention in Iraq, interests became more divisive and entered a phase of conflict. He supported Iraq's territorial integrity, fearing that ethnic Kurds on the Turkish border would pose a problem in the future. However, Israel, which is "besieged" by Arab countries on all sides, praised the move. Although Turkey tried to mediate between the Arab countries and Israel in order to normalize these relations, Israel's attack on Gaza shook relations. Later, during the "World Economic Forum" held in Davos in 2009, a scandal between the Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the President of Israel S. Perez led the parties to a dead end. These conflicts continue in different areas, twisting in different ways. After being called an Israeli child thief in a Turkish-made film, Turkish Ambassador O. Çelikkol was summoned to the Knesset and placed in a "low chair" and the absence of the Turkish flag on the table, contrary to diplomatic protocol, led to the severance of relations. Sometime later, on May 31, 2010, 1 US and 8 Turkish citizens were killed when Israel shot down a Turkish ship outside its territorial waters. The lack of a realistic assessment of the incident at the UN Security

²⁵ Eldar Cəfərov, "ABŞ-ın Türkiyə-İsrail Münasibətlərinin Tənzimlənməsində Rolu", Tarix və onun problemləri, No 3, 2014, s.2.

Council worsened relations. In a statement after the attack on Mavi Marmara, Ilham Aliyev condemned the incident. Azerbaijan's position on the Palestinian issue is fully consistent with the position of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. Therefore, Azerbaijan wants to establish an independent and sovereign Palestinian state with Palestine as its center in East Jerusalem. From this point of view, Azerbaijan draws a parallel between the occupation of Karabakh by Armenia and the occupation of Palestine by Israel²⁶.

Shortly after the collapse of the USSR, Turkey was the main state that could help Israel establish relations with the newly independent Muslim countries. Therefore, the role of Turkey in the establishment of Azerbaijani-Israeli relations is undeniable. Especially after failing to get help from the United States under Amendment 907, we needed the help of the Jewish lobby to bring the Nagorno-Karabakh problem to the attention of the world community. After going through all these processes, the change of political line in Turkey did not go unnoticed in the Azerbaijani-Israeli relations.

Following the tense relations after the Mavi Marmara incident, Turkish Ambassador to Azerbaijan Hulusi Kilic gave an interview to the press saying that Azerbaijan should reconsider its relations with Israel. According to a report in the Israeli newspaper Yedioth Ahronot, Kilic also used the "BTC card" against Israel, saying that Israel was also prepared for possible "problems" in the BTC pipeline²⁷. That's why transit view of Turkey and non-alternative Israel depends on Turkey with energy security. Turkey, which plays a catalytic role in the development of Azerbaijani-Israeli relations, has suddenly become an obstacle. A number of reasons for this stem from Turkish-Israeli relations. Declining common interests and threats, and the US intervention in Iraq are just a few of them. One of the common threats was the religious factor. In particular, the religious factor that Israel sees as a threat in

²⁶ Mina Muradova, "Azerbaijan Struggles to Remain Neutral in Turkey-Israeli Spat", Analyst, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, <http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5648/print>

²⁷ Dudi Cohen, "Turkey to Azerbaijan: Stand with us Against Israel", Yedioth Ahronot, <http://www.ynetnews.com/0.7340.L-4127332.00.html>

Turkey's domestic politics ("Political Islam" not only ceased to be a religion, but even came to power)²⁸.

The attempt to re-establish the borders and severed diplomatic relations between Armenia and Turkey in Switzerland in 2007, which was described in the Turkish media as "opening of the borders with Armenia" and closed in 1993, caused a very strong reaction of our country. Without achieving any of the goals set, they simply created new problems with all the neighbors by simply applying Davutoglu's "zero problem" theory to the neighbors, without applying it in practice. Later, the "Flag Crisis" in the Turkish-Armenian football match and the participation of Abdullah Gul in the return match in Armenia caused tension. Armenia's "football diplomacy" did not happen, although it was intended to break the Azerbaijani-Turkish relations. Thanks to Ilham Aliyev's foresight, we not only overcame this difficult period, but even turned a broken relationship into a "strategic partnership" in 2010. At a time when relations were close to breaking down, Azerbaijan began to move closer to Israel. The agreement reached in February 2012 on cooperation in military and counter-intelligence relations with Israel proves that the Azerbaijani-Israeli relations cover not only the political and economic spheres, but also other areas and have reached the stage of "strategic partnership".

Turkey's influence on Azerbaijani-Israeli relations has been different at different times. Thus, if Turkey's foreign policy in the early 1990s was aimed at bringing Azerbaijan and Israel closer, in the 2000s it brought Azerbaijan and Israel closer together, although it did not want to cut ties between Israel and Turkey. At a time when Turkey is trying to use the BTC card, the Jewish lobby has also tried to raise the issue of the so-called "Armenian genocide" in the United States.

According to the Yedioth Ahranoth newspaper, Knesset Speaker Reuvan Rivlin said during the meeting: "As a nation that has experienced genocide, we cannot

²⁸ Araz Aslanlı, Dr.Nazim Cəfərsəy, "Türkiyə-İsrail münasibətləri: keçmiş, bu gün və gələcək", http://qafsam.org/page/94/az?fbclid=IwAR3r-aF6dgQn0HdHOOfrUeH9iAV2e56E6_3tOx6P-idjIBLAiaN4NTv9Xd8

ignore this problem²⁹." In the following years, Rivlin was elected President of Israel and continued Turkish policy. He is even the first Israeli president to take action for the "Armenian genocide." After this tough political line, both sides, thinking more pragmatically, began to step back. The Israeli side has not recognized this so-called genocide. The need of both countries for each other has led to reconciliation. Up to 30% of Israel's energy security is transported via the BTC pipeline alone. Therefore, Turkey is one of the vital countries for Israel. Azerbaijan also played a role in Israel's soft policy on the so-called genocide. Following the views of Israeli analysts, the idea that this decision would cool not only Turkey but also Azerbaijan from Israel prompted Israel to take a step back. Because the role of Azerbaijan and Turkey in Israel's "new circle" policy is undeniable.

Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov paid an official visit to Israel and Palestine in 2013. This is the first official visit to Israel at the Foreign Ministry level. It was incorrect to describe this visit in the media as a visit only to Israel, because Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov visited the Middle East. According to the Foreign Ministry spokesman, the issue of opening an embassy in Israel or Palestine was not on the agenda. It was also noted that the issue of Palestine was on the agenda for Azerbaijan by providing loans to the Palestinian population. One of the main reasons for Turkey's influence on Azerbaijani-Israeli relations is the fact that Azerbaijani-Turkish relations are much closer than at the level of the two countries.

Although both Turkey and Azerbaijan act in their national interests, they are very sensitive to each other's vital interests. Israel has always tried to keep a third party in mind, both in its relations with Azerbaijan and in its relations with Turkey. Due to all this, Turkey's catalyst in the establishment of Azerbaijani-Israeli relations led to the subsequent transfer of this role to Azerbaijan. If Turkey regulated Israel's relations with our newly independent country, after the 2000s, Azerbaijan tried to play a catalytic role in restoring Turkish-Israeli relations.

²⁹ Attila Somfalvi, "Knesset Must Recognize Armenian Genocide", Yedioth Ahranoth, <http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4166801,00.html>

Israel-Armenia-Turkey triangle is also fluctuated. Armenia-Palestine relations and proximity of using self-determination law broke Israeli-Armenia relations as well. Turkey's Armenia relations in the mid of 2000s, improved Israel-Azerbaijan relations. The only state Georgia in the region, Turkey-Israeli relations do not influence deeply. Georgia's geographically proximity of Russia and Western world helped to avoid or neutralize Israeli-Turkey rivalry.

3.2 Israeli and Iran's confrontation in the region

Iran and South Caucasus, properly Azerbaijan and Armenia, related and neighbour countries. Above 16.5 million ethnic Azerbaijani³⁰ and approximately 250 thousand ethnic Armenians live in Iran³¹. After our country gained independence, both countries have established more cautious relations for some time. The reason for this was the fear of spreading the Iranian revolution beyond its borders. However, in the early days after the collapse of the USSR, Iran sought to spread the Islamic revolution, but in modern times it has replaced this policy with more economic dialogue. After gaining independence, the establishment of relations between our country and the West and Israel, the adoption of a secular state model, made it difficult for Iran to influence the Shiite population in Azerbaijan³².

Relations with Iran were very complicated in 1990-1994. Thus, relations began to improve until 1992, but began to deteriorate in the summer with the coming to power of Elchibey. After Heydar Aliyev led the country since 1993, a balanced policy was chosen, so relations with Iran began to normalize again. A tough domestic policy has been chosen against ethnic Azerbaijanis living in Iran and more than twice the population of Azerbaijan. Afraid of all this, Iran was one of the countries that helped Armenia the most during the Karabakh conflict. One of the most important elements influencing Azerbaijani-Iranian relations is the close dialogue between

³⁰ https://joshuaproject.net/people_groups/18859/IR

³¹ <http://www.parstimes.com/history/armenians.html>

³² Arif Keskin, "Şii Jeopolitiği ve İran", "Ortadoğu'da Güç savaşları: Hedef Neden İran, Der.Mehmet Tuncel,Etkileşim Yayınları,2008, ss. 50-52.

Baku and Tel Aviv. The development of relations between Israel and Azerbaijan, which Iran considers its most important enemy, has been strongly condemned.

Iran even condemns Turkey for mediating in the establishment of these relations. Ethnic Identity Group and U.S. Foreign Policy author Professor Thomas Ambrosio also notes that in the first years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkey saw Azerbaijan as a springboard for gaining influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia through a common language and religion. He writes the facts of seeing Turkey³³. Azerbaijan has tried to balance Israel with the Conference on Islamic Cooperation, and has not lost the support of one of the two in resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Therefore, during the UN occupation of Gaza in 2008-2009, Azerbaijan also voted for the Goldstone report, and even issued an ultimatum to Israel during the 2006 Israeli occupation of Lebanon³⁴.

However, the Arab countries, which condemned Azerbaijan for establishing relations with Israel, did not give an ultimatum on this issue. Azerbaijan also accepted the opening of a Palestinian embassy in Baku on June 29, 2011 and expressed support for Palestine becoming an independent country. This proves the balanced policy pursued by our country at that time. Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov announced at the 2013 Conference on "Development of Jerusalem and Assistance to the Palestinian People" within the Organization of Islamic Cooperation that we will provide \$ 5 million in aid to Palestine³⁵.

According to Iranian analysts, Azerbaijan has approached Turkey, the United States, Israel and NATO, in fact trying to reduce Russia's influence. In the early 2000s, there were many rumors that the NATO army would open a headquarters in our country. Vafa Guluzade, Heydar Aliyev's political adviser, also spoke about measures for Azerbaijan's security, as well as his closeness to NATO. The reason why the issue was removed from the agenda after a while was that NATO did not yet

³³ Thomas Ambrosio, "Ethnic Identity Groups and U.S. Foreign Policy", 2002 p. 151

³⁴ Maxim Edwards, "Conflict in Nagorno-Karabagh raises scrutiny of Israel's arms sales to Azerbaijan" <https://globalvoices.org/2020/11/12/conflict-nagorno-karabakh-raises-scrutiny-israeli-arms-azerbaijan/>

³⁵ "Azerbaycan'dan Filistin'e Yardım" , <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/disisleri-bakani-davutoglu-turkiye-kudus-u-ve-filistan-halkini-hicbir-zaman-yalniz-birakmayacaktır.tr.mfa>

have plans to expand into Eastern Europe and put it on the agenda of the South Caucasus, where Azerbaijan is located.

