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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AA - Association Agreements

AFSJ - Area of Freedom, Security and Justice

CAP - Common agricultural policy

CFSP - Common Foreign and Security Policy

CoJ - Court of Justice

CSDP - Common Security and Defense Polcy

DCFTA - Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area

EAEC - European Atomic Energy Community

EAEU - Eurasian Economic Union

EaP - Eastern Partnership Countries

EC - European Council

ECB - European Central Bank

ECSC - European Coal and Steel Company

EDA - European Defense Agency

EDC - European Defense Community

EDF - European Defense Fund

EEAS - European External Action Service

EEC - European Economic Community

EFSF - European Financial Stability Facility

EMU - Economic and Monetary Union

ENP - European Neighborhood Policy

EP - European Parliament

EPC - European Political Community

ERDF - European Regional Development Fund

ESC - Economic and Social Committee

ESF - European Social Fund

ESM - European Stability Mechanism

EU - European Union

EUGS - Global Strategy for the EU's Foreign and Security Policy

IGCs - Intergovernmental Conferences

JHA - Justice and Home Affairs

QMV - Qualified Majority Voting

LI - Liberal Intergovernmentalism

MEP - Member of the European Parliament

NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization

PCA - Partnership and Cooperation Agreement

PESCO - Permanent Structured Cooperation

PPEWU - Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit

TEU - Treaty on the European Union

TFEU - Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

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ABSTRACT

EU's foreign policy and determinants of the external policy of the EU are actual topics in the field of international relations, due to its role in world affairs as a global actor. Most research focuses on separate analysis of historical development, theoretical overview of the EU in general. International literature has dedicated very little attention to theoretical and empirical analysis of the EU foreign policy. Also due to its character of being latest and ongoing, the topic "The conflict between the EU and its member states over the formation of Single European Voice in World Affairs" forms research gap and this study could provide a new perspective. This research project thus seeks to identify the determinants of the EU external policy. To start, the historical development of the EU, analysis of grand theories, and specifying the appropriate one to identify feature of EU's current foreign policy activities. Shortcomings of CFSP/CSDP and predominance of member states in the formation of unified foreign policy will be examined. In the end, the determinant of European foreign policy by examining one of its common policy activities – EaP and EU-Russia relation in this context will be presented.

INTRODUCTION

With regard to its population, economic scale, military resources and voting power in international organizations, the European Union (EU) is an influential actor in world affairs. Despite these enumerated tangible and intangible capabilities, the foreign policy of the EU is a puzzling theme for observers. The apparent increase in the number of European states logically shows that the number of policies and bilateral relations has been considerably extended. The progress of the EU's foreign policy is only increasing this complexity and the increasing amount and variety of foreign policy problems. The EU's most serious foreign policy challenge is to establish a common position with the countries of the world. Throughout the EU, political parties and societies are divided about the future of the union in ways which enable the major powers to exploit the differences that can change the global picture. This powerful argument justified a substantial effect on the future of the union as well as international relations on the basis of studies on the stated problems. To understand such present events in a thorough manner, we need to refer to the historic progression of the EU and various theories of European integration.

The EU has emerged in the multifaceted and dynamic process of European integration as the leading organization. The EU was established on 1 November 1993, more than four decades after early efforts to foster the institutionalized partnership between the European states. The EU is the latest fruit of the evolved European integration since the establishment of the Council of Europe in 1949.

The emergence of the EU in the early 1990s could and must therefore not be considered to be a radical and entirely new European policy initiative after the Cold War. Its creation was certainly inspired by the events of 1989 in Central and Eastern Europe and, as stated by the authors of the founding treaty, by the desire to lay 'strong foundations for the building of future Europe'. It is also necessary to see the establishment of the EU in 1993 as an additional phase in a process of increasingly closer integration among a number of states. In particular the efforts by the Six, Belgium, France, Germany (Western), Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands in the

1950's to develop a new type of supranational integration in a concerted effort to foster peaceful reconciliation and co-existence, economic development and security and the establishment of a new form of supranational integration.

However, the reform of the Treaty and the Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs) became virtually permanent items on the EU agenda from the mid-1980s. The EU has been set up and developed in a wide range of ways, including by expanding the range of strategies in which the EU has the power to operate; adapting institutions' decision-making power; and launching significant integration projects — in particular the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the implementation of the euro in 2002, and an extension which has resulted in membership of 28 countries. The EU, therefore, assumed many of the union's characteristics during its first decade. It quickly looked like or was thought to be, a superstate to some. However, it has always been a much loose and fluid organization for many, especially supporters of political union. It had a complicated combination of intergovernmental collaboration and supranational inclusion, with the combinations of multiple supranational institutions and member states, to advance a variety of policy agendas. A complex mixture was embodied in their pillar structure, finally removed from the Lisbon Treaty. Since the foundation in 1993, this combination of supranationalism, intergovernmentalism, and distinct types of inclusion has been and continues to be complex.

In order to analyze the complexity of the structure of the EU and its effect on the formation of the EU foreign policy, it is important first to analyze the evolution of dynamics of European integration. Several theories of EU integration have been examined on the path of analysis of its complicated foreign policy. Overview of the European integration theory and its application to the field of European foreign policy compromises three main theoretical approaches: neofunctionalism, federalism, and intergovernmentalism. Neofunctionalists viewed European integration as a self-sustaining process and claimed that the sectorial integration would lead to the establishment on the new political entity in Brussels. Neo-functionalist principle prevailed during the early integration period, but it soon became clear that the

forecasts were not enough to clarify the integration processes' ups and downs (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2006, p. 97). When it comes to federalism, a federal state or European federation should be a sovereign state in the decision-making process where a central government includes regional units. The federalist theory is relatively silent on the topic of European foreign policy. Failure in the project of building the European Defense Community (EDC); challenges in EU common policies showed the inability of federalism to analyze the foreign policy nature of the EU. An excessive focus on the end product of inclusion, without extending on the way to get there adequately, is among the criticisms against federalist theory (Jorgensen, Aasne, Drieskens, Laatikainen, & Tonra, 2015, p. 170).

In terms of European foreign policy, liberal intergovernmentalism is very appropriate to analyze current challenges and cooperation at EU level. It emphasizes that national governments are the main players for integration. The primary element of integration is the national interests of member states. They regard institutions as a means to create credible commitments for member states' governments to ensure that other governments with which they negotiate remain on their side. In contrast to neo-functionalists, liberal intergovernmentalists regard supranational institutions as of little importance in the integration process (Moravcsik A. , 1998, p. 9).

Because of the intergovernmental nature of European foreign and security policy, it is significant to analyze foreign policy choices of individual countries, and the impact of the EU institutions on the choices and vice versa. European integration theories are ill-equipped to explain interactions between EU foreign policy and national foreign policy preferences. In that case, Europeanization becomes suitable for an explanation of regional and local decision-making. It is an analytical concept, which helps to understand the impact of EU on the national level. Europeanization is a way to promote the EU's foreign policy standards and values. Europeanization is strong in areas where individual countries share similar norms. In the area of foreign policy that is based on different interests and relative power of the countries, the influence of Europeanization is weak.

Apart from theoretical analysis of the EU's foreign policy, analytical inside to the way in which strategies are conducted within Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) explained how member states and supranational institutions influence on the EU. These intergovernmental policies indicate the fragmentation of the EU. During the evolution of the common policy, member states of the EU were fragmented and after the institutional progress, several reforms, the new structure could not change the foreign policy nature of the EU. CFSP / CSDP is still dependent upon the political wishes of their member states, and there are inevitable limitations for the practice of external policy in the union because member states wish to maintain the sovereignty and national identity. The challenges in implementing common strategies negatively influence on EU 'actorness' in world affairs.

These conflicts between member states and the EU institutions over the formation of one voice in international relations mainly became apparent in European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). The ENP was established as part of the EU's Eastern Enlargement. Therefore, it is not surprising that enlargement was a strong justification for the policy's launch. These initiatives aimed at EU eastern neighbors and were designed to implement subregional politics that would be similar to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership or the Northern Dimension. From the beginning of the negotiations over building common neighborhood policy, member states shared different views and actively involved in developing the policy according to their desires. The countries were divided into four groups during the preparation of the ENP:

• Polish leaders supported the proposal of Finnish and German authorities;

• Baltic states were actively involved in moving the agenda towards the East and South Caucasus;

• Visegrad countries did not fully engage (Sadowski, 2013);

• Romania and Bulgaria supported the development of the Black Sea Cooperation (Kostanyan H. , 2014).

The common characteristics of these ideas were that they were connected to the interests of individual countries in sub-regional cooperation.

Eastern dimension of the ENP posed more threat for the EU, it worried about the exploitation of criminal networks, bribery, smuggling and etc. (Sadowski, 2013) Nevertheless, the behavior of member countries, uncertainty in the EU common policy made obstacles for the EU to act collectively towards Eastern Partnership Countries (EaP). First of all, the EaP is prepared on the principle of 'conditionality'. However, the EU was selective in applying conditionality. For instance, the EU due to its internal energy demands is less strict towards the countries with rich hydrocarbon resources than others. When it comes to security-related issues, member states are keen on the establishment and improvement of bilateral relations. Different views of member states were visible during negotiations on association agreements (AA) with the third countries. During the talks of the EU-Moldova AA, ten member states were prone to strengthen relations with Moldova and decided to change the state place from the ENP to the sphere of expansion. However, the concept was rejected by France, Italy, and Spain. This case also repeated in the EU-Ukraine case.

While the EU attempted to enhance its existence in the region with its eastern partnership policy, it has been changing EU-Russia normal neighborhood relations to 'challenged neighborhood' relations. Russia tried to reinforce its impact on the region through different projects. The EU had to develop deeper relations within the EaP and also develop common policy towards Russia. However, the lack of interests of member relations in common policy affected negatively EU effectiveness in the common foreign policy towards Russia. In 2014, EU sanctions on Russia indicated the fragmentation of the EU. Thus, the Council agreed to extend sanction duration till the full application of the Minsk Agreement. However, states dependent on Russia became opposite to this prolongation. In particular, Italy, Greece, Cyprus, Austria, Hungary and some politicians from Germany and France objected the decision. The EU's failure sent a message to Moscow that the EU's intervention, even destabilization of common neighborhood policies will have very restricted.

Moreover, it is an obvious fact that Russia can divide member states and build bilateral relations with them according to its policy orders.

All these examples prove that member states of the EU could not act collectively in the political, economic sectors, because national interests of them are different and all of them prefer their national interests rather than the common EU.

Hypothesis Foreign policy of the EU is based on member states' rational choices more rather than the agenda of the supranational institutions of the EU.

The study attempts to apply the concept of liberal integovernmentalism in several cases in order to answer the question of why the member countries are the major determinants of external EU policy. The economic and political interests of member states, the advantages, and disadvantages of collective action of the EU can be assessed in order to facilitate testing of the scope of research. The framework for the discussion on the role of member states and supranational institutions in the foreign policy pursued by the eastern dimension ENP of the EU and EU-Russia relations in the context of the eastern neighborhood.

The EU had acquired an active integration in the 1990s, but the discussion on the CFSP and CSDP demonstrated it would be difficult for the EU to speak in world affairs with the single voice because members want their own internal policy passion to be preserved. They have major foreign policy differences and prefer to act in regards to expectations and wishes of them. The union is therefore faced with the inevitable foreign policy difficulties.