Another point of concern for Iran in the development of our country's relations with the United States is the close involvement of the United States in the exploitation of Caspian energy resources and the restructuring of the Caspian Basin policy. In order to balance Russia and Iran, the great powers bordering Azerbaijan, he was forced to establish contacts with actors outside the region and developed relations with Israel. According to Aran Amnon, a Middle East specialist at the City University of London, the element that increases the importance of Azerbaijan for Israel is Iran's nuclear power³⁶.

In modern times, Israel and Iran are waging an invisible war for influence in the South Caucasus. Israel is trying to maneuver against Iran by developing relations with these countries. In return, Iran is trying to weaken our country by using Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan's bleeding wound. On the other hand, he is waging a psychological war, saying that if there is a war with the United States, he will attack Israel and its allies. There is also a lot of competition between the Israeli security service MOSSAD and the Iranian security service SAVAK. The Iranians blamed MOSSAD for the assassination of Iranian physicist Mustafa Ahmadi. These issues have deepened to such an extent that on May 22, 2012, Iran recalled its ambassador, Mohammad Bagir Bahrami. Although the reason is that they insulted their religious leaders, in fact, it is said that it was done adequately to get closer to Israel³⁷. One of the breaking points in relations between Azerbaijan and Iran is Iran's attempts to export religious religious extremism to the north. In the 1990s, Heydar Aliyev realized this and took certain measures. He prevented Iranian mullahs from preaching in Azerbaijan, saying it was against secular principles³⁸.

³⁶ Alden, C. and Aran, A. (2011). *Foreign policy analysis: New approaches*.

³⁷ "Geri Çekilme Arifesinde Bakü ve Tahran", New Eastern Outlook, Çev. Şharifa jabbarova, Uluslararası Strateji ve Güvenlik Araştırmaları Merkezi, <http://www.usgam.com.tr/index.php?l=844&cid=826&konu=0&bolge=7>

³⁸ Alexander Murinson, "A Bone in the Throat: Azerbaijani- Iranian Relations in the beginning of the 21st Century",

Recently, Azerbaijan is balancing the close dialogue that Iran has developed with Armenia with Israel. Thanks to the changes, the "Balanced Policy" of Heydar Aliyev's time has changed a bit. Our country abstained from this in the November 2011 vote of the UN Security Council on Iran's human rights violations. But before that, we always voted against. As Ilham Aliyev said, today Azerbaijan is pursuing a policy based on its national interests, leaving behind a period of balanced policy and becoming more independent.

According to foreign media reports, Azerbaijan-Israel relations have developed significantly in the military field, which has alarmed Iran. In order to prevent all these concerns, the then Minister of Defense Safar Abiyev visited Iran on March 12, 2012 and said that the lands of our country would not be used against Iran³⁹. The main reason for this opinion of Azerbaijan against Iran is the document signed in 2005. According to the document, if one of the two countries is attacked by a third country, the other country must remain neutral⁴⁰. Along with Azerbaijan, Israel has been developing relations with Turkey and Georgia in the region since the 1990s. Along with Azerbaijan, Israel has been developing relations with Turkey and Georgia in the region since the 1990s. In view of all this, the issue of opening an embassy in Israel since the time of Heydar Aliyev, but not received, is not only due to fear of Iran. Another major reason may be the lack of support from Islamic countries. In particular, low-interest loans from countries such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE, as well as gaining the votes of 22 Arab countries in the UN. Azerbaijan, which has been developing in recent years with oil exports, rightly continues its strategic alliance with Israel, despite Iran. Especially when we consider Nagorno-Karabakh, which is the main problem in Azerbaijan's foreign policy, not only did Iran not support us, but it also helped Armenia without neutrality, which accelerated the pace of development of our relations with Israel.

³⁹ Mark Perry, "İsrael's Secret Staging Ground", Foreign Policy, http://www.foreign-policy.com/articles/2012/03/28/israel_s_secret_staging_ground

⁴⁰ Güner Özkan, "Azerbaycan-İran İlişkileri: Bir Millet İki Devlet veya Düşman Kardeşler", Uluslararası Stratejik Araştırmalar Kurumu, <http://www.usak.org.tr/myazdir.asp?id=2134>

Today, the Yerevan-Tehran tandem is also moving towards a strategic alliance. In 1992, Iran exported natural gas and gasoline to Armenia to continue its military aggression. In the same year, they agreed to build the pipeline. However, Moscow's concern that Armenia would be fully liberated delayed the issue until 1997. According to the agreement between the two countries in April 2007, work was done to build a 300 km pipeline through Mehri⁴¹.

It is also known that Iran indirectly provided weapons to Armenian servicemen waging war against Azerbaijan. A statement issued by the US State Department in May 2002 stated that Armenia was also assisting Iran in acquiring a nuclear weapon. It is reported that such activities take place in the Upper Karabakh region. Iran has been a window to the world for Armenians since Turkey closed its borders with Armenia in 1993. Therefore, as Ganira Pashayeva said, if Iran, like Turkey, closed its border with Armenia, the fate of the war could have been different⁴².

In an interview with Hurriyet Daily News, Deputy Foreign Minister Araz Azimov noted that Iran and Armenia have about 30 agreements on political and economic cooperation, and expressed support for Russia's resistance to the Nagorno-Karabakh peace talks with Russia and Iran⁴³. Recently, there has been a big gap between Iran's policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia and its official ideology. His support for Armenia instead of Azerbaijan in the Karabakh conflict, his support for Moscow instead of Muslim Chechens in the conflict in Chechnya, and his support for Moscow during the Tajik civil war show that religion is not the main driving force in Iran's political line. Even Iran's pro-Armenian policy is unconstitutional. This is because Article 3, paragraph 16 of the Iranian constitution, adopted by referendum on December 2, 1979, states that "to build the country's foreign policy on the basis of Islamic values, to treat all Muslims as brothers and to provide uninterrupted and

⁴¹ Michael Fredholm, "The World of Central Asian Oil and Gas", Asian Cultures and Modernity Research Report No. 16, Stockholm University, 2008, p.50

⁴² Ganire Paşayeva: " Tarihe Bakacak Olursak İran'a Söyleyecek Sözümüz Çok", The First News, <http://www.1news.com.tr/roprtajveyorumlar/20120228110316092.html>

⁴³ Serkan Demirtaş, "Upset with Iran, Baku Moves Closer to Israel", Hürriyet Daily News", <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/upset-with-iran-baku-moves-closer-to-israel.aspx?pageID=238&nID=31876&NewsCatID=359>

sustainable assistance to the oppressed."⁴⁴ These articles were used in the opposite in the relations against Azerbaijan and Chechnya.

The Caucasus, which has historically been indivisible between Turks, Russians and Iranians, has attracted the interest of actors outside the region in recent centuries, especially after oil became an important economic factor. According to Arastun Orujlu, the Caucasus region is currently witnessing the most mixed competition of the last 200 years. Thanks to competition between regional states, global powers are also gaining influence in the region and creating an invisible "chain of alliances." In addition to Azerbaijan, Israel's rapprochement with Turkey has led to the formation of two separate alliances, especially in the Arab world (especially Syria). Concerned about Iran's relations with Israel and its diversified policy in the first group, Azerbaijan's enemy has approached Armenia. Russia has approached Iran in line with Turkey's activities in the Caucasus⁴⁵.

Syria is getting closer to Iran due to Turkey's close relations with Israel, while Armenia is joining the first group because of problems with Azerbaijan and Turkey. The actions of Armenia, which has a Russian military base on its territory and seeks to establish a political alliance with Iran, Syria, Greece and Southern Cyprus, run counter to Israel's foreign policy interests. Therefore, Turkey, which feels threatened by Armenia's place in the first group, and Israel's choice of a close line in the Caucasus policy, and its non-support of the "Armenian Genocide" have brought the countries closer in a tripartite format. Georgia, meanwhile, has moved closer to Israel thanks to its strong ties with the United States. It is no coincidence that Israel has been one of the largest investors in the Georgian economy. Georgia's close relations with Turkey make it in the second group. As a result, a Turkey-Israel-Azerbaijan-Georgia union was formed against the Russia-Iran-Syria-Armenia-Greece union. Iran's desire to export revolutions to post-Soviet countries has been a factor in the

⁴⁴ "The Constitution of Islamic Republic of Iran", The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Islamic Republic of Iran,

<http://en.mfa.ir/index.asp?fkeyid=&siteid=3&pageid=2144>

⁴⁵ Damien McGuinness, "Iran Nuclear Tensions Put Caucasus on Alert", BBC News, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-17100586>

deterioration of relations from the very beginning. In addition, the weakening of Iran's power in resolving the economic difficulties and ethnic conflicts of these countries has reduced its influence. Israel's developed economy and political power gave it the image of a "model country" and took it one step further in its competition with Iran. Given all this, Israel does not want to besiege Iran by creating alliances in Central Asia and the Caucasus, and Iran does not want other players to enter the region. Azerbaijan, which is constantly trying to balance this competition, has the opportunity to maneuver in its bilateral relations. There is a great potential for more effective development of relations between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Islamic Republic of Iran and the achievement of mutually beneficial results, and the Azerbaijani side is making great efforts to use these opportunities⁴⁶.

Israel-Iran rivalry occurred at Caucasus, Georgia and Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan because of Islamic religious and ethnic Turkish population. Armenia is not a threat for Iran. At the same time, Georgia is not a threat but it is opportunity for trade relations with West. That's why, Armenia depends on Iran economy and Israel understood that Armenia is not beneficial. Azerbaijan is threat for Iran and potential ally for Israel. Thus, Israel-Iran classical rivalry occurred in Middle East and influence South Caucasus. After the second Karabakh War, Iran lost their political cards in the region and will try to improve reputation in Azerbaijan. Iran wants to give internationally martyr medal Azerbaijani national hero's family but family did not accept it⁴⁷. All attempts after war, do not help to regain reputation in Azerbaijani population. Israel and Iran rivalry changes its picture after the war. Israel-Azerbaijan proximity, even if, Azerbaijan declares that open trade missions in Tel-Aviv⁴⁸. Azerbaijan-Israel relations transforms strategic partnership and Iran will try to change its one-way Armenia policy toward the Azerbaijani side. After the war, Iran will join new reality and behave balanced manner for Baku.

⁴⁶ Yaqub Vəliyev, "Müasir Dövrədə Azərbaycan-İran Münasibətləri", Tarix və onun problemləri, No 4 ,2009, s.6.

⁴⁷ <https://iqna.ir/az/news/3489712/polad-h%C9%99%C5%9Fimovun-ail%C9%99sin%C9%99-general-qasim-s%C3%BCleymani-medal%C4%B1-verildi-foto>

⁴⁸ https://apa.az/en/xeber/politics_of_azerbaijan/Opening-of-the-trade-mission-of-Azerbaijan-in-Israel-is-a-historic-event-for-both-peoples-coloredANALYTICScolor-348425

2.3 Israeli and Russia's ambitions and cooperation in region

For some time after the collapse of the USSR, the issue of the collapse of Russia was on the agenda. Therefore, during this period, Russia was forced to focus on the North Caucasus and reduce its influence on the processes in the South Caucasus. During the Chechen war, Russia focused on its own internal problems, creating unresolved conflicts in the region because it thought it would lose the South Caucasus completely. After some time, Russia, which has gained internal stability, has chosen to create a number of organizations to build new "integration" ties or to maintain existing ties. These include the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and the BRICS. The change of the world after 2001, the launch of the US Arab Spring operations, the intervention of NATO in Bosnia, required a change in Russia's geopolitics. Although Russia did not feel ready as a regional power, security threats forced it to do so.