Secondly, member states always analyze their own cost-benefit and determine 'leading lines' for their foreign policy. They all have different policies, and they are better served by bilateral relations or a distinct foreign policy agenda. Economic interests and relative authority are determined by the choice of the governments. There is not the same economic power for member states and one strategy cannot be suitable for another. In addition, member states may establish common policies, particularly in areas not linked to their financial interests. As a result, it is clear that the EU can speak for themselves or that the member states can establish separate foreign relations. This depends on the government's willingness and interests.

In addition, under the 'conditionality' system the EU establishes its common foreign policy with third nations. Thus, third countries may not agree on the condition of the EU and the member states, who are interested in relations with third countries as a partner, established bilateral relations and implement their foreign policy instruments independently. For example, the EU developed ENP policy to promote EU norms and values without affiliation. In addition, the policy is developed according to the "one-size-fits-all" approach. Not all the countries in the EU neighborhood are willing or capable to undertake the commitments of neighborhood policy in accordance with the EU requirements. Therefore, they are interested in strengthening bilateral relations with member states rather than the EU. For instance, Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia are the forerunners of the ENP/EaP. Their geographic proximity and economic dependence give an upper hand to Brussels in the enforcement of its policies. On the other hand, Azerbaijan, the most eastern country of the EaP, rich with hydrocarbon resources is less reliant on EU than others. Moreover, Azerbaijan as an energy supplier and potential energy transit country has more significance to the EU than other EaP countries. Therefore, in relation to Azerbaijan, the EU is less insistent on the implementation of its norm and values.

Moreover, member states have different interests and policies towards neighbor countries, which also made obstacles for the EU during the negotiations of AAs. For instance, member states like Romania, Poland, and Baltic states are prone to strengthen deep relations with Moldova within expansion context while France and Italy and other countries objected this suggestion. In the context of the eastern neighborhood, the EU does not only focus on building relations with third countries but also attempts to make a relationship with Russia according to its interests. The EU views Russia as a "strategic challenge". However, Russia has enormous energy resources and a number of EU countries have closer economic relations with Russia. At the end of the day, the EU again faces the problem of collective actions and the cases prove that the EU's foreign policy remains decentralized and sharpened by its member states ' interests.

The thesis aims to analyze the position of the member states and supranational institutions in EU foreign policy in a comparative manner.

Tasks of the thesis: The following tasks had to be resolved in order to achieve the objectives set in the work:

— To explain the historical development of the EU and identify the main foreign policy reforms;

— To identify the most relevant theory of European integration in the analysis of EU foreign policy;

— To analyze the level of Europeanization of national foreign policy and the role of nation-states in the process;

— To explore the foreign policy of the EU and the impact of member states on the implementation of Eastern neighborhood policy and EU-Russia relations in the framework of EaP.

Analysis of the literature A number of works have been published on the EU's foreign policy, many scholars have written articles about the theoretical and historical framework of the EU. Moreover, Europeanization was analyzed as a tool of promoting the foreign policy of the EU; different cases and the role of the EU and its member states have been conducted. However, all above-mentioned issues have been analyzed separately and little attention was dedicated to comprehensive analysis on the conflict between the EU and its member states to speak with a Single Voice in world affairs. Thus, due to changes in international relations, due to the character of being ongoing, literature about the topic is uncommon.

Michelle Cini and Nieves Perez-Solorzano Borragan's book *"EU Politics"* analyzed establishment and development of the EU comprehensively, mentioned treaty reforms and their effects on EU politics. The book *"European integration theories"* edited by Thomas Diez and Antonjo Wiener, covers grand theories of European integration and explained constructive approaches. Moreover, Eva Gross's book "The Europeanization of national foreign policy: continuity and change in European Crisis Management" and the book *"A Common Foreign Policy for Europe? Competing Visions of the CFSP"* edited by John Peterson and Helene Sjursen analyzed the EU as

a global actor, the role of supranational institutions in EU external relations and domestic policies of the member states. Finally, Christopher Browning and George Christon's article *"The constitutive power of outsiders: the European Neighborhood Policy and the Eastern Dimension"* and Ficher's article *"The EU and the Insiders/Outsiders of Europe: Russia and the Post-Soviet Space"* explained interests of the EU and Russia in the region included into the eastern dimension of the ENP and bilateral relations of them in that context. A drawback is that these pieces concentrate primarily on an informative context and conceptualize Furthermore, there were separate theories and cases mentioned, but the relationship between contexts and theories has not been thoroughly explored and the discussion of unified foreign policy between member states and the EU has not been analyzed relatively. In addition, recent activities, policy strategies of each state have changed and it is rare to find literature that explained conflicts between member states and the EU on making 'one voice' in international relations. Literature that fits the premises of the research project is thus rare and creates a research gap. This thesis could contribute to closing the gap.

Research question: Who speaks for Europe: Member states or supranational institutions of the EU?

Sub-questions:

—   Why has the EU failed to sustain a unified foreign policy attitude in world affairs?

—   How have member states influenced on CFSP/CSDP and changed EU decision-making on the external policy?

Research Novelty. There is a quite limited scope of research on the conflict between member states and the EU over making unified decision on external policy as seen from the analysis of the literature. In addition, recent tendencies, prioritizing of member states' foreign policy, changed international position are not so much studied due to its character of being recent and ongoing. Research study attempts to introduce these problems into my thesis and tried to make comparisons and draw parallels within the theoretical framework of EU external policies and the EU and its member

states' current policies. From this point of view, the scientific novelty of this work is determined. In this work I tried:

— To outline the development of the EU and highlight foreign policy reforms through treaties;

— To identify the most relevant theory of European integration that explains the EU's foreign policy;

— To identify the shortcomings of the CFSP/CSDP and highlights the role of member states in common external policies;

— To review the consequences of the member states' independent foreign policy strategies and collective action problem in the EU's external policy through the cases.

The methodological and theoretical basis of the thesis is determined by the tasks listed above and is based on the principles of objectivity, historicity, systemic character and the strategy of social phenomena. The paper uses qualitative research to understand who is the key contributor of the EU's external policy; to identify the problematic elements of CFSP/CSDP; to analyze the role of member states in EU's Neighborhood Policy and EU-Russia relations in the framework of EaP.

Moreover, general scientific methods such as analysis, synthesis and methods of comparative study of federalism, neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism have made it possible to comprehensively study foreign policy of the EU and the role of its member states in making decision on common external policy as phenomena, to conduct analysis on why the role of supranational institutions is undermined and foreign policy is consist of rational choices of national actors.

The structure of the thesis is determined by the purpose and objectives of the study. The work consists of an introduction, two chapters (including a total of 5 paragraphs), conclusion and references.

Prior to analysis, In order to be able to elicit the historic development of the EU, a broad historical outlook will be irreplaceable. The analytical section will primarily cover the position of the member states in one of the constituents of the EU's foreign policy - EaP and the place of them in EU-Russia relations in the framework of EaP. After presenting historical and theoretical context, the analytical part will be the main

part of the thesis. Moreover, problematic aspects of CFSP/CSDP will be analyzed and national interests as the main determinants of the foreign policy will be identified.

I THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE ANALYSIS OF THE EU FOREIGN POLICY

1. 1. Development of the EU – Historical overview

After the Second World War, the threat of East-West confrontation made a reconciliation of France and Germany top priority. After the war, European nations were seeking not only peace but also solutions to economic problems. At that time, coal and steel were the basis of the country's power and the main tool to end the rivalry between France and Germany. Jean Monnet drafted a plan for de-facto solidarity (Schuman Plan) (Diebold, 1959). The plan was the basis of the Treaty of Paris in 1951.

According to the agreement, Six European countries (Belgium, Italy, Germany, Luxembourg, and France, the Netherlands) established the European Coal and Steel Company (ECSC) which was the first step towards European integration. The starting point for European integration aimed to promote peace and coexistence, financial growth and safety, social development. There were 4 institutions: (Michael Dougan, 2009):

1. High Authority (executive body);

2. Council (legislative body);

3. Parliamentary Assembly (controlling the activities of High Authority);

4. Court of Justice (CoJ).

First successful step motivated member states to pursue sectoral cooperation in other areas. In 1950, defense of Western Europe was a major priority because of the beginning of the war in the Korean Peninsula. The confrontation between Soviet expansionism and the US committing resources in the Far East made Western Europe vulnerable. German rearmament considered necessary (Schwartz, 1986). But how could Germany do it? As a solution, ECSC-modeled EDC was proposed (Mattes, 2012). "Six" agreed to sign a treaty, however, EDC was failed. Nevertheless, a new suggestion for expanding economic integration was proposed immediately. It aimed at integrating into particular economic sectors through customs union. The UK involved

discussion and as a result of discussion, two supranational communities – the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC) were launched in 1956 with the signing of the Rome Treaty (Di Nolfo, 1992). Besides the custom union, sides decided to conduct research in nuclear utilization, build an economic community with common rules, involving free movement of workers, goods, and services. A common Commission and Council were launched and the institutional arrangement was the most remarkable feature of the Rome Treaty which established the basis of the institutional architecture of the EU.

Achievement in objectives set out in the Treaty was challengeable. Common agricultural, external trade and transport policies needed to be developed and agreed upon. Furthermore, common law for market regulation had to be adopted; trade relations with non-members had to be regulated cooperatively. All these activities were a part of political integration while articles of treaty mainly stressed on financial changes.

The early years of the EEC and EAEC showed that it was feasible to integrate, at least between the 'Six'. Therefore, the UK decided to join "Six" s integration efforts and applied for membership. The UK request was widely welcomed by the Members, however Charles de Gaulle, French President announced that he was opposed to the request of the UK and he used his veto power twice. He suggested intergovernmental integration – Union of the European Peoples, instead of supranational integration (Ludlow, 1999, pp. 235-236). After resigning of the President, the problem was solved and the UK together with Denmark, Ireland, and Norway became members of the Community, a plan for EMU agreed (O'Neill, 2000). The first enlargement deepened the Community's tasks and brought additional responsibilities for social, regional, environmental issues.

During 1970s, initial attempts for the EMU-restriction on currency fluctuations, agreement on a funding mechanism for 'own resources'; first tentative measures in the field of foreign policy cooperation – establishment of the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), and the European Social Fund (ESF) were the main developments. On the other hand, 1973 oil crisis, instability of the international

currency, inflation made obstacles for continuous economic growth. This economic recession and high unemployment stagnated European integration. Nevertheless, efforts to sustain and deepen integration continued.

As a result of the efforts, "Solemn Declaration on the European Union" and was proclaimed in 1983 which proposed a concrete reforms and renewed approaches towards regulation of internal market, especially remove of barriers to the free movement of goods, services, and capital (Weiler J. H., 2007).

Two significant reforms made with The Single European Act that was signed in 1985: Commitment to establish the internal market by 1 January 1993; institutional Reform: introduction of Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) system (Wessels, 1997).

New reforms brought changes in political integration. These changes led to concerns on three fronts (Weiler J. H., 1991): relations between states and internal markets: the degree of state regulation; the harmonized link between social policy and regulation of internal market; EMU for the realization of internal market (Schioppa, 1987).