Russia took different steps in different regions and then tried to unite them under a single strategy. For example, in Russia's Baltic policy, the main force in Ukraine and Kazakhstan is the Russian population, while in the Caucasus and Moldova, this tool is ethno-political conflicts, enclaves. Russia-Israel rivalry occurred in the Caucasus at Georgia and Azerbaijan. Georgia's western policy and Azerbaijan's national interest policy demands different approach to the rivalry. For example, in Georgia, Israel should directly against Russia and its impossible for Israel's foreign policy strategy. Therefore, in Azerbaijan and Armenia conflict, Israel-Russia's proxy war occurred in the region.

Israeli-Russia rivalry changed in Caucasus. In the mid of 90s, Russia perceive that Israel is a western Trojan horse in the Caucasus. But after 2001, Russia's Caucasus policy and Israel's Caucasus approach changed a little bit. Thus, Russia moved to changed or blocked Western ideas going to South Caucasus and at the same time Israel became the independent actor in the South Caucasus. Therefore, Russia-

Israel relations are a little bit weird. Sometimes Russia balanced Iran and Turkey in the region with Israel and Israel choose Russia against Iran.

In the Caucasus, Armenia joined CSTO, Azerbaijan joined Non-Aligned Movement. Conversely, as Georgia is not a member of the CSTO like Armenia—and, unlike Azerbaijan, sought to join NATO, albeit unsuccessfully—Russia felt that there was indeed motivation for it as well as nothing preventing it from taking military action against Georgia in August 2008⁴⁹. Georgia's doubt for choosing political orientation caused to lost 2 different areas. Azerbaijan's energy potential and transformation of Caucasus leader worried Russia and it try to length the solution of Nagorno Karabagh conflict. Russia's main geopolitical tower of Armenia changed its political approach toward the west. In the point of view of Russia, Georgia's land annexed but Georgia transformed west, Armenia started lost quickly and Russia changed Azerbaijan policy slowly in South Caucasus. If in 2000s, Russia controlled Caucasus via poor Armenia with creating balance. After 2018, Russia changed policy toward South Caucasus, try to controlled powerful Azerbaijan and Azerbaijan controlled the whole of Caucasus. Israel-Russian rivalry and classical Russia-Iran-Armenia trilateral strategy changed in Caucasus. Russian soft-power and security balance in Caucasus faced new opportunities. Israel's soft-power and Russian soft-power rivalry continue at Caucasus. Strategic Russian bank "VTB" came to own 100% of CJSC "VTB Armenia"⁵⁰ and 51% of "Bank VTB in Azerbaijan"⁵¹; in 2006 world-largest gas company Gazprom signed a 25-year strategic cooperation agreement with Armenian government enabling the company to control all of the natural gas-related projects in the country; Russian cell phone operators Beeline, MTC and Megafon purchased large shares in national operators in Georgia, Armenia, and Abkhazia. Therefore, Russia is still influence Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijani market economy.

⁴⁹ Michael Bishku, "The South Caucasus and the Growing Influence of Russia: Balancing on a Tightrope", MERIA Journal Volume 15, No 1, (March 2011), p.2

⁵⁰ "O Banke VTB (Armenia) (About the VTB Armenia)", 2013-01-25. URL: <http://ru.vtb.am/about/>

⁵¹ "Ot mezhdunarodnogo opyta k azerbajdzhanskoj praktike (From the international experience to the practice of Azerbaijan)", 2013-01-25. URL: <http://ru.vtb.az/>

Russia's altered view for Caucasus will establish new rivalry between Israel and Russia after the Second Karabagh war. Azerbaijan's victory, Russian peacekeepers came into Azerbaijan, Russian new mediator role in Caucasus is beneficial for Russia's new South Caucasus policy. In 90s, Russia lost its mediator role and accept OSCE's role in conflict. After 2020, Russia gains new mediator role on Armenia-Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabagh conflict. Russia's new South Caucasus policy based on "stick and carrot" policy. If Armenia changes its foreign policy against Russia, then Russia punished it. Russia's peacekeeping policy is another problem for Azerbaijan and Georgia. Peacekeepers helped secessionist groups and fight against Georgia⁵². Russia gets new influence means Azerbaijan, at the same time Russian 102 military base located in Armenia. In Generally, Russia's army was located in all Caucasus countries, de-facto. Russian military and economically existence in the Caucasus and Israel's economically existence is quite different. For example, Turkey's military existence and trained Azerbaijani and Georgia army for preparing NATO standard creates Turkey's military power in the region. Even though Iran's military power does not influence the region.

To sum up, Russia and Turkey transformed new and real actors of South Caucasus, but Iran and Israel secondary much more economical and ideological power. Indeed, Israel's South Caucasus policy improved but Iran's policy lost its fulcrum in the region. In the period of war, UK and Israel's diplomatic powers and Turkey's military strength changed Russian policy a little. Russia-Israel rivalry and cooperation in the South Caucasus is pragmatic relations on the reality of Caucasus. Israel do not support Georgia, when Russia fights against Georgia at the same time, Russia does not create barrier Israel's Caucasus policy. On the other hand, military industry is the second financial sector for Russian economy⁵³. Israel's and Turkey's new tactic UAV caused losing Russia's defense arms' market in the world and South Caucasus. It is the other and essential economic rivalry cause for Russia-Israel relations.

⁵² <https://www.mei.edu/publications/russias-peacekeeping-south-caucasus>

⁵³ <https://tradingeconomics.com/russia/weapons-sales>

CHAPTER III. STAGES AND SEQUENCES IN ISRAEL'S POLICY IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS

3.1 From the Collapse of USSR to 11 September 2001

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the bipolar structure in the international system has been replaced by a much more complex and "fragile" structure. There is almost no state left unaffected by the process. In the whole world The South Caucasus, which has been under the Russian administration for nearly 200 years and where today three independent states (Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia) are located, is one of the regions most affected by this process of change. The region called "Transcaucasia" during the Soviet Union period. After 1991, on the one hand, while experiencing the pain of transition from central planning to market economy, from communist rule to democracy, on the other hand, it witnessed the power struggle of the great powers. With the collapse of the USSR, the largest continental state in the world, in 1991, a great power vacuum occurred in the middle of Eurasia. With Brzezinski's conceptualization, this "black hole" formed in the heart of Eurasia was tried to be filled by the US, the Atlanticist-Anglo-Saxon naval power that reached the position of the world's only superpower⁵⁴.

With the US turning to the former Soviet region, which it stayed away from during the Cold War period, Israel, Washington's biggest ally in the Middle East, started to increase its influence in the region. Approximately a quarter of a century after the USSR cut all diplomatic relations with Israel after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, known as the "Six Day Wars", Israel re-contacted the countries of the region. In this context, countries in the region such as Israel's leading force of the USA in the regional competition between the USA and Russia. Developing its foreign policy understanding largely due to geographical isolation, security concerns and fear of being destroyed by the surrounding Arab states, Israel attaches great importance to

⁵⁴ Emeklier, Bilgehan (4 Haziran 2010). "Soğuk Savaş Sonrası Uluslararası Sistemin Analizi".

developing its relations with non-regional states in the new period⁵⁵. According to Tel Aviv, the dialogue to be established with the Southern Caucasus countries will both positively affect Israel's relations with other states and, considering that Azerbaijan and Armenia are borders with Iran, it will be an important move to encircle Tehran. South Caucasus countries have dealt with the problems that every newly established country will face after gaining their independence. In order to overcome some of the political and economic problems that emerged during this process, these states have made great efforts to develop their relations in the international arena. Membership of Western-based organizations such as the Council of Europe, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, and their dialogue with NATO within the framework of the Partnership for Peace Program were seen as important tools to reach the political, military and economic resources they needed in this painful period. In this respect, Israel has been one of the most important countries that the South Caucasus countries have contacted in this process, with its close dialogue with Western countries, especially the USA, as well as its technological power.

Israel's policy toward South Caucasus occurred and changed their normal picture. Israel always used periphery strategy in international system. In bipolar world, Israel used periphery strategy against Arab world and try to create safety circle. After a while, Arab states lose their enmity position for Israel, Iran change their internal regime. After 1979 revolution, Israel prepared new periphery strategy but this time against Iran. In 1979, Israel's new periphery strategy do not work because this strategy works only exist a lot of neighbour countries. After collapsed USSR, Israel tried to reuse their new strategy at Caucasus. This approach used two periphery policy. One of them covers Northern Africa, Cyprus, Azerbaijan⁵⁶ and it is great chamber, but the other one covers Turkey, South Caucasus, Middle Asia countries. These circles create red lines for Israel and state used reaction all levels in any time.

⁵⁵ Efeğil, Ertan (2013). "İsrail'in Dış Politikasının Belirleyicileri". *Ortadoğu Analiz*, 5(49): 55-56.

⁵⁶ https://vestnik.mgimo.ru/jour/article/view/519?locale=en_US

That's why, Israel's South Caucasus policy divided into three periods. First period is from the dissolution of USSR to 11 September 2001. In this period US based international system existed and Russia is quite poor for intervene world policy and the whole of Caucasus. The second period is after 11 September 2001 act. Some scholars argue that USA's lost hegemony and Transnational terrorism transformed against it. The others argue that former Communism threat abolished and USA used terrorism as enemy for fighting against it and influence the world. Whatever which thoughts are true in the IR context, we strongly agree that this change influence Israel's South Caucasus policy. The third term of altering of Israel policy occurred The Second Karabagh War period.

Israel's foreign policy doctrine based on some crucial facts which directly influence it. One of the main indicators of Israel's foreign policy mean is based on super powers. If Israel or Jews used Great Britain at the beginning of the century for moved to Middle East. After three decades Israel used France for fight against Egypt. After Ben Gurion's becoming power, and USA transformed super power, Israel established its foreign policy trusted USA. That's true, sometimes properly, Israel's Africa policy and Iran policy different than USA's policy and point of view to region but in general Israel-USA tandem existed after USSR's collapse period. In this period, Russia is poor and weak in the system, USA is a hegemon. Israel is regional country and used USA and West's umbrella for including the region.

South Caucasus region is perplexed and it has geopolitical vacuum in the region in this term. Iran finished war with Iraq, Turkey fighting against PKK and Russia is weak for controlling region. In this term, whatever USA is a hegemon but it is far from the region. USA used EU and Israel for including the region. At the same time, region countries' internal policy and cooperation among them is collapse. Even if Armenia-Azerbaijan become enemy and fighting against each other. That's why, Israel's foreign policy toward South Caucasus based on social and historical background, in other words, Israel used Mountain Jews and USA's hegemony for including region. At the same time, intervene for establishing balance in the region in this term. Israel helped Azerbaijan for losing Russia's power in this country.

Azerbaijan is Israel's most important country in the South Caucasus, with Iran's neighbor and its energy resources. Israel was one of the first countries to recognize the independence of Azerbaijan. The main reason that brought Israel closer to Azerbaijan was the way Azerbaijanis viewed Jews. Shortly after declaring our independence on October 18, 1991, Israel recognized our state on December 25, 1991. However, diplomatic relations between the two countries were established on April 7, 1992. One-on-one flights between the two countries began in 1992.