These concerns were solved with the Maastricht Treaty in 1991 which was designed to deepen and expand European integration. It involved intergovernmental and supranational changes. A new entity was the EU and it brought together ECSC and EAEC. In addition to supranational activities, members agreed on intergovernmental cooperation on CFSP and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) (Wayne Sandholtz, 1998, p. 188). It created new features. Firstly, plans for EMU- differentiation among member states: full participants, losers and those – the UK, Denmark (opt-outs). The second one was deep integration in the field of social policy. All member states were prone to closer integration, except the UK. So, new legislation on Social Policy would not apply to the UK, it was binding for the other member states and all of them had access to EU machinery and resources.

To sum up, all above-mentioned activities demonstrated that the new EU was not a uniformly structured organization; it consisted of a mixture of intergovernmental and supranational pillars. Moreover, the Maastricht Treaty gave a right of choice to member states for several policy areas.

Ratification of the treaty captured a long period; it entered into force in November 1993. Public support for the EU decreased, national governments had a dilemma to choose integration or not (Commission, 1997). EU's role in foreign policy, internal markets were not good enough, and these uncertainties made several questions. Members witnessed pillar-system was not effective and alternatives should be prepared. Preparations for the EU reformation began in 1995. Three key aims were determined for 1996 IGC:

1. A strong relationship between the EU and its citizens;
2. Improvement in enlargement preparation;
3. Providing with greater external capacity.

The discussion on three topics concluded in 1997 with the Amsterdam Treaty. The treaty was not as popular as the Maastricht Treaty, because it mainly communalized the previous treaty. For instance, it added to the EU objectives the creation of Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) and shifted Pillar III (JHA) activities to Pillar I. Schengen Agreement integrated to the legal framework of the EU through the Treaty, again Ireland, Denmark, and the UK gained different opt-outs from both new reform. It also led to the extension of QMV and the scope of co-decision procedure-the legislative power of the EU. When it comes to the enlargement procedure, it could not facilitate the accession processes.

With the momentum of the 1990s, there were more than ten countries applied for membership. Therefore, reforms in the enlargement procedure were a top priority on the EU's agenda. There were concerns that if the EU did not have any proper strategy or program, wide enlargement would be a burden for the EU member states, made a challenge for the whole idea of the union.

In order to resolve the issue, the 2000 IGC opened and it has a limited agenda. Some of them preferred a focus on only membership issues while others wanted a discussion on a broader agenda. Discussion drew away towards a political Europe of tomorrow. The member states highlighted that the new enlargement – closer cooperation would change the EU, but would not weaken it. As a consequence of the discussion, the treaty of Nice was signed in 2001.

Its primary accomplishment was the institutional adaptation of 10 new member states. In addition, the European Charter on Fundamental Rights which included more than 50 articles compiling personal liberty, economic freedom, and social rights, was adopted in EU law.

All these treaty reforms brought new approaches as well as made new obstacles for the whole EU and its member states, especially in the light of enlargement. "Future of Europe" debate began in 2004, discussion on the constitution of Europe was very controversial and the result of the discussion was the rejection of ratification. Overall, the EU stayed as a complex structure evolving the blend of intergovernmentalism, supranationalism, and different forms of integration.

The EU needed institutional reforms. It was the undeniable fact that the EU institutions did not exercise function in exclusive basis (Ziller, 2008). In 2000, Joschka Fisher, German Foreign Minister gave a very clear answer to the issues of the Union: "the transition from a union of states to "European Federation" (Joerges, Meny, & Weiler, 2000, p. 24). It means that a European Parliament (EP) and a European government should function as an executive and legislative power. Institutional reforms focused on improving democracy within the Federation by increasing the role of the EP in the decision-making process. Political agreements, old issues, new strategies were discussed very broadly. In consequence, the new text was agreed and the Treaty of Lisbon was formally signed in 2007.

It brought new differences which played a bridge-role between member-states, the treaty was significantly different from the Constitutional Treaty, but the nature of reform was similar to pre-Constitutional treaty reforms. The Treaty of Lisbon created two equal-valued treaties: the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) (Craig, 2008, p. 137). The treaty defined the new institutional framework of the EU as below: The EP, The European Council (EC), The Council, European Commission, the Court of Justice of the EU, the European Central Bank (ECB), the Court of Auditors. Advisory bodies were the Economic and Social Committee (ESC), the Committee of the Regions.

The first four institutions were the key players of the Union: the legislative and executive power shared with two intergovernmental (EC and the Council) and two supranational institutions (EP and the Commission) (Craig, 2008, p. 158).

The changes were the continuation of the previous treaty. In any event, it was naive to expect a radical redesign of the institutional framework of the Union, because leaders of the national parliament were driven by two contradictory impulses:

1. To create the EU more democratic and effective;

2. To avoid any state-building process (John Peterson, 2006, p. 17).

As a whole, the Lisbon Treaty offered an improvement on the functioning of the Union's institutions, development of democratic legitimacy of the Union, enhancing its role in decision-making. ((EP), 2008, p. Point C).

The treaty removed the pillar structure that was introduced under the treaty of Maastricht. Consequently, decisions on the policy of justice and home affairs are now subject to co-decision and QMV. However, foreign policy choices are unanimously decided. In a number of policy fields, member states lost the right of veto. National parliaments have been provided the chance to raise a 'yellow card' or 'orange card' when they believe that the subsidiarity principle is not being respected (Gostynska-Jakubowska, 2016, p. 2). In addition, for the first time, the Lisbon Treaty established an exit clause enabling member states to withdraw from the EU (Panizza, 2019, p. 2). Member states voted for a limited review of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2010. This would enable the EU to create a new permanent crisis mechanism for the eurozone, the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), to succeed the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) in 2013 (ESM, 2019).

Overall, changes demonstrated that the concurrent pursuit of several goals such as enhancing the EU's effectiveness and democratic legitimacy and preserving the preeminence of the member states were extremely challenging exercises.

It is essential to realize that any effort to create supranational structure, created new obstacles which risked the role of EU institutions in decision-making. By failing to simplify the institutional framework of the union, it led to in-efficient functioning of

its decision-making and increases the role of member states in policy-making. (EURACTIV, 2010).

1. 2. Grand theories of European integration: Conceptualizing European foreign policy

People or countries generally collaborate or form partnership for one of four purposes: they can be forcibly brought together, they can share common values and objectives, and agree on how to govern themselves as a whole, they can come together because of the need for safety in the face of a common external threat, or they can decide to foster peace and enhance their quality of life more.

Interstate collaboration in Western Europe has long been affected and motivated by one of the first three motives, but a change to the fourth has taken place since 1945.

Economic integration has been seen as a means of attaining peace, so trade obstacles have been removed, domestic currency policies have been harmonized, and arrangements have been made for the free motion of individuals, products, money, and services, all in the hope of bringing new prosperity levels. However, it has never been seen by the most ardent advocates of economic integration as an end in itself, and as EU member states have constructed closer financial connections, some of their rule makers have flirted with the concept of political integration.

Different ideas, point of views have emerged with debates and several theories attempted to explain European integration. The grand theories are federalism, neo-functionalism, and intergovernmentalism.

1. 2. 1. Federalism

Federalism's basic impulse is to reconcile unity and diversity. The purpose of the federal level of government is to exercise tasks and duties that influence both the constituent units and the federation's individual citizens, particularly in foreign affairs and defense. The sub-national levels of state exercise tasks that are believed to

be dealt with more properly at these stages: education, local government, economic development.

Historically, federalism has been linked to traditional state-building and national integration procedures. It was construed as a specific manner of bringing together earlier distinct, autonomous, or independent territorial units to create a new type of union based on values that can be summarized, in the dictum 'unity in diversity'.

It is possible to distinguish three logics of federalist thinking related to the subsequent building of Europe (Burgess, 2004): the experience of conflict, the discussion between the founding states of European integration on what form this new initiative should take, and, lastly, domestic federalist movements. The first logic relates to the post-war period concept based on the war experience itself. Federalists across Europe, not least Great Britain, are arguing for the best way to set up a European federation. Britain encouraged European nations to create a United States of Europe in Winston Churchill's September 1946 speech.

Indeed, the federal concept of a future unified Europe was born among the anti-fascist resistance fighters. It was believed that the win over Hitler was the first step towards a new political order in Europe. It is essential to emphasize that many competing and contradictory convictions were subsumed in conceptualizations of what a future Europe would look like under the concept of 'federal' Europe.

During this era, the new concept was discovered in the main federalist publication: the Ventotene Manifesto. Drawn up by a group of Italian federalists, led by Ernesto Rossi and Altiero Spinelli, the future Member of the European Parliament, the document brought together a number of thoughts, attitudes, and hypotheses on a federalist future for European integration. The impact of Spinelli as an adviser to the Italian Government as Secretary-General of the Italian Federalist Movement during the first half of the 1950s was particularly crucial, despite the failure of the two initiatives he helped to set up (the European Defense Community (EDC) and the European Political Community (EPC)).

Nonetheless, it was the economically driven European vision of Jean Monnet that substituted Spinelli's later. The one main aspect that came to fruition of the Spinelli

project was the establishment of a European Parliament. The concept of Spinelli, called 'democratic radicalism', led to a parliamentary assembly that now plays a key position in decision-making in Europe. A third logic emerged, however, beyond the democratic radicalism of Spinelli and the rampant interactionism of Monnet: the establishment of individual federalist movements at the national level under the heading of the European movement. European movements continue to be highly active at the domestic level in their campaign to support these thoughts.

While all this is extremely relevant to situating the emergence of federalism as an idea and a form of the state, it is equally important to understand what federalism really is. Federalism is a compound mode of government that combines a particular government with regional governments in a single constitutionally linked political system.

Analytical approaches to federalism in European integration arose in parallel with these normative views. However, they only collected momentum in the early 1990s when European integration's empirical advances reintroduced government-level issues.

Federalism created a comeback in the 1990s with the Maastricht Treaty and issues about the future and objectives of the European project. This resulted in more advanced and distinguished approaches to federalism that was integrated into other European integration theories and concepts. In specific, federalist views affected the governance literature and liberal intergovernmentalism that arose partially in reaction to federalist views. Political government's shape, dynamics, and implications at distinct stages of a political system are at the core of EU scholarship comparative federalist research. Devolution, decentralization, and 'subsidiarity' concepts, which became increasingly important in the 1980s, were obviously affected by previous federalist discussions (A. Menon, 2006). This interpretation enables us to define the EU as a governance scheme based on at least two levels of government, each with its own right and directly acting on its people. The European Treaties allocate jurisdiction and resources to these two major public orders in this regard. In specific,

the Lisbon Treaty implemented clear 'shared government' clauses in fields where EU and Member State jurisdictions overlap.

Finally, a study on comparative federalism also focuses on the issue of politics and elections. This theoretical branch, anchored in electoral sociology, analyzes the functions of political parties within a federal system. It considers the evolving party system in a confederal way at EU level. The result of such a building is an incredibly heterogeneous system of parties where national ideologies and interests overlap, sometimes clashing with mere ideologies or interests of parties. The reasons for this are twofold: Firstly, there is a big amount of domestic political parties working outside the rigid ideological logic of the European political parties' primary families. Secondly, in the context of European elections alone, certain parties have appeared (L.Thorlakson, 2005). Research has shown that building a system of embedded parties at the supranational level poses significant difficulties by using the instruments of comparative federalism. Subsequent enlargements introduced new political divisions to the structure of the party, which has yet to reach the level of coherence of a federal domestic structure.