Despite the establishment of diplomatic relations between Azerbaijan and Israel in a very short time, relations with Israel remained a bit remote due to the foreign policy pursued by the then President Mutallibov against Russia and Iran. However, the provision of arms to our country both before and after the Karabakh war shows that there are relations between the two countries. Azerbaijan is one of the areas where anti-Semitism has not been experienced since the past, and for this reason, the Jewish population is densely populated⁵⁷. The fact that Israel today meets approximately 30% of its energy needs from Azerbaijan alone makes Azerbaijan an important country for Israel. Azerbaijan, after Turkey and Egypt, is the third mostly Muslim country that has mutual strategic and economic relations with Israel⁵⁸.

Some Israeli experts think that the development of Israel-Azerbaijan relations, which have been increasingly increasing in recent years and considered as "strategic", will help Israel to change its negative perception in the Islamic world. According to Murinson, Israel's cooperation with newly independent Muslim countries, particularly Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, will be a "model" between Muslim countries and the Jewish state⁵⁹.

Elchibey negotiated the opening of an embassy in Israel in 1993, believing that further development of relations with Israel would help bring him closer to both Karabakh and the West. The fact that Israel and Azerbaijan have similar foreign policy goals and problems caused the development of relations between the two

⁵⁷ Lili Di Pippo, "Israel Interest in Strategic Cooperation with Azerbaijan" , Caucaz Euronews, <http://www.caucaz.com>

⁵⁸ Abilov Shamkhal, "THE AZERBAIJAN-ISRAEL RELATIONS: A NON-DIPLOMATIC, BUT STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP", OAKA, Cilt:4, Sayı: 8, s. 148, 2009

⁵⁹ <https://www.jpost.com/opinion/op-ed-contributors/a-welcome-new-stage-in-azerbaijani-israeli-ties>

countries in a short time. First of all, regional loneliness, problems with neighboring countries, concern for Iranian expansion and security of Caspian energy resources are the focal points of both countries in foreign policy⁶⁰.

Like Israel, Azerbaijan also has concerns about the security of the country. In these periods, the fact that 20% of its territory is under the occupation of Armenia and its neighbor with Russia and Iran, which constantly support Armenia in military, political and economic terms, is an important security weakness for Azerbaijan. Although the ceasefire agreement was signed with Armenia in 1994, the continuation of the hot conflict during this period increases the security concerns of Azerbaijan. In addition, the fact that it is surrounded by two great powers, Russia and Iran, which constantly support Armenia politically and militarily, has made it necessary for Azerbaijan to communicate with other regional powers to support it and supply weapons.

Relations between Azerbaijan and Israel increased during the time of Abulfeyz Elchibey, matured in the time of Heydar Aliyev and gained a "strategic" character during the reign of Ilham Aliyev. Emphasizing that Israel is among the four or five important countries in Azerbaijan's foreign policy, Elchibey thought that the Jewish Lobby could influence the American administration to end the occupation in Upper Karabakh and help Azerbaijan to establish economic and political dialogue with the West⁶¹. Especially the removal of Azerbaijan from the scope of the "Aid to the Freedoms Law" approved by the US Congress on October 24, 1992 with the effect of the Armenian lobby revealed the need of Baku for the Jewish lobby, considering the limited power of the Turkish lobby in Washington⁶². This law was temporarily repealed in January 2002 by the President of the United States, George Bush, after Azerbaijan joined the anti-terror coalition of the USA, opened its airspace to the USA

⁶⁰ Bourtman, İlya (Summer 2006). "İsrael and Azerbaijan Furtive Embrace". *Middle East Quartely*. 13(3): 47-57. <https://www.meforum.org/987/israel-and-azerbaijans-furtive-embrace>

⁶¹ Wasserman, Aryeh (1995). "A Year of Rule by the Popular Front of Azerbaijan". Der. Yaacov Ro. *Muslim Eurasia Conflicting Legacies*. Essex: Frank Cass &Co. Ltd. 143-160.

⁶² Uzer, Umut (2011). *Identity and Turkish Foreign Policy*, New York: I.B. Tauris&Co Ltd.

in the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq after the events of September 11, 2001⁶³. According to the additional article, these or similar acts will be revoked only when Azerbaijan's embargo on Armenia ends. The fact that the act was originally written as "Russia and 11 states" but later changed to "Russia, Ukraine, Armenia and other countries" also shows how interesting the Armenian lobby is here⁶⁴.

Despite all these developments between the two countries, Azerbaijan still does not have an embassy in Israel. Azerbaijan, which did not open an embassy in Tel Aviv despite all the pressure of Israel, shows this situation as a reason for its geographical location, especially its proximity to Iran and its membership in the Organization of the Islamic Conference⁶⁵. Baku calculates that if the diplomatic representation in Tel Aviv is raised to the level of embassy, the majority of Muslim countries may lose their support against Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

Despite Armenians try to genocide against Azerbaijan in Khojaly district, Azerbaijan has been accused of imposing an embargo on the enemy. Against this decision, Azerbaijan began to take two serious directions in our foreign policy. The first is giving a larger share to BP (England) instead of AMOCO (USA) in the consortium set up to extract oil from the Azeri, Gunashli and Chirag oil fields, and the second is working with the Jewish lobby against the Armenian lobby. Since the first presidency of Heydar Aliyev, Azerbaijan-Israel relations have reached the peak and reached the level of strategic partnership. The first official visit between the two countries was the meeting of Israeli MP Efrahim Sneh with Heydar Aliyev on December 6, 1993, and he later expressed interest in developing economic and cultural relations with Azerbaijan⁶⁶.

⁶³ Həydər Əliyev İrsi Beynəlxalq Elektron Kitabxana (22 Kasım 2006). "Azerbaycan-ABD". <http://lib.aliyev-heritage.org/tk/752886.html>

⁶⁴ Rovshan Mammadov, "ABD'nin Güney Kafkasya Politikası", Ankara Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, , Ankara,2008,s.14

⁶⁵ Abilov Shamkhal, "THE AZERBAIJAN-ISRAEL RELATIONS: A NON-DIPLOMATIC, BUT STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP", OAKA, Cilt:4, Sayı: 8, s. 148, 2009

⁶⁶ <https://www.jpost.com/opinion/supporting-the-azeri-formula-in-nagorno-karabach-conflict-646255>

Eliezer Yotvat, the first ambassador of Israel to our country, started his work on March 22, 1994 by presenting his agrarian document to Heydar Aliyev⁶⁷. Yotvat did his best to raise relations between the two countries to the highest level. Before Yotvat was appointed ambassador, Israel was represented in our country by Beni Haddad, an employee of the Israeli Armed Forces. Haddad, 24, had no experience when he started working, but he was also tasked with helping Azerbaijani Jews migrate to Israel. Fearing to establish direct diplomatic relations with Israel, Heydar Aliyev sent his Foreign Policy Adviser Vafa Guluzade to Tel Aviv, but did not hurry to open an embassy. Although Israel does not like this situation, Azerbaijan has tried to explain it with the issues of neighborhood with Iran and membership in the OIC.

The opposition of the Arab world prevented us from opening an embassy. Due to all this, no embassy has been opened in Israel so far. This issue was discussed again in 2004, but was not resolved due to lack of funding. The President of Azerbaijan, Heydar Aliyev, has always paid attention to Israel, and because of his cautious approach, they have called this policy a "silent but deep" political line. For example, on January 28, he met with Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres in Davos, and on November 2, 1996, he met with Israeli leader Benjamin Netanyahu in Lisbon⁶⁸.

On October 22, 1995, on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the United Nations, he met with the Prime Minister of Israel, asked for the support of the Israeli lobby and spoke about assistance to the Armenian lobby and the expansion of Azerbaijani-Israeli relations. Israeli President Netanyahu's visit to Baku on August 29, 1997, returning from an official visit to China, is considered the highest-level visit ever⁶⁹. During the visit, talks were also held on the transportation of Azerbaijani oil to Israel. The far-sighted political leader Heydar Aliyev tried to seize all the opportunities, raised the Nagorno-Karabakh issue at each meeting and asked the

⁶⁷ Azərbaycan Respublikası Prezidentinin İşlər İdarəsi Prezident Kitabxanası,
<http://www.elibrary.az/docs/xronologiya.pdf>

⁶⁸ Azərbaycan Respublikası Prezidentinin İşlər İdarəsi Prezident Kitabxanası, s.72
<http://www.elibrary.az/docs/xronologiya.pdf>

⁶⁹ "Netanyahu Meets with President of Azerbaijan in Baku", İsrail Line",
<http://www.fas.org/irp/news/1997/970829-il.htm>

lobbies for help in this direction. During the BTC project, he sought the support of the Jewish lobby and managed to implement the most important projects in Azerbaijan's energy security.

After Georgia declared its independence on April 25, 1991, nearly 200 years of Russian domination ended in this country, but the ghost of Moscow continued to be effective in Georgia's political and economic policies for a long time. Eduard Shevardnadze, who became president after the short-term rule of Zviad Gamsakhurdia (April 14, 1991 - January 6, 1992), who was distant to Russia, was in charge of many senior positions such as Politburo member, USSR Foreign Ministry, Gorbachev's advisor. He understood his political climate well and followed a strategy that was more cautious against Russia and took it into account, taking into account the regional balances in foreign policy.

Israel's policy towards a country is largely in direct proportion to that country's view of the Jews. This point of view of Tel Aviv is clearly revealed by the words of Israeli diplomat Eitan Na'eh, "The tolerance in a country can be measured by the tolerance of that country to the Jewish community."⁷⁰ In this context, Jews living in Georgia (Gurjim) stand out as an important factor in the development of Israel's relations with Georgia. The decrease in the Jewish population, which started with the USSR's decision to allow the immigration of Jews to Israel in 1972⁷¹, has recently increased due to the South Ossetia conflict in 2008.

Georgia is the only Caucasian country send diplomatic mission to Jerusalem and consulate at Tel-Aviv. At the same time, Israel's embassy exists in Georgia. However, after diplomatic established, Israel sends its ambassador to Georgia, but Georgia sends it ambassador in 1998. It is crucial fact that shows us Georgia's political orientation after independence. Roughly this process occurred in Azerbaijan 4 years early than Georgia. Russian and Western geographical proximity to the

⁷⁰ Ambrosio, Thomas (2002). "Entangling Alliances: The Turkish-Israeli Lobbying Partnership and Unintended Consequences". *Ethnic Identity Groups and U.S. Foreign Policy*, Ed. Thomas Ambrosio, Westport: Praeger Publishers

⁷¹ Bekker, Moşe (2000). "Yevrei v Azerbaydjane:istoriya iPerspektivi". *Tsentrlnaya Aziya i Kavkaz*. 2(8) <https://www.ca-c.org/journal/cac-08-2000/27.bekker.shtml>

Georgia influence its balance policy in bad manner. At the same time, Israel in bipolar world, tried to returning their nation in Jerusalem. Georgia's do not have any border with Iran, this factor impacts Israel-Georgia relations improve trade and military based.

In 1996, Georgia-Israel trade chamber existed and it helped to increase political relations. This term Georgian leader, Eduard Shevardnadze who former USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs, do not analyze Russia's real power in region and it caused 6 years non-relations term with world. At the same time, unipolarity, ethnic conflicts and new world economic system created barrier for Georgia's government.