It is essential to emphasize that while debates on European federalism often imply or even promote the conversion of the EU into a federal country, federalism as a theoretical concept of organizing political authority and power is not necessarily connected to statehood (Tanja A. Börzel, 2003).

Although federalist approaches to European integration have been increasingly discovered in the margins of EU research, substituted instead by multi-level governance agendas, among the first theories created to study and politically build European integration. However, the distinct crises that the EU has experienced since the early 2000s have altered this function. Today, the concept of an extremely asymmetric federation of the European Union is commonly shared. The normative nature of federalist analyzes justifying domestic and global integration initiatives and it is deemed relevant to understanding the mechanisms of modern integration.

However, there are still two limitations. The first refers to the highly heterogeneous nature of the approaches concerned with federalism. Federalist methods are more of a

'descriptive theory'–but nonetheless a theory, because it develops explicit, though diverse, and sometimes contradictory hypotheses for understanding the nature of a political body based on inter-state foundations.

The second boundary is empirical. The latest European treaties seemed to strengthen member states' authority against the Commission's authority. Member states stay stronger than institutions' supranational level, with the Council of Ministers enjoying the authority to avoid policy developments in fields where Member states object.

Conceptual instruments created by federalist academics allowed us to create a stronger knowledge of these procedures and constantly reminded us of the energy game in which European member states, sub-national actors and European institutions function. Therefore, the EU is simultaneously intergovernmental and federalized.

1. 2. 2. Neofunctionalism

Studies of the early years of European integration resulted in Mitrany's concepts being expanded as neo-functionalism. This claims that prerequisites are required before integration, including a shift in government attitudes away from nationalism and towards collaboration, the willingness of elites to encourage integration for pragmatic rather than altruistic purposes, and the delegation of true power to a new supranational authority (Rosamond, 2000). There will be an expansion of integration created by spillover once these modifications take place: joint action in one region will generate new requirements, tensions, and issues that will boost the pressure to take joint action in another region. For instance, agricultural integration will only operate if associated industries are also incorporated, such as transport and agricultural support facilities.

The ECSC was the precursor of today's European Union (Rosamond, 2000). This was partially developed for short-term objectives such as encouraging Franco-German cooperation, but it was also seen by Monnet and Schuman as the first phase in a process that would eventually lead to political integration (Urwin, 1995, pp. 44-

46). In the beginning, few individuals endorsed the ECSC concept, but once it had been operating for a couple of years, trade unions and political parties became more passionate as they started to see its advantages, and pressure for integration in other industries increased. Urwin notes that the ECSC's sectorial strategy was handicapped because it still attempted to incorporate only one portion of complicated industrial economies and was unable to achieve its objectives in isolation from other financial sections (Urwin, 1995, p. 76). Following the ECSC, a new agreement was reached between its members to attain wider economic integration within the EEC.

The main element of functionalism is spillover. It requires various forms. For instance, if countries incorporate one industry of their economies with functional spillover, the difficulty of isolating it from other industries would result in all industries being integrated (George, 1996, p. 24). Differences in norms with technical spillover would cause distinct countries to grow to the state stage with the most stringent laws. Lastly, political spillover means that when distinct functional industries become integrated, interest groups such as corporate lobbies and trade unions will increasingly turn their attention away from attempting to influence domestic governments to try to influence the new regional executive, which will encourage their attention to win new powers for themselves.

Neo-functionalist ideas dominated European integration studies in the 1950s and 1960s, but fell briefly out of favor in the 1970s, partly because the process of European integration seemed to have come to a halt in the mid-1970s, and partly because the spillover theory needed further development. The most prevalent criticism of neo-functionalism was that it was too linear and required to be extended or altered to take into consideration various integration pressures, such as changes in government and political attitudes, the effect of nationalism on integration, the influence of external occurrences, such as changes in internal financial and military threats, and social and political changes (Haas, 1968, pp. 14-15).

Joseph Nye (Nye, 1971, pp. 208-214) gave a boost to neo-functionalism when he wrote about removing it from the European context and also looking at non-Western experiences. He found that regional integration studies involve an integrative

potential that depends on various circumstances: The wisdom of enabling poorer Southern and Eastern European countries to join the EU has been raised questions for a long time. At the same moment, variations in Member states' size or wealth may be less significant than the existence of a driving force that helps bring them together, such as the tension between France and Germany. To what extent the elite organizations in the member countries that regulate economic policy believe alike and hold the same values. Extension of group activity was concerned. Such organizations have a main role to play in encouraging integration if they see it in their interests. Moreover, Member states' ability to adapt and react to government requirements, which in turn depends on national stability levels and decision-makers' ability – or willingness – to react. In addition, neo-functionalists have developed theories they used to forecast European institutions' behavior.

It is anticipated that the Commission will behave as a "political businessman" and mediator. According to neo-functionalist theory, the Commission will attempt to push for higher collaboration between member states in a direction that contributes to increasing supranational decision-making.

It is anticipated that the European Court will rule not only on the grounds of legal arguments but also in favor of political integration. The Court will thus try to extend Community law's logic to new fields.

It is anticipated that the European Parliament will be a supranational focused organization and the Commission's natural partner. Although members of the EP (MEPs) are elected by their home nation citizens, they are split in their day-to-day job politically and ideologically. Neo-functionalists expect members of the EP (MEPs) to develop loyalties to the EU and the 'European idea' so that they will often defend national interests in Europe.

It is anticipated that the Council will be the organization that defends domestic interests. Neo-functionalists would also expect member states to be affected by the spillover logic, which would lead them, despite their domestic interests, to argue for higher financial and political integration. It is also anticipated that member countries will be affected by the reality that they are engaged in continuing supranational

negotiations. This makes resisting proposals that lead to further political integration difficult for a member state.

Although neo-functionalism has been extensively criticized and some of these criticisms have revealed significant shortcomings, the conceptualization and explanation of the dynamics of European integration remain a significant strategy. There are several reasons for this: firstly, as illustrations of the situation have stated, neo-functionalism has a very helpful toolkit to analyze important problems, primarily to explain EU decision-making processes and results. While this has been an ancient and longstanding study issue, it will remain a prominent one. Secondly, neo-functionalism influenced subsequent theorization and subsequent methods drawn widely on its assumptions and hypotheses, which in turn offered helpful construction blocks for a number of frameworks. Third, neo-functionalism has proved capable of reformulation, partially because of the nature of its theoretical assumptions, and partially because of its authors' propensity to self-reflect and self-criticism.

The supporter of regional integration should, therefore, acknowledge that neo-functionalism has been and still is an emerging theory, rather than confining its significance to particular circumstances that prevailed at the moment of its formulation five decades ago. Its place between the fields of international relations and comparative politics enhances its ability to explain an extremely unorthodox and unprecedented transformation process that none of these can capture nearly by definition. The neo-functionalist study agenda is therefore not exhausted by any means.

There is continuing potential for the theory to be developed, not least by further specifying the circumstances under which the various kinds of spillover stress are likely to develop. It therefore still requires work, but it should be taken as a challenge rather than an excuse to reject the neo-functionalist strategy.

1. 2. 3. Liberal Intergovernmentalism

Intergovernmentalism is one of the grand theories which provides a conceptual explanation for European integration. It is considered as a state-centric theory, because it stressed on the role of states in European integration. In other words, integration occurs only if nation-states have a continuous surplus of profits and losses. As it takes place according to its 'guidelines', it is thus seen as enhancing the nation-state (Milward A. , 1992). While governments are the main actors for intergovernmentalists, the role of supranational institutions is undermined.

Governments only transfer sovereignty to organizations where future joint benefits are significant, but attempts to ensure other governments 'adherence through decentralized means' are likely to be ineffective (Moravcsik A. , 1998, p. 9). Any important autonomous entrepreneurship is refused to supranational institutions and is subject to change by member states.

Moravcsik created the intergovernmentalist strategy in his liberal intergovernmentalist account (LI). He departed from 'classical' intergovernmentalism that considers domestic interests resulting from the perception by the state of its comparative role in the state scheme. Rather, Moravcsik views national preferences resulting from the context given by the state's domestic politics. Preferences arise in national politics from vibrant political procedures. The primary source of integration, however, lies in the interests of the nation's themselves and each takes the comparative authority to the negotiating table. Further integration is therefore feasible when member states (the most powerful) see their interest best served by such undertakings.

As far as European foreign policy is concerned, 'classic' intergovernmentalists were very skeptical about the prospect of integration because this policy region was regarded as elevated politics (Hoffman, 1966, p. 882). When the functions are concerned with Grosspolitik's ineffable and intangible problems, when greatness and prestige, rank and safety, dominance and reliance are at stake, we are completely within the sphere of traditional inter-state politics (Koenig-Archibugi, 2004, p. 139).

Effective collaboration relies on the convergence of domestic interests, but in the field of foreign policy, such convergence has been viewed as rather unlikely, as countries tend to have very distinct interests in this policy region, as a consequence of which Hoffmann considers a 'diversity logic' at stake in European foreign policy. During the Cold War, the Community's member states followed distinct European security and defense foreign policy interests. While de Gaulle attempted to challenge American tutelage, the other member states were unwilling to test American hegemony and thus risk losing their protective authority (Hoffman, 1966, p. 890). This scenario altered after the lifting of the iron curtain and significantly weakening the demand for US security. As a consequence, the basic preferences of safety and defense strategy among member states, including those of Britain, Germany, and France, converged significantly, making it possible to cooperate more closely in this area (Hoffman, 2000).

Liberal intergovernmentalism indicates that issue-specific economic interests of dominant interest groups determine the usefulness of the integration function of member states. In terms of foreign policy, considering the lower participation of important interest organizations, this utility function is hard to determine (Moravcsik A. , 1998, pp. 28-30). As a consequence, somewhat altered the initial LI thesis.

It was subsequently argued that in fields where economic interests are not significantly influenced, member states tend to promote further integration without unilateral options for intervention, therefore claim that Britain and France were the biggest opponents of a supranational CFSP during the intergovernmental meetings leading up to the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties, because they had other (unilateral) domestic and safety policy options, while Germany lacked such options and thus favored a more supranational CFSP (Moravcsik & Nicolaidis, 1999).

As a case, Moravcsik analyzed the issue of British membership in the 1960s with regard to enlargement. LI explained that the British negotiating position was week due to Britain being more EC-dependent. France managed to obtain significant concessions in exchange for giving up its veto because it had little economic interest in membership of the UK. LI was also applied to the enlargement of the East and

argue similarly (Moravcsik & Vachudova, 2002). Due to its reliance on Western European investment and market access, the negotiating power of EU member states was considerably higher than that of the applicant nations. As a consequence, the candidate countries decided not to be excluded from the Union but to accept the circumstances of EU membership.

It was argued that member states cooperate in European foreign policy because the realization of their preferences at EU level gives them support vis-à-vis domestic opposition and cultural organizations and because financial interdependencies between nations are gradually increasing, as a consequence of which specific financial interests can only increase (Koenig-Archibugi, 2004).

In addition to these rather explicit applications of classical and liberal intergovernmentalism to European foreign policy, many writers seem to have at least implicitly regarded EFP, and in particular the CFSP / ESDP, from an intergovernmental view. The notions of the 'lowest common denominator,' the significance of domestic interests, control of member states and the intergovernmental design of big components of European foreign policy may have been the mainstream account in this policy region for a long time.

Today LI theory analyzes the development of the European integration. Liberal intergovernmentalism focuses on national interest naturally leads to the opposite evaluation. National governments are still calling for tune in European integration, pursuing various domestic interests, negotiating hard with each other, and institutionalizing integration in order to maintain control. In some instances where EU policymaking is prominent for some subgroup of population-trade policy, Common agricultural policy (CAP) reform, service deregulation, immigration, constitutional reform, national defense reform, right down to a comparatively minor problem such as the recognition of Kosovo-European governments stay sensitive to the public. Polls indicate that the EU is as trusted or popular as domestic governments throughout Europe. The absence of salience in the minds of Europeans is the primary reason why they are not actively participating in elections or discussions at European level (McNamara & Meunier, 2007, p. 41). Much of what is perceived as a

democratic deficit is due to the overall unpopularity of government and the unfortunate decision to force unnecessary public discussions and referendums on a confusing constitutional reform (Moravcsik A. , 2006).

Overall, all above-mentioned cases indicate that LI can analyze today's Europe and its foreign policy. Member states are the main determinants of the EU foreign policy and all reforms and challenges depend on their interests and preferences.

1. 3. Europeanization of national foreign policies in EU member-states

Historians, anthropologists, sociologists, and political scientists have used the notion of Europeanization to define a range of events from the creation of European culture to the spread of social practices (Featherstone K. , 2003). Its introduction in the field of EU studies since the mid-1990s is linked to a study program that concentrated on transforming policies of member states in the context of European integration. Europeanization is, therefore, the EU-zation. The initial idea was that the emergence of distinct governance structures at EU level created adaptational pressures whose magnitude and transformative potential was conditioned by the 'good fit' between national and EU policies and institutional arrangements.

Europeanization results are usually measured by scales of transformation, adaptation, and absorption (Börzel, 2003). It focuses on the effect of EU institutions on domestic policies.

The Europeanization strategy conceptualizes EU institutions as exerting impact on domestic foreign policy through distinct procedures: domestic preferences projection, domestic policy adaptation, or the emergence or shift of domestic preferences that privilege a European strategy (Wong, 2005). The model of parliamentary politics focuses on the country's national political circumstances and how important participants in the political process effectively negotiate to enforce their political preferences. In this context, key authorities and bureaucracies' perceptions and preferences, as well as the elite public sphere, are crucial in evaluating the decisions for or against the EU CFSP and ESDP.

Europeanization has increasingly been used to explore elements of European integration and to analyze how 'Europe matters' in a particular policy sector (Knill, 2001). It has been conceived as a historical phenomenon, transnational cultural diffusion, institutional adaptation, or policy and decision process adaptation– reflecting the interdisciplinary nature of the concept's use (Featherstone & Radaelli, 2003). Therefore, the wide use of the word presents a number of difficulties for researchers who wish to use the idea. First, 'Europeanization' needs to be correctly defined to delineate Europeanization from associated procedures and ideas, especially European integration. This is also essential in order to establish appropriate Europeanization indices for the assessment of gathered empirical information. More essentially, it is also necessary to establish the applicability of the concept in the field of foreign and security policy as foreign and security policy differs from other policy fields due to the intergovernmental nature of decision-making. Furthermore, foreign and security policy decision-making tends to be entrusted to the national executive with less domestic parliamentary supervision than in other policy areas. Consequently, any EU impact on national foreign policy implementation is not immediately evident. And EU foreign and security policy's intergovernmental nature does not produce the sort of legally binding adjustment pressures policy fields in the first pillar. Europeanization thus enables researchers to concentrate on puzzles beyond the cause of European integration or the nature of EU decision-making and to study the nature of the 'reciprocal connection' between European and national levels (Börzel, 2002, p. 195).

Because of the intergovernmental nature of the EU's foreign policy system, pressures emanating from the EU stage are not as powerful or direct as in fields of financial and social policy (Bulmer & Burch, 1999). Therefore, with respect to foreign policy, it can be said that the delegation of foreign policy competences has had a restricted effect on national policy decisions (Hix & Goertz, 2000). On the other side, EU membership has led in procedures of adaptation for new and founding EU member states, both in terms of their strategies towards earlier internal states and strategies towards third countries to align them with current EU policies (Manners & Whitman,

2000). Through the institutionalization of the EPC and later the CFSP and the ESDP, in spite of its intergovernmental decision-making, foreign policy, and security policy have become part of the integration process and cooperation within the EU CFSP (Ginsberg R. , 2001).

Although the effects of Europeanization on national foreign policy are weak compared to policy areas located in the first pillar, there are a number of documented changes in the foreign policy of states. However, those changes are not always explicitly referred to as Europeanization. With the evolution of EU foreign policy cooperation, some researchers used a Europeanization strategy to document modifications in domestic foreign policy: in his research of Irish foreign policy, Keatinge (Keatinge, 1984) referred to the Europeanization of foreign policy to label the reorientation of Irish foreign policy as a consequence of EC accession, while Torreblanca recognized such a change in the case of Spain a few years later. Therefore, in applying the idea to domestic decision-making under CFSP and ESDP, it can be expected to discover proof of some degree of Europeanization even in the field of safety and defense.

In order to discover the level of Europeanization of national policy, it is important to identify the definition of "Europeanization". Three concepts of Europeanization can broadly explain the process and they can be useful to explain potential changes in foreign policymaking of EU member states (Wong, 2005):

- domestic adaptation (top-down);
- domestic projection (bottom-up process);
- identity reconstruction (including change in interests and identity).

Europeanization can be described as a system of domestic change stemming from the pressure on adjustment created by European integration. Changes depend on the 'good fit' of domestic organizations, on their identity and personality (Torreblanca, 2001). This concept is applied to both institutional and informal procedures. In the framework of foreign and security policy, this perception of Europeanization runs counter to LI approach to CFSP / ESDP where countries attempt to achieve individual targets (Moravcsik A. , 1998). Participation in CFSP is designed as a

reciprocal relation. It is more congruent with national structural methods observed in international relations and comparative politics (Gourevitch, 1978).

As a consequence of Europeanization according to the first concept, changes can be observed in one or more of these areas: bureaucratic restructuring, constitutional change, elite socialization and shifting of public opinion (Smith M. E., 2000). Adaptation can also be anticipated to lead to more general policy changes, preferences and institutions, a more prolific EU agenda and compliance with the common policy goals, agreed measures for the unity of the EU. In cases of crisis or choices concerning the implementation of a CFSP / ESDP policy tool in a particular case, bureaucratic and constitutional restructuring is less probable to be observed since these constitute change as a long-term reaction to incidents and to the institutional development of the CFSP / ESDP. However, one could hope that the European agenda will be highly advanced, that the common goals will be complied with, and that the domestic political positions would be relaxed in order to make progress in EU policy and institutional activities possible.

On the other hand, as national projection, Europeanization can be viewed as export of national ideas, domestic policy-making models to the EU (Bulmer, 1998). This refers also to the notion of scale politics (Ginsberg R. , 1989), and the advantages of collective decision-making in foreign policy activities at reduced expenses and hazards. Generalization of previous domestic policies onto a greater scale established a beneficial connection between the country and the EU level. National projection gives benefits to national states. Because, countries increase their influence in the international arena; it decreases the expenses of implementing a controversial policy against an extra-European force; and a powerful European presence in world affairs could possibly be useful to all EU members as it improves the global impact of individual nations (Regelsberger, 1997). National policy results could enable states to take advantage of the EU to support particular domestic interests, to boost domestic their impact worldwide through participation in or the initiation of EU policy, to influence the foreign policy of other member states.

In practice this top-down and bottom-up are interlinked, making Europeanization, not just an outcome or a consequence of policy, but also an ongoing and reciprocal process in the form of member states' responses to the process of European integration in EU institutions (Börzel, 2003). This generates a methodological dilemma: on the one hand, EU policies and institutions can alter domestic policy preferences; on the other hand, they originated at the domestic level.

The third idea of Europeanization brings it closer to European integration and indicates that domestic foreign policy may eventually converge. It recalls the idea of safety groups (German, 1957), and the earlier mentioned idea of elite socialization (Smith M. E., 2000). Evidence of identity conceptions towards Europeanization involves the development or presence of standards in the political elites, shared European and national interests definitions, increased government support for EU collaboration, shared and overlapping domestic and global definitions of the role of the state, and the parameters of Europe's safety. In the context of the EU's external policies' long-standing involvement in CFSP re-enters the members of the EU and reoriented their foreign policy cultures in a comparable way (Smith M. E., 2000, p. 614).

When it comes to policy domains, the increasing EU multi-level political system has restructured diverse national policies and brought them to a similar line. This concept is somehow similar to neofunctionalism: Initially, most of the policy was concerned with European "market-making": policies designed to promote a Single European Market. Following economic relations, it has affected almost every domestic policy area since the late 1980s. Clearly, the most advanced policy fields in the EU were also those policies which provided more appropriate possibilities and restrictions in domestic policy environments: the development of EU decision-making was more and more related to the agricultural, cohesion, financial and environmental policy. In addition, national stresses led to differential national adaptation procedures in the case of public policy.

Above-mentioned three conceptual approaches were applied to several empirical cases. The role of the EU and its CFSP/CSDP can be analyzed in the context of crisis.

According to the first consideration, the EU can play an important role in crisis management; become a single voice of the member states and even the joint policies of the EU as well as CFSP/CSDP can be considered as the main branch of national policies discourse. Second consideration reflects the small role of the EU. It means that the EU can prepare joint actions, but it is not given the right to speak on behalf of the member states. Finally, the role of CFSP/CSDP can be zero, any instruments or actions would not be applied by the EU. All member states can choose to deal with the crisis alone. All these choices for the role of CFSP/CSDP depend on the level of national adaptation, domestic projection.

To conclude, Europeanization can be described in a way that the EU promotes its values and norms beyond the borders through its foreign policy. And if fostering democracy, human rights, rule of law are on the agenda of the EU foreign policy, Europeanization can easily influence national policies as soft power. However, when it comes to the Europeanization of foreign and security policy, the outcomes are not powerful and it mainly depends on the willingness of member states.

II THE EU WITH ONE VOICE ON THE WORLD STAGE? CONVERGENCES AND DIVERGENCES BETWEEN MEMBER-STATES AND EU IN FOREIGN POLICY

2. 1. EU's Collective Action Problem: CFSP and CSDP

From the beginning of EU integration, common foreign policy has been a key challenge for the EU. It was clear that if member states did not act as a group, the EU put its effectiveness in world affairs under the question. On the other hand, member states were afraid of negative effect of deep political integration on their sovereignty. Governmental officials are divided into two groups: supporters of US leadership and dependence on the EU. This complex picture made legal and constitutional challenges and members attempted to find an appropriate way.