The country with the least contact between Israel and the Southern Caucasian countries is Armenia. So much so that although Israel recognized Armenia right after its independence, it established its diplomatic relations with Armenia until 2007 through the Israeli Embassy in Tbilisi. The historical animosity between Armenians and Jews was as effective as Tel Aviv's intense relationship with Azerbaijan in its attitude that centered Baku and excluded Yerevan in a sense. However, Armenia's diplomatic relations was poor with Israel, after mid of 90s, Armenian President visited Jerusalem. In my opinion, mid 90s, the understanding geopolitics year of South Caucasus. Armenia and Israel have two main problems. The most important reason for this is the negative attitude and antisemitic behavior in Christian Armenians towards Jews. For many years, Armenians claimed that the 1915 deportations were carried out by the Jews in the Committee of Union and Progress⁷².

They argued that the Armenian legion, known as the 812th Battalion, which took part in the German army during World War II and known as the 812th Battalion, was associated with the anti-Semitic perspective existing in Armenians at every opportunity⁷³. The anti-Semitic behavior of Armenians towards the Jews continues even today. This situation encouraged the immigration that started since the period of the USSR and Armenia has become the country with the least Jewish population in the Southern Caucasus today. They claim that the Armenian deportation is a source

⁷² Shaw, Stanford J. (2008). *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda ve Türkiye Cumhuriyetinde Yahudiler*. İstanbul: Kapı Kitapları.

⁷³ Türkkaya Ataöv ,*An Armenian Source: Hovhannes Katchaznoui, 1989*

of inspiration for the perpetrators of the holocaust and they try to find support for their thesis based on the sensitivity of the international public, especially the Western countries, towards the holocaust.

In the recent years, the Armenians have the idea of taking advantage of the power of the Jewish lobby in making the so-called genocide allegations louder over the holocaust, and there is also a desire to gain similar material gains by the Jews and therefore Israel through the holocaust. As is known, according to the Luxembourg Treaty signed between West Germany and Israel in 1952, it was decided to transfer 3 billion marks of goods and services from Germany to Israel and to give 450 million marks to the families of Nazi victims⁷⁴. In his book titled "Holocaust Industry", Finkelstein stated that those who claim to be the heirs of the genocide who were used to extort money from Europe using the victims of the genocide are literally "grave robbers"⁷⁵. One of the most important issues affecting Israel-Armenia relations negatively is the relations between Azerbaijan and Israel, which developed rapidly after 1990 and accepted as a "strategic partnership". Yerevan claims that the rapprochement between the two countries is a move towards him and that Turkey is almost trying to surround him by participating in this partnership. The partnership between Turkey, Israel and Azerbaijan was perceived as a "threat" not only by Armenia but also by Iran and Russia, and an unnamed alliance between Iran-Russia-Armenia was established in the region against Turkey-Israel-Azerbaijan-Georgia partnership⁷⁶.

As a result, Israel-Armenia relations have continued at a very distant level since the early 1990s due to the historical Armenian-Jewish conflict as well as the close dialogue between Israel and Turkey and Armenia with Iran. In addition, the fact that Israel's policy towards the South Caucasus is centered in Azerbaijan has been effective in Tel Aviv's negative approach to Yerevan. No access to the sea in this process; Turkey is stuck between Azerbaijan and Georgia and despite Armenia,

⁷⁴ Heilig, Karen (2002). "From the Luxembourg Agreement to Today: Representing a People", *Barkeley Journal of International Law* 20 (1): 179-180.

⁷⁵ Finkelstein, Norman (2003). *Holocaust Industry*. İkinci Basım. London: Verso Press.

⁷⁶ Uslu, Nasuh (2004). *Turkish Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Period*. New York: Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

which lacks natural resources, Azerbaijan has become a very remarkable factor for Israel, which is dependent on foreign energy with its rich hydrocarbon resources. In addition, the presence of the 812th Armenian legion in the Nazi army and the pressure exerted on the small number of Jews in Armenia today affect Israel's negative approach towards Armenia. Despite the anti-Semitism in Armenia, the existence of tolerance towards the Jews in Azerbaijan made Israel stand in favor of Azerbaijan in its South Caucasus policy. Armenia-Israel relations developed in the field of trade, but Armenian market is under blockade by Turkey and Azerbaijan. Therefore, Israel chooses pragmatic cooperation and widespread long-term era.

Israel's South Caucasus policy in this period based on getting oil from the region, stopping war against regional countries, creating a imaginary barrier between Iran's border and South Caucasus and either solve all regional problems or at least frozen conflicts.

3.2 Israel's regional policy after 11 September 2001

After the September 11, 2001 incident, it became clear that the US could no longer manage the international system alone. Therefore, a world has emerged in which regional powers have become more active and balanced policies have become increasingly difficult to manage. South Caucasus countries choose foreign policy direction accurately, as well as, Israel changed its approach on Caucasus. In multi polar world, Israel's South Caucasus policy transformed more courage steps and miscalculation of its led to bad consequences.

Georgia rapidly changed its direction, a few years later Armenia and finally Azerbaijan. New world order is changeable Georgia and Armenia moved fast and give the big payment for miscalculation of policy. However, Israel's strategy to encircle Iran was not adapted to the new period. Georgia's membership to the EU and western-oriented organizations has not been welcomed by other Caucasian countries with the same joy, it has become an inexhaustible situation that regional actors think will lose power. As a result, neither the EU nor Israel was able to openly aid Georgia,

which is against Russia, which is still considered to be the 2nd best army in the world.

Israel's overall security concept has not changed significantly over time. In the field of security, Israel attaches great importance to two things: 1) All issues are approached with the fear of extinction so that there is no second Holocaust. 2) Attempts to be the first party to take a preemptive response when the simplest threat is felt (Iraq's 1981 nuclear power plant crash). In the new world, Georgia's security is not an Israel's issue. At the same time, Israel always relied on one super power in the system, for example it was USA, French and today China transformed Israel's security alliance. If Caucasus republic did not calculate Israel's real power, real borders of politics, then they tell a lie for only yourself.

The other essential reality for Israel's security and foreign policy doctrine is changeable and compromise in the system. We can see it, after 2008 annexation. Israel halts military aid but after the war increased bilateral relations with Georgia.

After 2001 act, Israel tried to active policy in the region. Iran's Middle East policy create for Israel new threat and If Israel did not active in the South Caucasus then Iran influence the region. A decade Israel's unseen but deep policy in the region either changed or disappear. USA's Iraq and Afganistan policy, Arab Spring shows that Israel's South Caucasus, Iran and sometimes Middle East policy merged USA. That's why, Israel getting higher military, economic and political relations with region countries. If previous period, Israel understanding South Caucasus is a far region and whole region. After changing USA policy, Israel focused each region countries separately.

After Haydar Aliyev's death, Ilham Aliyev get the high voice of people and became the president. In his first visit occurred France and its show us he continued father's foreign policy at first year of his duty. His Jews policy continued too. Arthur Lenk, Israel's ambassador to Baku from 2005 to 2009, said Azerbaijan's lack of anti-Semitic behavior had strengthened ties between the two countries. Lenkin's predecessor, Eitan Naeh, expressed sympathy for Jews in Azerbaijan: "Tolerance in a country can be measured by the tolerance shown to Jews living in that country. There

is a very tolerant environment against Jews, and no anti-Semitism. No one can create a more tolerant environment for Jews living in Muslim societies⁷⁷.”

Ilham Aliyev started relations with Israel before he became president. In 1998, while still a member of parliament, he visited the United States and signed a document on the establishment of the Azerbaijan-Israel-US Interparliamentary Friendship Group. Ilham Aliyev, who later expanded his ties after becoming president, received Harold Tanner, the leader of the Great Jewish Organization of the United States, on February 13, 2006. At this meeting, the leader of the organization told Ilham Aliyev that they would do their best to repeal the 907th amendment⁷⁸. The most important event in Israeli-Azerbaijani relations during Ilham Aliyev's presidency is the bilateral dialogue with Shimon Perez. In June 2006, President Ilham Aliyev met with Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Perez in Astana. Later, they met at the World Economic Forum in Davos in 2009 to discuss oil and gas issues⁷⁹. Perez's official visit to our country on June 28-29, 2009 is considered the most important event in the history of bilateral relations. The first official visit of the President of Israel to Azerbaijan caused a great response in the region and the world. Perez visited our country with three ministers and sixty businessmen, signed documents in technology, telecommunications and many other areas⁸⁰.

Speaking about the about 1 million refugees and IDPs in our country, Shimon Perez said that Azerbaijan was working hard to end this difficult situation and the Jewish lobby would always help. Concerned about this meeting, Iran called our ambassador to its territory and tried to prevent the meeting. However, Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov assured the Islamic Republic of Iran that the meeting

⁷⁷ Thomas Ambrosio, “Entagling Alliances : The Turkish-İsraeli Lobbying Partnership and Unintended Consequences”, Ethnic Identity Groups and U.S.Foreign Policy, Der. Thomas Ambrosio, Praeger Publishers, Westport, 2002, p.151.

⁷⁸ “American Jewish Community for Fair Resolution of Armenian-Azerbaijan Nogorno Karabakh Conflict”, Today-Az, <http://www.today.az/print/news/politics/23260.html>

⁷⁹ “Azərbaycan-İsrail Münasibətləri”, <http://library.aliyev-heritage.org/print.php?lang=az&page=8269149>

⁸⁰ “President Shimon Peres in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan for Historic First Visit”, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Communiques/2009/President_Peris_visits_Azerbaijan_and_Kazakhstan_28_Jun_2009.htm

was not aimed at interfering in the internal affairs of any state. The issue has expanded so much that Ilham Aliyev has stated that Azerbaijan will not take part in any conflict with its border neighbors. According to Gallia Linderstraus, both Israel and Azerbaijan see Iran as a major threat, which has led them to become strategic allies.

According to Murinson, the siege of Iran, high-tech assistance and the use of the Jewish lobby to balance the Armenian lobby have made Israel a partner for Azerbaijan. The breakdown of Israeli-Turkish relations during Ilham Aliyev's presidency also affected the rapprochement of the two countries. Israeli-Turkish relations, which reached the point of diplomatic crisis after the Mavi Marmara incident, have greatly increased the role of Azerbaijan as a fulcrum in the region. Another reason is the geopolitical disagreements with Iran, which has made Azerbaijan a good ally for Israel, which is trying to besiege Iran. Against the background of all these strange political events, political relations between Israel and Azerbaijan have risen to the highest possible level.

By assessing the existing geopolitical and civilizational values and acting on the basis of common interests in bilateral and multilateral relations, the countries have always supported each other. Even Azerbaijan's non-permanent membership in the UN Security Council and the four resolutions on Nagorno-Karabakh have been the result of great efforts by the Jewish lobby and the state of Israel. All these relations have brought the countries very close in terms of support in bilateral diplomatic-political, regional and international organizations, Israel's siege by Arab countries and the diversification of Azerbaijani oil, trade and energy relations, especially in the military sphere. Economic and military cooperation in the field of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) has led to the strengthening of multilateral relations. The balance of power in the South Caucasus region has changed in favor of Azerbaijan.