During the 1950s, building common foreign policy of the EU was not important as common economic policy formation. For instance, the Rome Treaty did not mention foreign policy. However, logically, economic cooperation demanded common external policies. Member states attempted to discuss the foreign policy, failed EDC, Gaulle's plan was the first movements in this direction. However, it established the basis of later discussions on the topic. As a result of the discussions, EPC was proposed in the 1970s and was formally adopted with the Single European Act. 1990-91 Gulf War turned out to be a turning point. The US organized a multinational campaign for the defense of Saudi Arabia with 13 countries (Ginsberg R. , 2001, p. 193). The crisis divided the members and they gave different responses to the war (Anderson, 1992): France supported military action, but it mainly stressed on diplomatic resolution because of the good relations with Arab oil manufacturers. Britain completely supported the EU and the use of military power. Germany had constitutional limitations on the deployment of its troops. Portugal, Spain, and Belgium refused to use military forces and Ireland chose neutral position (van Eekelen, 1990). This fragmentation indicated that EC was only an economic power

and its institutional structure and military power did not permit it to act as a single actor (Delors, 1991).

After the crisis, ministers focused on the foreign policy issue, negotiations were not a simple task, reflecting the basic distinctions between those that wanted to move to more integrated EU and those who wished to keep these movements slow and to hold states' decision making in their hands. As a result, Title V of the Maastricht Treaty indicated boldly that 'a common foreign and security policy' covering all fields of foreign and security policy, and is being developed hereby. The Maastricht system created a political structure based on three pillars: the European Communities; CFSP; and JHA (Wayne Sandholtz, 1998, p. 188). The CFSP's goal was: to protect the common values, core interests, liberty and integrity of the Union; to reinforce its security; to preserve peace; to improve global security in line with the UN Charter principles, the Helsinki Final Act and the Paris Charter goals including on external borders (Article 11, TEU).

Member states developed common foreign policy successfully. The EU jointly act in humanitarian and economic aid to developing countries. It rapidly expressed its support to the US for fighting against terrorism after the 9/11 attack. The joint action strengthened the role of the EU in international relations as a global actor. However, several cases such as failure in building peace in Bosnia or becoming a mediator in Greece-Turkey dispute (1996) showed the weaknesses of the EU. Institutional structure again limited its action. In its fields of responsibility, such as trade, growth and humanitarian assistance, the European Commission retains its authority of initiative. At the same time, the enhanced Council of Europe lays down general CFSP guidelines and the Council of Ministers takes most decisions and mechanisms on the basis of unanimous votes. Therefore, a plurality of players was still allowed to talk on behalf of the EU, and rivalry among EU bureaucracies continued to be part of EU foreign policy's daily operation.

Amsterdam brought modifications to the institutions, too. In order for the European Union to anticipate international crises, the first thing to do was establish a Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (PPEWU) in Brussels. Secondly, the ancient

practice of having four distinct portfolios of national external affairs within the European Union was substituted with the development of a single post on foreign policy and with the appointment of Javier Solana, the High Representative for Foreign Policy.

In an attempt to dismantle the Pillar structure which began with the Maastricht Treaty, the Lisbon Treaty was welcomed in 2009. According to the Treaty, the scheme of the rotational six-month presidency was substituted by the permanent presidency of the Member states under the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy who is also Vice-President of Europe Commission (Article 18 (1) TEU). The High Representative chairs the EU Council on Foreign Affairs and is aided by the European External Action Service (EEAS) in fulfilling its responsibilities. This new service consists of Commission staff, the Secretariat General of the Council, the diplomatic services of Member states (Article 27(3) TEU). Despite the modifications resulting from the Treaty of Lisbon and the establishment of EEAS, the EU external policy structure continues to be extremely fragmented, involving various processes and actors. This diversity of actors and policy centers leads to a windmill of actions, visions, and declarations, which confuses the overall visibility and consistency of the EU.

Different logics continue to follow decision-making. Geography and history obviously play a significant role in the determination of domestic priorities. In the Baltic area, Finland and Sweden will always be more worried than in the Mediterranean nations about what happens. On the other hand, in comparison with Nordic countries, they always are more interested in what happens in the Maghreb. However, it is becoming increasingly apparent in a Europe without internal border that all member states must be concerned with what is happening at every corner of the European Union. As a result, the EU also has a broad agreement on the importance of transatlantic relations, strengthening of laws, human rights, and liberal democratic values outside the EU, with the aim of promoting stability in the immediate Union (Wæver, 2000).

Also, today attitudes of EU's member states towards the CFSP vary. In general, smaller member states are very passionate because they have an impact on the EU that would otherwise be hard for them to accomplish. Germany, Spain, and Italy are still well conscious of the fascist past and usually, want to work throughout the Union on a consensus basis. France is still confident that they should be in a permanent leadership position, as it believes that they have a permanent seat on the UN Security Council and military capabilities. This contributes sometimes to tensions in the direction and intent of the CFSP between countries and the others. However, they even recognize difficulties in dealing with neighboring countries like Russia and security issues like the Western Balkans by "getting it alone". Development of the CFSP could not change its intergovernmental nature and it demanded more and more efforts to be a single voice in world affairs.

The EU's worldwide aspirations are not just foreign policy; they include a clear dimension to security and defense (Blockmans & Wessel, 2011). Member states, such as Germany, France have military power, but when it comes to applying their forces, all of them have separate opinions and progress on cooperation in security and defense policy is very slow. Portugal, Netherlands support strong security relationship with the US, while France, Germany, Italy, Spain are prone to closer cooperation within the EU. Moreover, different countries have their own security policy preferences and capacities which also directly influenced their policy-making. For instance, German and Dutch armed forces were considered as a part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) while France has its own separate policy towards its former colonies. Northern countries and Ireland kept their neutrality in security and defense policy. Nevertheless, NATO is a coordinator of Europeans' defense policy.

Since the 1990s, the EU's safety and defense policy have changed. It has so far concentrated on managing civilian and military crises based on the member states' capacity. In the Eastern and Southern neighborhood of the EU, the EU performed limited civilian and low-intensity military missions. It has not created its own command structures and has not yet used the European rapid response force for crisis

management activities. A tool to enhance industrial collaboration between EU member states was designed by the European Defense Authority. But it has only to a restricted extent supported multilateral initiatives. The restricted scope of the CSDP was related to some EU member states' refusal to expand the competence of the EU in this sector. (Gotkowska, 2017).

The EU's security and defense policy is one of the hardest instruments for the European project. Differences between the member states' internal interests were even more pronounced in defense issues as opposed to the external policy. The Central and Eastern European nations are increasingly worried about Russian policies' insecurity and the dangers of Middle East disputes and massive Mediterranean immigration challenges are being prioritized by Southern Members.

The European Security Strategy was approved in 2003 as the framework for the CSDP (Carrasco, Muguruza, & Sanchez, 2016, p. 19). Since then the world has altered considerably, and the present situation must be reflected in European strategy. In December 2013, the CSDP was put at the forefront of the discussion as the European Council was conscious of the need to recreate European security and defense policies in the context of recent threats. Since then, a number of security measures have been introduced with regard to particular problems as a guideline for member states' behavior.

CSDP collaboration is moving towards discovering mechanisms for common actions on the ground, strengthening logistical collaboration. Different military and civil "pooling and sharing" activities have been initiated in this context to unite the resources of member states to undertake joint activities. The European Defense Agency (EDA), which was established in 2004, can and should continue to analyze the potential for 'pooling and sharing' military and civil resources in the development and realization of particular initiatives of member states (Keohane, 2004, p. 2).

Debates on the CSDP are growing since mid-2016 because of a conjunction of three reasons: decision of the UK on leaving the EU; new strategy for the EU Foreign and Security Policy - Global Foreign and Security Strategy; Donald Trump's dislike by

some EU member countries, coupled with a belief that there is a need to decrease EU dependency on the US.

Through the year-long negotiations, the military planning and management capacity was established – the creation of the European Defense Fund (EDF) and the annual coordinated assessment of defense, together with the choice to launch Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO).

After a referendum in which Britain chose to leave the EU, Germany and France agreed that strengthening cooperation. Within days following the UK referendum, the German and French Foreign Ministers released the paper 'A strong Europe in a world of uncertainty' which pointed to the safety strategy as one of the main three fields for enhanced EU integration (Rose & Pascouau, 2017, p. 13). In September 2016, the ideas put forward were clarified and won support from Italy and Spain by the defense ministers of the two countries. An argument for enhancing security and defense integration was that the UK cannot stop the growth of collaboration after leaving the EU any longer.

During the US presidential election, Donald Trump used several claims towards European allies. Trump's speeches triggered member states to deepen military integration. Discussions were not stressed on growth in military spending or strengthening trans-Atlantic relations. It mainly focused on building the new military structure which would not depend on the US. The situation caused uncertainties of European countries towards the US in the field of security guarantee (Ratti, 2018). Moreover, the anti-American public was growing within the EU. However, discussions could not be applied to actions because of the contradiction between the member states.

After the referendum in UK, The European Council's approval of the Global Strategy for the EU's Foreign and Security Policy (EUGS), drafted by the EU's High Representative for External Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, on June 2016, came several days (Buitelaar, Larik, Matta, & Vos, 2016). With the new political scenario evolving within the EU and in transatlantic relations, the document that outlines the EU's objectives and aspirations in foreign and security policy has

grown in significance. According to the document, the Commission has become a significant player in the discussions on the evolution of the CSDP. However, jurisdiction and institutional structure restricted its potential in this area.

Overall, these projects may provide a chance to improve EU member states' military capacities and boost investment or simplify defense expenditure. However, these projects could have adverse implications for NATO in an unfavorable political scenario. EU initiatives are therefore obtained with excellent caution in most Baltic States and Black Sea areas. The Polish partners from the Visegrad Group are less willing to see themselves as part of the eastern flank and are more excited about the planned enhancement of collaboration. But it is not certain that the new European projects will produce measurable outcomes or stay an unimportant reaction to a short-term political demand.

Over the next century, the CFSP and the ESDP will be working in a challenging and evolving safety setting, faced with modern challenges and still traumatized with their significant transatlantic partners and member states. There is no shortage of ideas with regard to reform proposals to reinforce the CFSP, make it more efficient, more coherent and consistent, and improve the position of the EU on the global level, but when it comes to actions, lots of problems appear.

To sum up, it is clear that naturally, the external policy continues to be a delicate field, and members want to preserve their own passion. Foreign ministers are also unwilling to act cooperatively while unanswered issues remain concerning the legitimacy of the member states and their important differences in foreign policy culture, experiences, and expectations. At the end of all facts and discussions, CFSP/CSDP depend on their members' political wishes and there are inevitable limits to the exercise of foreign policy.

2. 2. The state of the EU relations with the Eastern Neighborhood and Russia

The ENP is a main concern in the foreign policy of the European Union. The Union and its member states experience many difficulties and dilemmas in developing and implementing a strategy that not only encourages these interests efficiently but also creates greater ties with neighboring nations centered on the principles on which the Union is established.

Discussions on the ENP referred first to the necessity of the EU Eastern neighbors. The issue of how to manage the eastern frontier of the EU, in particular with Belarus, Ukraine, or Moldova, came onto the agenda in 1997 when accession prospects for eastern and southern applicants were lastly recognized and negotiations with the first accession countries were opened in 1998. As a further condition for membership, the Commission needed "excellent relations with neighbors" and some leaders began thinking about the consequences of enlargement and the outlook for "wider Europe".

During negotiations, the perspective of enlargement started to raise concerns at the political level about the way to deal with the new neighbors and with security at the borders of the enlarged EU. The issue gained momentum with the summit of Copenhagen of 2002. The Council of General Affairs requested the Commissioner, Chris Patten, to prepare a joint strategy for cross-pillar policy in order to resolve this stalemate. It led in a joint letter in which Patten and Solana distinguished the approach from the multiple future areas. (Patten & Solana, 2002).

Looking at the initial proposals on the Wider Europe of the EU made in 2001-2003 primarily from the UK, Sweden, Poland, and Germany, they primarily referred to a sub-regional perspective and proposed an "Eastern Dimension" in European Union external relations based on experience in the Northern Dimension, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership or the EEA.

However, after the Eastern Enlargement, states like France, Spain, and Italy stressed the need to concentrate on the South again and to restart the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership which was experiencing problems in its present sub-regional manner.

The "Wider Europe" initiative later became the ENP: after it had included the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership states and countries in the Southern Caucasus. Javier Solana also included it in the 2003 European security strategy to highlight the importance of the political discourse (Solana, 2003). In 2004, the policy was officially adopted as the ENP.

The new member countries from Eastern Europe have taken a significant part in affecting the European policy since the beginning of membership talks in 1998 until the introduction of the ENP in 2003-2004. They were highly involved in developing greater collaboration with ENP Eastern countries and therefore most of them endorsed the Finnish Northern Dimension Initiative for Belarus of 2006 and the German policy of ENP Plus, which was suggested for EU Presidency in 2007 (Duleba, Benc, & Bilcik, 2012). Four groups of countries appeared among the new member states. First, Polish leaders' talks and proposals have given additional assistance to British and Swedish leaders calling for a more 'Wider Europe" strategy and the premature proposals by the Finnish and German authorities to strengthen northern and eastern external ties in the EU. They expressed their concern at the absence of an Eastern European policy of the EU. Second, the states of Visegrad have also been encouraged but not similarly involved and organized. Third, the Baltic States were actively involved in the transition to the European agenda for the East and the South Caucasus. Fourth, Romania promoted closer collaboration with Bulgaria as well as with Moldova (Keohane, 2004, p. 14). Moreover, it supported the development of the Black Sea Cooperation which has been taken into consideration by the Commission in 2006 correspondence.

To sum up, the initial proposal on a strategy towards EU neighbors, was mainly related to the establishment of "Eastern Dimension", Black Sea Cooperation, and strengthening "Northern Dimension". All these policies linked to the idea of member relations on sub-regional cooperation.

The ENP aims to build closer links without providing them a perspective of membership between the Union and its neighbors. It is a new policy to promote stronger economic growth, stability and better governance in the neighborhood of the

EU. It is a policy that promotes stability and prosperity beyond the EU's boundaries through regional collaboration on one side. The major policy dilemma that the EU faces is the need to choose the right balance between the promotion of democratic values and the protection of its strategic interests – notably strengthening security and stability in the neighborhood.

The concept of the ENP takes the use of various kinds of intergovernmental and supranational processes, both in terms of international and economic policy. The strategy submitted by former Commission President Romano Prodi to 'Everything but Institutions' had been contrasting with those neighbors' expectations that wished to apply in the near or the remote future to become EU Members. The reason is that the Union does not grant them long-term 'prizes' to respect EU laws and values. Moreover, the Union built a relationship with its neighborhood countries under the mechanism of "conditionality". However, the EU was selective and inconsistent in applying conditionality (Lehne, 2014). EU-Azerbaijan relation is a good example. The EU is interested in convincing Azerbaijan to support Nabucco pipeline project and sell European gas. If the EU used its norms and values as the main principle for the relations with Azerbaijan, it would make obstacles for the bilateral relations (Grant, 2011). These economic concerns assist to clarify why the EU has been stricter in the issue of political prisoners in Minsk rather than in Baku.

Despite electoral fraud during the elections of 2005, and a demonstration response to it, the EU did not change its policy strategies towards Azerbaijan (Raik, 2012, p. 568). Therefore, the EU chose to implement negative conditions towards the countries in which the EU has a minimal interest, but not to break down its relations with its key energy and regional partner because of the EU's values.

When analyzing the Communication on Wider Europe, the ENP Strategy Paper and the European Security Strategy for 2003, the main purpose of the EU was to avoid negative neighborhood spills by creating a 'democratic state' circle. Therefore, specialists challenged the altruistic element of the ENP. It can also be argued that the EU's objective of being surrounded by economically and politically stable states involves creating a "buffer zone" between Union and less stable southern and eastern

areas (Nielsen & Vilson, 2014). The ENP was also designed to address the member states' concerns over the potential challenges posed by their neighbors, both east and south.

In the East, the EU faced the danger of political and financial turbulence in post-Soviet countries transmitting over the common frontier following wide enlargement of 2004 (Sadowski, 2013). The EU has been worried in particular about possible exploitation of criminal networks, bribery, smuggling, and trafficking. The EU also expressed concern about the weakness of Russia-influenced countries and hybrid systems.

In evaluating the position of EU members in EU decision-making towards its eastern and southern neighbors, it should be noted that the member states used the EU as a cover for their discernible national policies towards the neighbor countries.

Security-related issues are under the influence of member states whereas the EU was allocated normative values such as democracy, human rights duties. For the first issue, the member state pursued bilateral strategies with ENP countries (Leigh, 2015). To sum, when the EU attempted to achieve its common goals, it would be hard to prevent conflicts between member states and the EU. If criticisms on human rights records of neighbor countries by EU institutions had a negative effect on mutual collaboration, national officials became aggressive towards the EU officials. (Leigh, 2015: 219).

The distinct behavior of member states towards the ENP is one of the main reasons for this fragmentation. It is claimed that the member states are not fully engaged and the ENP meetings are not fully accessible for them. Moreover, the EEAS plays a key role in the implementation of the policy that is considered too complicated by member states (Cohen-Hadria 2016, 44-45).

In addition, competencies are divided between the EU and its member states. One distribution becomes clear on the human rights issue. Member states avoid conveying difficult messages on human rights violations in ENP countries, leaving it to the EU responsibility. However, if they keep bilateral relation with the countries, they do not support EU statements on the violation of human rights in those countries. (Witney

and Dworkin, 2012; Biscop et al., 2012; Lehne, 2014).

The other distinction is on the basis of geography. The northern dimension of the ENP is of more interest to EU Mediterranean countries, while eastern members are more willing to collaborate with EU Eastern partner countries. As an example, EaP is on the policy agenda of Italy, although the Italian government is mainly concerned with the refugee problem and other southern-neighborhood problems (Franceson, 2015). Italy is the EU's third-largest financial ally for Ukraine and Belarus's major business partner. In the fields of energy, climate, infrastructure, Italy also has powerful financial connections with Azerbaijan (Franceson, 2015: 6-10).

For France, EaP is less important. France generally supported Poland and Sweeden's EaP initiative and Paris examined relations with the eastern neighbors whilst taking Russia's position into account. It is preferable for France to build relation with Russia directly. During the French presidency in the EU, Russia-Georgia war proved it. President Sarkozy, the main mediator, wanted to normalize relations with Moscow a few months after the conflict and reached a controversial agreement to supply two Mistral warships to Russia. France's willingness to take an active part in the EaP is also driven by Europe's political and financial rivalry with Germany (Nougayrede, 2015, pp. 11-13).

While France and Italy are concentrated in their southern district, Poland regards the EaP as its key project. Poland has also given more regard to the northern neighborhood in latest years. Poland is thus in favor of an ENP strategy which is distinct, adaptive and tailor-made (Buras, 2015).

It could be asserted that distinct ENP views of the member states of the European Union could explain the uncertainty of the ENP's goals. Instead of using the multilateral article of the ENP, most member states still prefer to construct ties with ENP nations through a mutual path. In many instances, geographical closeness and domestic concerns determine the amount of participation in the southern or eastern neighborhood of some member states.

The different views of the member states became apparent during talks with the EaP nations on the association agreements, in particular regarding the prospects of

accession of these contracts. During the EU-Moldova Association Agreement negotiation approximately ten member states (including Romania, Poland, the Baltics, and the Czech Republic) were prepared to strengthen their relations with Moldova and decided to transfer the state from the ENP on to the sphere of expansion. The concept was obviously objected by France, Italy, and Spain. The other members have operated like fences and can be influenced in some way (Kostanyan H. , 2014).

During the discussions on the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, the same member states took the same position. The Ukrainian negotiators could use the affiliation scheme to make grants in other fields of negotiating, but without much achievement, due to the absence of a stable and strong stance on the EU (Van der Loo, 2016).

With regard to strategy development and execution, owing to the divergent roles of respective member states, the EU has often been prepared to take steps at the smallest prevalent denominator stage (Comelli, 2013). The ENP has been successful in technical co-operation due to national considerations and the member states' interests; however, to achieve their own political goals, member states must reassess their tending to protect their national interests at the expense of common goals (Maurer & Simao, 2013, p. 14).

As its strategies improved in the eastern neighborhood, the EU actually enhanced its existence in the so-called "common neighborhood" between the EU and Russia. This is particularly obvious in the offer made by the EU to three eastern neighborhood countries in the Eastern Partnership by the association agreements and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA). These agreements involve domestic change through integration into the law. Russia viewed this as an effort to regulate its area of impact (Delcour & Kostanyan, Towards a Fragmented Neighbourhood: Policies of the EU and Russia and their consequences for the area that lies in between, 2014). Russia, in return, is reportedly actively striving to undermine EU policy towards its neighborhood in the East (Emerson & Kostanyan, 2013). This has been visible since the launch of the EaP in 2009, which thus reshaped Russian policy in the common neighborhood and gave the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) a

boost (Solonenko, 2015).

The normal EU-Russia neighborhood has become a "disputed neighborhood" in practice. The most prominent instance of Russia's attempt to block EU policy towards the former Soviet territory was Russian resistance to President Victor Yanukovych not to join the agreed EU-Ukraine AA (Delcour, Kostanyan, Vandecasteele, & Elsuwege, 2015). Even though the Russian President, Vladimir Putin, was already present during his first term, Russian foreign policy was especially visible during his third term with Russian attention being focused on opposing closer relations amongst the common neighbors and on the integration of Eurasia (Berg, 2014).

While the ENP was removed from Russia, different frameworks of EU-Russia collaboration were set up, resulting in the formation of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) and the implementation of Roadmaps for the' Four Common Spaces' for 2005 (Fischer, 2012). Although the PCA has been established and road maps have been drawn up, ties between the EU and Russia have been continuously worsening, in particular after the conflict between Russia and Georgia in 2008 and difficulty in re-negotiating the PCA after the expiry of its ties in 2007 (Fischer, 2012).

The EU mainly considers the Eastern neighborhood to be a buffer area between inner stabilization and a messy external climate threatening illegal immigration, organized activity, illness and poverty (Berg, 2014). On the other hand, Russia perceives the common neighborhood more geopolitically, linked to the Soviet historical heritage. It is also argued that the region is still very much in line with the former Soviet region and hence with Russia itself as the region continues to be closely connected with its culture, ethnicity, and history.