Israel and Azerbaijan have very broad economic and trade relations. These economic ties are not only based on historical relations. At the same time, it stems from the strategic and economic importance of Azerbaijan for Israel. Undoubtedly, the main area of relations between Azerbaijan and Israel is the economic and trade

sphere. Our country is located in the Caspian Basin, where there are large oil and gas fields. This makes our state very important for Israel. On the other hand, Israel also produces very strong industry, technical equipment and military ammunition. These are also considered very important for Azerbaijan. As a manifestation of all this, between 1993 and 2019, economic and trade relations between the two countries increased rapidly.

Israeli campaigns are also closely involved in the development of Azerbaijan's energy sector. For example, Israel has been a supplier of high-tech and energy to the oil and gas industry, and Modcom Sistem LTD opened an office in Azerbaijan in 2000. On April 20, 1993, a meeting of Azerbaijani and Israeli businessmen was held in the conference hall of the Dinamo Sports Society. Mr. Samovsky, Commercial Director of Sigma Trade Int and Mr. Hagay Cohen, President of Sial LTD, represented Israel at the event organized by the Azerbaijan-Israel Society and Rugby Small Enterprise. The main purpose of the Israeli businessmen at this meeting was to establish personal contacts with the business community of our republic. On June 9-12, 1997, at the invitation of the Ambassador of the State of Israel to Azerbaijan Arkady Milman, Dani Reizen, Vice President of Marketing of Magal, visited Baku. Magal is engaged in research and development of modern military and civil security systems. While in Baku, Rayze met with the Azerbaijani Defense Minister. During the meeting, issues related to the acquisition of modern identification and protection systems for the military needs of the Azerbaijani side were discussed⁸¹. Netanyahu put forward a number of practical proposals for the development of Azerbaijani-Israeli relations. During the conversation, Netanyahu discussed the opening of a \$ 35 million health complex in Azerbaijan in the future⁸².

On October 29, 2003, President Ilham Aliyev received Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the State of Israel to Azerbaijan Eitan Nayan. Touching upon the prospects of bilateral relations, Ilham Aliyev said:

⁸¹ Azərbaycan Respublikası İqtisadi İnkişaf Nazirliyinin cari arxivi

⁸² Шилияев А. Встреча Г.А.Нетаняху, Азиз газ., 1997 август.

"The existing friendship and cooperation between our countries and peoples will allow for the formation of closer ties in the future. We highly appreciate the activities of Israeli companies in Azerbaijan and want them to invest more in our economy. As you know, our country has favorable conditions for reliable protection of investments. Therefore, we call on businessmen to strengthen their activities in Azerbaijan."⁸³

Israel is the second largest importer of Azerbaijani oil after Italy. Trade between the two countries is growing every year. Oil revenues amounted to \$ 1.3 billion. The issue of energy security has become a key part of bilateral relations, Azerbaijan's large energy resources, its geographical location, the Caspian's petrochemical resources are all the way from east to west, as well as access to Central Asia's natural resources. Israel itself began importing Azerbaijani oil in 1991 after Azerbaijan gained independence⁸⁴. Minister of National Infrastructure Ben Eliezer also attended the opening ceremony of the BTC in the Mediterranean port of Turkey on July 6, 2006 and expressed his heartfelt words in his speech. He noted that the oil pipeline is an important factor in Israel's energy policy towards Azerbaijan. Israel was officially one of the 36 participants in the ceremony. Israel then offered to extend the BTC oil pipeline to the Red Sea port of Eilat.

The main task here was to create conditions for the transportation of Azerbaijani and Central Asian oil to the markets of India, Japan and South Korea via the Israeli pipeline. Speaking at the Caspian Oil and Gas Exhibition in Baku during his visit to Azerbaijan, Benjamin Ben Eliazer noted that his country is interested in exporting Azerbaijani oil. We and Azerbaijan are interested in transporting Azerbaijani oil along the Red Sea coast via the Ashkelon-Glot pipeline through the Ceyhan project. It is the shortest route from the major markets of India and China to the Mediterranean to the Red Sea. Discussions on this project lasted about a year. If this project is implemented, Azerbaijani oil will be transported to the Indian Ocean. In his interview, Ambassador Arthur Lenk noted that Azerbaijan is Israel's second business

⁸³ Бен-Амир Нили. Деловица инициатива: расцвет экономики, Израил- 1998

⁸⁴ Leila Krieger, Hilary, "Azerbaijan to open Trade Office in Israel", Jerusalem Post, 17 May 2006: (<http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost%2FJPostArticle%FShowFullscid=1145705>).

partner. Israel buys oil from Azerbaijan and we consider it important. Israeli Minister Ben Eliezer also proposed to extend the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline to Ceyhan to further expand the supply of Azerbaijani gas. "Our country is ready to buy as much gas as Azerbaijan offers."⁸⁵

On April 18, 2007, Yevda Abramov, a member of the Azerbaijani Parliament and a member of the Azerbaijan-Israel Friendship Society, said that Israeli businessmen were interested in investing in Azerbaijan's tourism, agro-culture and high-tech sectors. intends to develop friendship and political and economic cooperation between the two countries⁸⁶.

In addition to military ties, the Israeli government expects Baku to cooperate more in energy, agriculture and other areas. However, the energy issue was on the agenda during Prime Minister Netanyahu's visit to Baku. It is no secret that Azerbaijan has been the largest supplier of oil to Israel for years. During his visit to Baku, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu discussed the possibility of joining the Baku-led Trans-Adriatic Pipeline, which intends to deliver European natural gas to southern Turkey. "Currently, we are talking with Azerbaijan not only about oil sales, but also about oil rigs, which are an important part of oil imports. We are talking about the use of common facilities for gas exports and the potential diversification of Israeli gas exports.

One of the most important branches of the "strategic partnership" between Baku and Tel Aviv is military cooperation. Moscow's rapid armament of Armenia, Turkey's lack of independence in the arms industry, its dependence on imports, the problems we have in acquiring weapons as a result of the efforts of the Armenian lobby in the United States and the European Union, and the war with Armenia have forced us to buy weapons. During this time, Israel, isolated in the region, threatened by Iran and threatened along its entire border, was in dire need of relations with Azerbaijan, which has a Muslim-majority population, given its energy needs.

⁸⁵ Piskur, Michael, "The BTC Pipeline and The Increasing Importance of Energy SupplyRoutes", 08August, 2006 (http://www.pincr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=537&language_id=1).

⁸⁶ Yevda Abramov: "Azerbaijani, Turkish and Jewish Diasporas need to make joint efforts" <http://www.today.az/news/society/39592.html>

According to Arab media and pro-Saudi media, Israel provided arms to Azerbaijan even before independence⁸⁷.

Arabic-language Al-Wassat, based in central London, claims that Israel and Turkey provided stinger rockets to our country during the Karabakh war⁸⁸. By supporting Azerbaijan militarily, Israel will gain a strong ally in the Caucasus region, as well as guarantee its security by focusing the attention of the Islamic Republic of Iran on the north. In this case, he will be able to balance Iran, which he sees as his main threat. Haaretz newspaper wrote that in 2008 Azerbaijan reached a huge military agreement with Israel. According to the report, the Israeli side will sell artillery and wireless communication devices to our country. At the same time, the Israeli company Soltman has agreed with our country to sell artillery, military equipment, Israeli Military Industrial Rocket, and Tadiran as a communications company.

Also, according to Jewish analysts, who pay attention to the rapid growth of our population, our country can form a shield between the West and Iran in the future. The agreement will focus on Israel's arms sales to the South Caucasus. Here, too, we are talking about cooperation between Georgia and Israel. Thus, Israel intends to create a "living space" in the Caucasus. Thus, multi polar world influence Azerbaijani-Israel military relations. After the second term presidency of Ilham Aliyev, Azerbaijan changed slowly its foreign policy and security paradigm in policy. Therefore, Aliyev visited firstly Turkey, and interested in approach Israel. At the same time, Azerbaijani military supply strongly depended on Russian market and Russia is a huge supplementary country to Armenia.

All of these, pushed Azerbaijan cooperate with Israel. During Shimon Perez's visit in 2009, the issue of satellite imagery of Nagorno-Karabakh was also discussed. During the meeting, an agreement was reached on the purchase of military weapons

⁸⁷ Bourttman, İlya (Summer 2006). "İsrael and Azerbaijan Furtive Embrace". Middle East Quartely. 13(3): 47-57.

^{88 88} Abilov Shamkhal, "The Azerbaijan-Israel Relations: A Non-Diplomatic, But Strategic Partnership", OAKA, Cilt:4, Sayı: 8, s. 153 , 2009

worth \$ 400 million. According to Caucasus expert Sergei Markedenov, Israel's rapid armament of Azerbaijan will not only intensify the Karabakh conflict, but also lead to the opposition of religious groups under the influence of Iran to Azerbaijan. Milli Majlis confirms Azerbaijan's military budget for 2010 is \$ 3.1 billion, one third of which is allocated for modernization⁸⁹. In 2012, Israeli Aerospace Industries (IAI) reportedly sold \$ 1.6 billion worth of weapons to Azerbaijan. The operation involved unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and satellite systems. Over the past three years, Azerbaijan has become a more important place for Israeli arms exports. Bilateral military cooperation between Israel and Azerbaijan entered a new phase during Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's visit to Baku in 2016. A number of experts praised Netanyahu's recent visit, noting that a new military agreement was signed in Baku. Unexpectedly, during a joint press conference, President Ilham Aliyev announced that our country had signed long-term agreements worth \$ 5 billion over the years to purchase weapons and security equipment from Israel.

Finally, from the perspective of Azerbaijan, one of the main goals of foreign policy is the territories lost during the war in Nagorno-Karabakh in the 1990s. Security cooperation between Israel and Azerbaijan helps to pursue a balanced foreign policy against regional countries such as Russia, Iran and Turkey. Official Baku is already trying to buy Israeli-made weapons, especially kamikaze drones, after the successful "Four-Day War" in Karabakh in April 2016. According to Azerbaijani military experts, Israeli-made equipment is better and more modern than other purchased equipment. Nevertheless, Russia is still the main supplier of weapons to the Azerbaijani Armed Forces.

In 2020, Azerbaijan launched "Iron fist" operation for liberated occupied lands from Armenian army. Israel's UAV and communication system, at the same time, Jews diaspora's media power helped Azerbaijan for hearing right voice in the world. This military, political and supplementary aids by Israel to Azerbaijan helped changes the fate of war and Caucasus. These clauses have significant implications for

⁸⁹ "Azerbaijan Becoming "Major Ally" for Israel in South Caucasus", News.az, <http://www.news.az/articles/politics/34143>

Israel. Perhaps most immediately, Azerbaijan could “go public” about its relationship with Israel by opening an embassy⁹⁰. Azerbaijan, after the great war, declare trade mission will send to Israel. Iran’s behaviour and Turkey’s increasingly military power helped to change the vision of South Caucasus. Merging Nakhcivan and Azerbaijan’s other lands will create new opportunities for Caucasus. At the same time, Iran’s rivalry on Caucasus will lessen.

Aliyev’s national interest policy after second term presidency create customs trilateral relations in region and improve maneuver in regional and global politics. Azerbaijani-Israeli-Turkey alliance is the main aims. Hikmet Hajiyev, give interview after war, say that Azerbaijan can be mediator Turkey-Israel relations, because Israel is our strategic partner and Turkey are our brother⁹¹.

All these facts and 2005 official visit shows that Israel’s South Caucasus policy focused Azerbaijan and if it controls Azerbaijan, control whole region. However, Israel’s Azerbaijan policy developed, Israel’s Georgia and Armenia policy is not similar Azerbaijan.

After, reducing Shevardnadze’s reputation, Russia’s influence means decreased in Georgia as well. Georgian political landscape changed by revolution. Mikhail Saakashvili, who came to power with the Rose Revolution in 2003, unlike his predecessor, adopted a strict pro-Western and anti-Russian foreign policy. Having closed the Russian bases in his country, Saakashvili displayed his pro-Western stance at every opportunity by taking very radical steps such as the request for membership in NATO and the EU. After the events of September 11, 2001, Georgia joined the antiterrorist coalition of the USA and provided military support to the USA in the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, Azerbaijan joined the same military mission, but Georgian policy imperatives changed in two years by force way, but Azerbaijan’s policy changed in 7 years slowly and secure manner.

⁹⁰ <https://www.justsecurity.org/75135/potential-gains-for-israel-after-azerbajians-victory-in-nagorno-karabakh/>

⁹¹ <https://www.hurriyet.com.tr/dunya/azerbaycan-cumhurbaskani-yardimcisi-hikmet-haciyev-turkiye-ve-israil-arasinda-arabulucu-olabiliriz-41797025>

Saakashvili's pro-Western attitude has been one of the most important factors affecting the development of Georgia's relations with Israel. Especially as a reflection of Iran's containment policy, there have been significant developments in defense and military fields between Israel and Georgia in recent years, and Israeli soldiers provide training to the Georgian army. During this period, there was a noticeable increase in the economic relations of the two countries, and Israel has become one of the most important investment sources of the Georgian economy⁹².

The most important driving force in Israel's development of relations with Georgia is the USA. In addition to supporting Georgia economically, Washington uses Israel as an intermediary to provide military ammunition and other assistance to the country. Trying to avoid Russia's reaction with this tactic, the United States has given no aid to Georgia, has no presence there, and is trying to portray an image as if it was loyal to the agreements made with Russia⁹³.

The fact that the two ministers were Jewish in the Saakashvili period (Defense Minister David Kezeraşvili and State Minister Temur Yakobbashvili) is important in terms of the role of the Jews in politics. The strict pro-Western and anti-Russian policy of Saakashvili changed due to the fact that Georgia did not get the support it expected from the West in the South Ossetia conflict in 2008, and this situation caused a change in Tbilisi's perspective towards Israel. While the conflict between Georgia and Russia continued, Israel's reduction of military support to Georgia and withdrawing all its experts in this country caused Georgia to follow a more cautious policy against Israel. According to some experts, the decline of Israel's influence in Georgia after the Georgian-Russian tension has severely damaged Tel Aviv's post-Cold War "plan to link the security of the northern border", In the struggle of Israel against Iran, an important gap has emerged in the northern security area. Israel-Georgia relations must be a part of a great struggle in the South Caucasus involving Russia, Iran and Syria. At a time when tensions between Russia and Georgia

⁹² Cornell, Svante E. (June-Agust 1999). "Geopolitics and Strategic Alignments in the Caucasus and Central Asia". *Perception*. 4(2): 100-125. <https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/download/article-file/817114>

⁹³ <http://ajanskafkas.com/haber-arsivi/rusya-abhazya-ve-guney-osetyada-geri-donus-yok/>

increased in 2008, Russia clearly expressed its concern over Israel's arms sale to Georgia.

On the other hand, Israel ended the arms deal with Georgia with the thought of preventing the possible arms sales of Russia to Iran and Syria. Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov publicly voiced this Israeli step in a meeting and wanted to intimidate Georgia in a sense⁹⁴. However, with Russia's announcement that it would sell anti-ship missiles to Syria in 2009, the news that Israel would sell weapons to Georgia was brought to the agenda again⁹⁵.

In a secret document published by Wikileaks, the information that Israel and Russia shared secret codes about Iran and Georgia with each other reinforced Tbilisi's distance policy towards Tel Aviv. In the document in question, it is claimed that in return for the codes of the unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) sold to Russia by Israel to Russia, Russia received the codes of the TOR-M1 type anti-missile system, which was sold to Iran⁹⁶.

In this process, Georgia, worried about the struggle between Russia-West, Israel-Iran in the South Caucasus, started to follow a more pragmatic policy that takes into account the regional realities, especially with the effect of not getting the support it expected from the West in the conflict in South Ossetia in 2008. Israel understands that multi polarity in the politics and behave consider with Russia's national interest. Removal of mutual visas with Iran after 2008 and developments in economic, commercial and scientific fields are the manifestations of this new strategy. Tehran, on the other hand, reacted positively to the steps taken by Saakashvili, whom it regarded as pro-American, in order to partially reduce its siege over Georgia, which has been uncomfortable for many years, to balance the increasing influence of Russia in the region and to strengthen its influence in the Caucasus⁹⁷.

⁹⁴ Freedman, Robert O. (2013). "Russia", *The Routledge Handbook on the Israel-Palestinian Conflict*. Ed. Joel Peters and David Newman, 2013: London, Routledge p.334.

⁹⁵ <https://jameskirchick.com/2011/12/23/caucus/>

⁹⁶ <https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4196367,00.html>

⁹⁷ Cafersoy, Nazım (27 Mart 2012). "Gürcistan Batı-İran Gerginliğinin Neresinde?", *The First News*. <http://www.1news.com.tr/yazarlar/20120327111050079.html>

Bidzina Ivanishvili, who is said to be close to the Kremlin, won the parliamentary elections held in Georgia on October 1, 2012. The victory of Giorgi Margvelashvili, who was supported by Ivanishvili, in the presidential elections held on October 27, 2013 led to comments that Russia would be strengthened again in Georgia. However, criticizing Saakashvili's pro-Western stance, Ivanishvili made his first official visit to Brussels and Margvelashvili said in a statement immediately after the elections that "Russia remains a problematic part of our foreign affairs"⁹⁸.

It shows that it is not possible for Turkey to normalize its relations with Russia in the short term. Similarly, at an international symposium on the South Caucasus held in Tbilisi on 29 April-1 May 2013, Ivanishvili reiterated its wish for its country to become a member of NATO and the European Union⁹⁹. Finally, at the EU-East Partnership Summit held on 28-29 November 2013 in Vilnius, the capital of Lithuania, Georgia's initialing the "Association and Free Trade Agreement" with Brussels helped Georgia keep warm ties of Tbilisi with the West. gave the impression that he was working¹⁰⁰.

With Ivanishvili as prime minister, the future of Israel-Georgia relations is discussed in terms of Georgia-West relations. With this point of view, it has been argued that the relations of Israel, which is the most important ally of the West in the Middle East, with Georgia will be negatively affected. However, both the statements made by the Georgian government and the increase in official visits from Georgia to Israel revealed a contrary situation from these comments.

In an interview he gave before his visit to Israel in June 2013, Ivanishvili made a statement that the dream and dream of strategic partnership with Israel revealed Tbilisi's intention to keep close relations with Israel in the new period. Irakli Garibashvili, who became prime minister, continued unabatedly with Israel after Ivanishvili resigned as prime minister on 20 November 2013. Garibashvili, who made an official visit to Israel on February 28, 2014, met with his counterpart Netanyahu. In the statement made after the meeting, Netanyahu stated that her country is willing

⁹⁹ https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_100599.htm

¹⁰⁰ https://www.stradalex.com/en/sl_src_publ_leg_eur_jo/document/ojeu_2013.320.01.0022.01

to develop cooperation with Georgia in every field, especially in technology, agriculture, water and education.

The visit of Israel Defense Minister Liberman to Georgia in 2018 has improved the military relations between Israel and Georgia, and at the same time, the joint decisions taken were the subject of joint work in the fields of Iran and counter terrorism¹⁰¹.

Israeli's Georgia politics started after 2001 issue in the fast period. Both Georgia and Israel did not understand multi polar world's limitations at the first stage. Israel calculated in the wrong manner Russia's and Iran's red lines in Caucasus and exaggerated Western military powers in new world. All above shows us, Israeli-Georgian tie passed wrong way at the beginning, but a decade after understanding world's reality helped both sides improved their bilateral relations in the consideration regional dynamics and moved slowly. Israel's periphery strategy calculated more carefully, more slowly after 2008 annexation of Georgia.

To sum up, both sides understand military and strategic power of regions after 2008. In 2020, Second Karabagh war also changed South Caucasian map and reality. Both Israel and Georgia after the 2020, calculate the Azerbaijani, Turkey and Russia's new strategy for the region. Opening Zangezur corridor in a few month later, either will block the ancient hubs or open new perspective for Georgia, it selects itself. Georgia-Russia conflict and new perspective for Georgia will the two scenarios for country. Georgia's cooperation with all region country including Russia and Iran will create two effect for Israel.

Israel's dominancy reduced and Russia's, Iran's increased in the internal policy of Georgia. The second scenario, Georgia chooses disintegration new realities and lose their previous hub role in Caucasus. Israel-Georgia relations' future depends' on Middle East and South Caucasus dynamics. In my opinion, Georgia improved relations with Israel to strategic partnership levels and at the same time integrate new process of Caucasus. Russo-Georgian conflict solved in the future and Georgia's

¹⁰¹ <https://www.timesofisrael.com/liberman-visits-georgia-signs-defense-cooperation-agreements/>

western policy should change balance policy for multi polar world. That's true, preserving balance in the multi polar world is hard but Russia's grand Caucasus policy changed slowly late 300 years. Georgia will compute all variables of Russian new policy toward Caucasus and redefine its foreign policy imperatives toward the Caucasus. Israel is a geographically far country and that's why Israeli's cooperation does not work against regional super powers. In 2008 war explained Georgia Israeli's direct influence in the region is limited. Therefore, Israeli-Georgian relations will improve consideration new manner and new reality. If Georgia do not change its 2002-2008 policy, then established new threats for its security problems. In my opinion, Israel-Georgia ties will transform new strategic partnership and Georgia joined new perspectives for creating after second Karabakh war.

Armenia is the weakest and poor geostrategic country in the region. After the 11 September terror attack, world's polar system changed against USA's dominancy. Terrorist groups established new regional power and USA's world leadership decreased day by day. Therefore, Israeli politics toward the Armenia diverse in both new polarity framework and increasing regional powers at the region. Armenia-Israel relations strongly depend on Israel-Turkey relations.

In the beginning of 90s, Armenia gets independence from the USSR. Armenia searched new ally for balanced Russia, Turkey and Azerbaijan in the region. Therefore, a few years later, Armenian president Levon Ter-Petrosyan tried to create new relations with non-region state. Armenia has no energy resources and other strategic advantage for Israel in this term. The only advantage could be proximity to Iran's border but Armenia-Iran relations shows that the probability is not existence at all.

In this term, Ter-Petrosyan used against Turkey policy and Israel-Turkey bilateral relations were in high position. All this causes influenced Israel's Armenia policy. Israel-Turkey policy and Turkey-Azerbaijan policy create and diverse Israel-Azerbaijani ally against Armenia both state level and diaspora level. However, Turkey-Israeli bilateral relations continue in good manner. These were the "golden years" of Israeli-Turkish relations that continued until Erdogan come to power in

2002¹⁰². After Erdogan's Islamic policy in the Turkey, Israel-Turkey relations broke. At this time, establishing new chance for Armenia to developed bilateral relations with Israel. Israel's Armenia policy both Iran's proximity and the perspective of breaking relations with Turkey helped to preserved diplomatic relations with Armenia but safely. That's why, Israel-Armenia diplomatic relations leads via Israel's Georgia embassy. Armenian side tried a few times, opening embassy Yerevan and Jerusalem but Israel's region policy against this manner.