As a result, Russia has previously been claimed to use legacy institutional and economic interdependencies to oppose the spread of European neighborhood norms and practices in the region. Moreover, since the break-up of the Soviet Union, redefinition of "Europeanness" in Eastern Europe and Russia has taken place, which brought a clear distinction between 'insiders' and 'outsiders' of Europe. In Russian rhetoric, the crisis of politics, economics, and identity was also seen during these

years when the former superpower tried to redefine its national and regional identity (Fisher, 2012).

Dependency on oil, gas and other natural resources from Russia has often been mentioned as an aspect contributing to Russia's relative power and leverage over the countries in the common neighborhood (Delcour, 2016). Some researchers suggested that the integration of neighborhood countries towards the EU could decrease dependence on Russia. However, the current conditions of the EU policies are not suitable for the countries (Lebduska & Lidl, 2014).

With respect to the EaP, Russia is certainly the most commonly researched international actor. Russia presents a major problem for the EU position in the region. There were different views on the point to which Russia affected multiple aspects of the EaP, such as sectorial convergence and safety collaboration. While some scholars think that the further development and collaboration with the EU was successively discredited by Russia, others see that the outcome for the interactions of EaP nations with the EU was less positive. The common neighborhood is characterized as a geopolitical area increasingly defined by zero-sum dynamics between the EU and Russia, which is unfavorable for the ENP countries and the EU. The EU must obviously create a deeper relationship with EaP nations and create stronger use of current projects in order to avoid the further decline of the Eastern ENP's geopolitical and safety environment. Nevertheless, it does not provide a solution for the Russian challenge.

As already noted, the lack of interest of member states in common policies has a negative influence on the EU effectiveness and it has also been apparent in EU-Russia relations. The EU's capacity to talk in one voice is affected by the absence of a cohesive strategy between the member states towards Russia (Parkes & Sobjak, 2014).

It is also visible in the EU's sanction policy towards Russia. In 2014, the EU decided to give a response to the Russian activities in the east of Ukraine with imposing sanctions on Russia. After having assessed the implementation of the Minsk Agreements, the European Council agreed on 19 March 2015 that the length of

sanctions should be linked with the full application of the Minsk Agreements and decided in July of 2016 to renovate sanctions for another six months, until 31 January 2017. Even though the Minsk agreements are far from being implemented, there is an increasingly shaky consensus within the EU to extend the sanctions. It is argued that particular member states dependent on Russia strive to take an intermediate position between Brussels and the Kremlin (Dolidze, 2015). In particular, Italy, Greece, Cyprus, Austria and Hungary and some politicians in Germany and France opposed the prolongation of sanctions (Kostanyan & Meister, 2016). The EU's failure to prolong sanctions will give a signal to Moscow that de-stabilization of common neighborhood countries, including through army intervention, will have very restricted.

The absence of a coherent stance on the expansion of sanctions would miss a chance because they claim that these economic sanctions are affecting Russia's financial growth, in the light of the worldwide financial slowdown along with weak energy rates and bad financial strategy in Moscow and thus enhancing the EU's negotiating capacity. It is also highlighted that member states may take sanctions as a hostage to gain concessions in other fields (Wesslau, 2016). The ex-Prime Minister of Italy, Matteo Renzi, blocked the sanctions technical round-up in December 2015 and requested a discussion in politics. His action was related not only to the merits of sanctions but also to his irritation about Nordstream II with Berlin and his efforts to relax the EU budgetary rules.

The dilemma within the EU with regard to its Eastern neighbors and Russia analyzed by liberal intergovernmentalism theory. In the book "The Choice of Europe," the writer Andrew Moravcsik has released his European Integration Declaration on the grounds of choices made based on the domestic States' preferences. The theory argues that European integration is the result of national actors' rational choices (Moravcsik A. , 1998, p. 18). The choices of the players are determined by national economic interests and international organizations, so those reliable commitments can be guaranteed and strengthened between States (Moravcsik A. , 1998, p. 18).

The LI can explain the preferences of EU member states for an EaP. The nations were favorably disposed towards joint external ties with neighboring nations at EU level on the grounds of the safety interests.

EU effectiveness in the regional policy, as well as Russian bilateral relations, can be enhanced only if the member states are ready to cooperate and consolidate their domestic foreign strategies. Yet, as stated earlier, there is a substantial degree of dispute among the member states as to what defines European neighborhood "interests" and what stands for the shared European principles the EU aims to promote by common policies. It is probable that the level of application of ENP, EaP or other common policies will remain unchanged if the members choose to ignore this concept of mutually accountable responsibility developed by EU actors and reject the concept of the adaptation of their national policies to EU approaches.

CONCLUSION

Research study attempted to prove the hypothesis "Foreign policy of the EU is based on member states' rational choices more rather than the agenda of the supranational institutions of the EU".

To start, the thesis analyzed the historical development of the EU. From the end of World War II, the EU attempted to deepen integration and build common policy every field, such as economic, social, political and other fields. The first initiation came from six countries with the establishment of the ECSC. Succesful step motivated member states to pursue sectoral cooperation in several areas, to build an economic community with common rules. Following the decisions, the Rome Treaty was signed and it was a basis of the institutional architecture of the EU. However, the treaty made some challenges for member states, because of the political nature of reforms. According to the treaty, common agricultural, external trade, transport policies, and law for market regulation, cooperative trade relations with non-members should be developed. During the 1970s, first enlargement, instability in international arena brought additional burden to the EU. New reforms were proposed to solve the problems, but these suggestions such as the establishment of the internal market, institutional reforms led to concerns in member states.

Concerns solved with the Maastricht Treaty, which created an organization consist of intergovernmental and supranational institutions. The treaty built Pillar structure and CFSP and JHA included into the same pillar in which the role of member states are more powerful rather than the EU institutions. However, reforms were not enough for the EU effectiveness, new enlargement, changing nature of world affairs demanded new policies and activities.

As a result of long discussions, several changes, a new agreement was adopted in 2007. Lisbon treaty defined key institutions: two supranational (EP and the Commission) and two intergovernmental institutions (EC and the Council). It focused on the improvement of the role of supranational institutions in decision-making. However, foreign policy choices were unanimously decided. The treaty solved lots of

issues, but in terms of foreign and security policy-making which is directly connected with the national interests of the member states, the role of the EU institutions stayed limited.

Historical development of the EU indicated that from the beginning of European integration until today the EU could not simplify its institutional structure and ineffectiveness of the EU institutions mainly appeared in foreign and security policy-making. Several theoretical approaches have been developed to analyze this complexity and interactions between EU institutions and its member states in decision-making.

The second part of the first chapter conducted three grand theories: federalism, neofunctionalism, and intergovernmentalism. According to federalism, European federation as a state brought independent territorial units together to create a new type of the union which exercised tasks and influence the units and their citizens. In short, it built "unity in diversity". However, challenges in EU common foreign policy of the EU indicated the ineffectiveness of federalism to explain it comprehensively. As one of the main theories, neofunctionalism became popular during the early years of EU development. Afterward, a contradiction in political integration, the effects of member states' choices on integration showed that the theory is so linear; it should be altered and deepened. Finally, the third grand theory – intergovernmentalism developed from the 1960s and claimed that closer cooperation depends on the interests of member states. Intergovernmental bargaining is only possible when interests of the members overlap. Otherwise, cooperation is impossible. The theory is more applicable for the EU CFSP/CSDP because national interests are always on the agenda of EU policymaking. And interactions between national and European interests depend upon the level of Europeanization of the country. In the third paragraph of the thesis, it was proved that Europeanization is more powerful in the fields, such as social policy, rule of law, human rights rather than defense and security policies.

In order to empirically analyze the intergovernmental nature of EU foreign policy, research study examined the development of the CFSP and CSDP and impacts and

activities of member states and supranational institutions in the framework of them. The analysis presented that member states have been fragmented since the beginning of the negotiations on CFSP. During the 1990s, reforms somehow strengthened the role of the EU in the world as affairs as a global actor, but they could not solve problems completely. Some member states supported deeper integration to the EU while others wanted to keep decision-making in their hands. Treaty reforms attempted to build common foreign and security policy, however, the diversity of actors and policies led to confusion of the overall visibility of the EU. Defense policy, as the main part of the foreign policy, is also key challenge for collective action. Member states like Italy, Spain, France, and Germany supported close cooperation with the EU in defense policy, while Netherlands, Portugal are prone to build the policy under the US leadership. To sum, different attitudes towards the CFSP/CSDP, the interests of member states put inevitable limits on the EU institutions to the exercise of foreign policy.

In the final part of the thesis, research study examined one of the key priorities of the EU foreign policy – ENP, especially its eastern dimension (EaP) and the clash of the interests of the EU and Russia in the region, and analyzed how member states and the EU supranational institutions impact on decision making towards third countries and Russia.

First of all, it should be noted that ENP is a consequence of enlargement. The EU changed its borders and it needed to prepare effective sub-regional policy towards third countries. It was not easy, because the interests of member states were fragmented. For instance, Baltic States wanted to put the issue of relations with South Caucasus countries on top of the agenda, while Romania and Bulgaria were mainly focused on Black Sea Cooperation. Moreover, the EU faced a threat from the eastern dimension and tried to build common policy towards eastern countries. However, uncertainties of the policy of EU institutions, different attitudes of member states made obstacles. For example, under the 'conditionality' mechanism, the EU prepared neighborhood policy for the new neighboring countries to promote their standards and values. However, the EU could not apply it in all cases. Some countries agreed

with the policy, while others like Azerbaijan did not accept the approach of 'one size fits all'. Due to its energy potential, the EU could not be strict towards Azerbaijan; it did not want to damage economic relations because of its normative issues. In terms of security and defense, member states prefer bilateral relation with third countries beyond the EU. Different views of member states appeared during the negotiations over EU-Moldova and EU-Ukraine AAs. France, Italy, Spain rejected to change negotiation discourse from the ENP to the sphere of expansion, whereas states like Baltic countries, Romania, Poland wanted to cooperate with the two countries in the expansion sphere. As its strategies improved in the eastern neighborhood, the EU actually enhanced its existence in the so-called "common neighborhood" between the EU and Russia. The EU saw the Eurasian project as a challenge on its own, while Russia saw the EaP as a threat to itself. The EU, however, was unable to implement a unified policy towards Russia. Several EU member states have an economic relationship with Russia. In that case, the EU remained fragmented by the national interests of member states. It is also visible in the EU's sanction policy towards Russia. The EU wanted to prolong the duration of sanctions till full application of Minsk agreement. However, Italy, Greece, Cyprus, Austria and Hungary and some politicians in Germany and France opposed to the suggestion and the EU failed to apply the decision. In the end, Russia's relationship with the EU can easily be governed by its orders and strategies.

To conclude, by looking at the historical development of the EU, theories of European integration and Europeanization of national foreign policies, analyzing CFSP/CSDP, ENP/EaP, and EU-Russia relations in the framework of the EaP, this thesis has shown that the member states are the key determinants of EU foreign policy and the EU could not speak with a single voice in world affairs, especially in the field of security and defense. Research study comprehensively analyzed the conflict between member states and the EU institutions over the formation of the single voice in international relations through applying the theory of LI.

The EU foreign policy remained weak and fragmented because of the different interests of national governments and the complex institutional structure of the EU.

However, the EU can use alternative ways to build stronger common foreign policy. Increasing the overall level of activity, more fully embracing member states, building alliances to defend global governance, and mobilizing the institutional expertise could help build the confidence and ambition needed for effective international engagement.

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