After colorful revolution in Georgia, balance of power and threat changed in region. Approximately 15 years later, Armenia changed its political view from Russia to West. Armenia adopted western values and far away from Russia's pressure. Thus 15 years period of Armenian policy analyzed perspective of Russia's pressure and Israel-Turkey relations. After 2018, Armenia's revolution changed wheels of Caucasus and influence Israel-Armenia and Armenia-Russia relations as well. South Caucasus and Israel's region policy just focused changing dynamics. Russia-Turkey rivalry and cooperation established new page Azerbaijan-Russia ally and Armenian's singularity in the region influence USA and French Caucasus policy.

However, in 90s USA initiated Israel approach the region represented the Western ally, but in multi polar world, USA wants to directly influence the region. Israel's grand security policy and researching new alliance in post USA hegemony term, Israel-Turkey rivalry changes area for the Mediterranean Sea. In generally, we try to understand Israel's Armenia policy firstly we understand world's trends.

3.3 Israel's policy on the eve of the Second Karabagh War

Nagorno-Karabagh conflict is the essential conflict in the region and world politics. Armenia and Azerbaijan lived in USSR, but after dissolution of USSR, Armenia and ethnic Armenians occupied Karabagh region of Azerbaijan. There are

¹⁰² <https://www.haaretz.com/world-news/.premium-disunited-by-genocide-how-armenia-s-relations-with-israel-have-come-to-a-dead-end-1.9270625>

plenty of solution model suggested each country for solving the conflict, but Armenia do not accept models. After 1994 ceasefire agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan, each country prepared for negotiation process. This process continued approximately 30 years period and none of the solution accepted by these countries. However, UN's four resolution and OSCE's Minsk group's position helped to negotiation process but it was not arbitrary power.

The first huge military confrontation occurred 2016 April, Azerbaijan liberated a few villages from Armenia. This attack helped Azerbaijan for changing format of negotiation substantive manner. However, this substantive negotiation can be effective but Armenia's internal policy and foreign policy direction changed suddenly. Nichol Pashinyan getting the power, Armenia changed its presidency system to parliamentary system. After all this, Armenia declare new doctrine about conflict. This new tactic is also in line with the Armenian Minister of Defence David Tonoyan's publicly announced strategic doctrine of "New war for new territories", which he declared "will rid Armenia of this trench condition, the constant defensive state, and will add the units which may shift the military actions to the territory of the enemy"¹⁰³. This manner creates doubt substantive negotiation for Azerbaijan. This doubt transformed breaking down the whole of negotiation process after Valdai form. Armenian Prime Minister declared that "Karabagh is Armenia."¹⁰⁴ However, Azerbaijani President reply Armenian Minister, but Azerbaijan understood that negotiation is not an only way for solving problems. After a year, Tovuz clash occurred and General of Azerbaijani army died by Armenian side. All of clashes caused Azerbaijan and Armenia fight against Karabagh. Azerbaijan liberated its lands.

Israel's South Caucasus policy a little bit changed on the eve of war. After 2016, visit Netanyahu to Baku, shows that Israel will continue cooperation Azerbaijan after

¹⁰³ <https://www.euractiv.com/section/azerbaijan/opinion/caucasus-armenias-new-war-for-new-territories/>

¹⁰⁴ <https://en.president.az/articles/34358>

April war¹⁰⁵. Israel policy and international structure helped Azerbaijan changed status quo in the region. If Israel do not change its previous policy, then it can be lost all means and power in the region. During 44 days war, Israel continues to supply Azerbaijani army with its weapons. However, Israel do not supply Georgia at 2008, but it supplied Azerbaijani Army. This situation shows us Israel's interests, external factors and world political arena how influence Israel's foreign policy directions.

China's new Silk road and Belt and Road initiative project is the new hegemony for the world. After second Karabagh war, Azerbaijan liberated their invaded lands and signed three lateral capitulation agreement. This agreement mentioned new corridors which combine Nakhchivan and Azerbaijan¹⁰⁶. Zangezur corridor explain China's superpower rally and Turkey's regional dominancy term. USA based international system calculated USSR's influence territory and interests. After 2001, USA based system changed slowly Asia based system. China's economic willingness and Turkey's military dominance helped to change Caucasus reality. On the other hand, Zangezur corridor will become the new alternative ancient Silk Road and it creates new opportunity for regions and China¹⁰⁷. The other essential trend for international system is TURKPA. TURKPA is established in 2009 in Nakhchivan¹⁰⁸. Its creating area and opportunity for region is vital. Zangezur corridor merged Nakhchivan to Azerbaijan at the same time, Azerbaijan and Turkic nations and China with Europe.

That's why, Armenia's revolution, the second Karabagh war changed everything in the region. After a year from Pashinyan's getting power, Armenia declared that would open embassy at Tel-Aviv. Armenia tried to base on embassy thought that Israel's Caucasus policy is not depends on Azerbaijan-Turkey relations. Roughly after a year, Armenia recalled embassy from Tel-Aviv because of Israeli UAV.

¹⁰⁵ <https://mfa.gov.il/MFA/PressRoom/2016/Pages/PM-Netanyahu-Meets-with-Azerbaijan-President-Aliyev-13-December-2016.aspx>

¹⁰⁶ <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-54882564>

¹⁰⁷ <https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2021/03/07/zangazur-corridor-will-stimulate-regional-cooperation/>

¹⁰⁸ https://turk-pa.org/en/content/about_turkpa/history

Azerbaijani-Israel military cooperation and obtaining new UAV system like Harop, Hermes, Harpy cause of changing behave Armenia to Israel.

Israel's Armenia policy is strongly depends on global and regional trends because Israel did not need any Armenia's commodity. Armenia-Iran relations Israel-Azerbaijan relations established for historical and political causes. Georgia changed its political view and broke all ties with Russia and Israel did not helped Georgia against Russia. Armenia's Prime Minister understood if Armenia broke all ties with Iran, Israel do not help Armenia against Azerbaijan. Armenia has needed Iran more than Israel in the region, because Zangezur corridor is border with Iran. Iran's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Javad Zarif declare that Armenia's territorial integrity is the red line of Iran¹⁰⁹. Zarif's thought and Israel's silence influence Armenia's approach with Israel. After the second Karabagh war, Israel's influence in Armenia decreased but Israel's Azerbaijan policy strengthen. Israel do not try to safe balance in region. The other crucial fact is occupied Azerbaijani lands was border with Iran. Israel's Armenia policy created safe diplomatic relations with Armenia, because Armenia de-facto occupied huge part of Azerbaijan-Iran border. Azerbaijan regains its territorial integrity and border balance break Israel's balance in the region. That's why Israel wants to Azerbaijan get Zangezur corridor, because, Iran's blockade policy will happen.

¹⁰⁹ <https://apa.az/en/xeber/foreign-news/Javad-Zarif-Territorial-integrity-of-Armenia-is-red-line-of-Iran-341255>

CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS

In a new world political reality that emerged after the Cold War, the re-independence of a region such as the South Caucasus and a new ally in international relations from an isolated country like Israel have created a need for new ties based on the needs of both countries. Although the dynamic nature of the Caucasus region has led to a number of changes in the political lines of Israel and the Caucasus over a period of 30 years, relations as a whole have maintained a strong bond. Israel's policy in the South Caucasus has changed over the past 30 years, taking into account the global system, the regional balance of power, and the domestic and foreign policy orientations of the South Caucasus countries.

These changes are generally as follows:

a) Completion of these partnership criteria with the emergence of the strategic partnership criterion in accordance with the changing world trends in Israel's policy in Azerbaijan and the expansion of relations to the military sphere over time.

b) Armenia's policy is to maintain diplomatic relations, albeit at a distance, to increase diplomatic relations, but at the same time to reduce public opinion and military cooperation.

c) In Georgian politics, however, it has shifted from full diplomatic relations to relations that came to a breaking point during the 2008 crisis, and then to broader cooperation, including in the military sphere.

Although there have been no significant changes in Israel's relations with the three South Caucasus countries as a whole, there have been changes in Israel's Caucasus policy, both individually and as a region. Thus, Israel's policy of encirclement in the South Caucasus against Iran will have changed its direction and essence after the second Karabakh war. The main reason for this is that the ratio of the two Caucasus countries, which have a direct border with Iran, has actually changed in favor of Azerbaijan. It was known that in the pre-occupation period, Israel also attached importance to the Azerbaijani-Iranian border and sold radar systems to Azerbaijan to demonstrate its strength on these borders. After the liberation of their

lands, the presence of Azerbaijan, a strategic partner with longer borders with Iran, and Armenia, which is close to Iran and whose de facto borders with Iran are shrinking and even in danger of extinction, strengthened Israel's position in the South Caucasus.

Although the new order brought about by the Second Karabakh War in the world has reduced the role of Iran's geopolitical Russia in public opinion in the region, it has increased the role of Turkey and Israel. There are some suggestions that Israel needs to make in order to adapt to this new Caucasus so that it does not lose its position in the region. These suggestions are as follows:

- Balancing Iran and Russia in the region by cooperating with Turkey, recognizing the emerging reality and Turkey's growing power in the region.
- To develop new defense systems together with the countries of the region by further developing military cooperation in order to feel its military presence in the Caucasus.
- To encourage Armenia in the new form of cooperation proposed by Azerbaijan to increase public opinion in Armenia in order to increase its role in the post-war Zangazur corridor.
- Increase new four-way economic ties with Georgia-Azerbaijan-Armenia and Turkey to reduce Georgia's role as a transit country, and help Georgia grow in maritime trade by connecting Chinese products to the new China-Georgia-Israel sea route.
- To develop relations with the newly formed Turkic Council, as it includes countries that are necessary in Israel's environmental policy.
- To contribute to the establishment of the South Caucasus Economic Union in the future, and thus to have a say in the region as the only country that has strong ties with all three countries in the face of regional powers.

At the same time, the countries of the South Caucasus have aspirations in their policies towards Israel. These wishes for Azerbaijan:

- Balancing barriers to oil transportation and sales in the Caspian Sea through Israel

- Reaching a higher position in world politics through the Jewish lobby
- Normalization of power struggle in the region

For Georgia:

- The power of the Jewish lobby to balance Russia's expansionist policies
- Increasing economic ties with Israel to prevent Georgia's isolation in the region
- Feeling physically next to a new power that is an alternative to the West

For Armenia:

- A tool to hinder Russia's physical strength
- Assistance in joining Azerbaijan-Turkey-Georgia relations, either as a mediator or in rebuilding broken relations with the countries of the region
- Joint cooperation against Iran's strengthening in the region and obstruction of Armenia's interests
- Gaining economic power in small areas, as well as promoting integration with the West

As a result, although Israel's policy in the South Caucasus has changed since 2008, no significant qualitative change has been observed on the main line. However, in the emerging multipolar world, Israel's policy in the South Caucasus has not been fully structured. Although this process accelerated after the Karabakh conflict, it can be said that it will be fully formed after the full territorial integrity of Georgia. At the same time, after the demarcation and delimitation of the existing borders between the countries of the South Caucasus and the border countries of the region, the Israeli political line will be able to be structured in the Caucasus in accordance with the new realities and without conflict and cooperation.

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