

Khazar University

MASTER THESIS

European Public Opinion on Turkey's EU Accession

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ABSTRACT

“What do Europeans think of EU’s enlargement to Turkey and why?” is the main question that this research tries to deal with by making arguments, conducting analyses, providing proofs, and developing predictions.

The study evaluates enlargement more than a technical procedure that takes public opinion into account as well. According to the findings of the research, public support for Turkey’s accession to the EU is not only low, but also in decline. With some exceptions, the ‘new’ (EU-28) are generally more favorable towards Turkey’s accession while the ‘old’ (EU-15) oppose it.¹ EU countries with a large Turkish population are generally against to welcome Turkey in EU.² Countries defending ‘The European Project’ of deep political integration and a federal state pose a negative attitude on Turkey’s accession than who backs economic union and mutual benefits. The study also finds the extreme-right and nationalist parties standing against Turkey’s membership contrary to Liberals, Greens and the European United Left who usually are not so negative regarding it.

The study claims that Europeans’ attitudes towards Turkey’s accession to the European Union (EU) are largely shaped under the influence of perceived, misperceived, really existing or highly predicted factors in value-based, materialistic or moral character. In other words, European public opinion on Turkey’s membership to the EU is not only about the misperceptions, but also true perceptions or rational predictions and calculations. In addition to the fulfillment of official membership requirements, Turkey-, EU-, country- and individual-specific factors also effect Europeans opinion on Turkey’s accession to the EU. For most Europeans, political and social concerns are not only remarkable but also rather persistent. So as conomic disadvantages turns into advantages or vice versa as time goes on. However, this hypothesis hardly fits social and sometimes political matters.

¹ Hatipoğlu, E., Müftüler-Baç, M. & Karakoç, E. (2014) ‘Explaining Variation in Public Support to Turkey’s EU Accession, Turco-Scepticism in Europe: A Multi-Level Analysis.’ *MAXCAP Working Paper Series*, No. 4, pp. 1-26.

² Dagdeverenis, D. (2014) ‘EU Public Opinion and Turkey’s EU Membership.’ *EU-Turkey Dialogue Initiative Working Paper*, No. 2, pp. 1-22.

The study also answers if European citizens or elites form opposition toward Turkey's EU membership. It describes public opinion in any EU member state over Turkey's accession to the EU as influenced by the electoral market where the electorate and party elites are in a 'give-take' relationship, a never-ended periodical process. According to the study, in some European countries, national governments and ideologies, the ('top'), insistently create decline in citizens ('down') support to Turkey's accession whereas in other European countries political elites act according to the citizens will and tend to be more attractive for the voters or party members. Nevertheless, it concludes that Turkey's EU membership is an elitist task that can be realized if the geopolitical environment requires and elites present it more desirable to the citizens. Due to the current internal, regional and international instability concerns of EU and Turkey, the accession sounds urgent, advantageous for them, but also rather costly in the evaluations of the study.

Keywords: Turkey's Accession to the European Union (EU), Europeans Opinion on Turkey, Factors Affecting Europeans Attitudes, Suggestions to Raise Public Support to Turkey.

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ABBREVIATION

AKP	The Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi)
CAP	The Common Agricultural Policy
CEECs	Central and Eastern European Countries
CHP	The Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi)
EEC	The European Economic Community
EU	The European Union
EU-15	Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom
EU-28	Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia
GDP	Gross domestic product
HDP	The People's Democratic Party (Halk Demokratik Partisi)
ISIS	The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
MHP	The Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi)
NATO	The North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OECD	The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OSCE	The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PKK	The Kurdistan Workers' Party (Kürdistan İşçi Partisi)
PP	The Privileged Partnership
TEU	The Treaty on European Union

UK	The United Kingdom
US/ USA	The United States of America
WWI	World War I
WWII	World War II

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I INTRODUCTION

Turkey's EU membership perspective as well as the European public opinion on it constitutes one of the most popular and controversial topics of both Turkish and European academic researches and non-academic disputes regarding Turkey-EU relations. Despite Turkish membership efforts since 1950s, it remains the longest application process of all times. The dilemma between the duration of the pre-accession negotiations and EU-standard reforms in Turkey from 2005 on and the trend of declining support for Turkish membership in Europe makes the case to fall under extended number of discussions.

Turkey, who tried to keep her neutrality during WWII and had the wish of civilization and modernization viewed Europe as a more civilized and modernized one. As the war was over, she took part in the Marshall Plan, became a member of the Council of Europe, NATO, OSCE, and applied for membership in the EU.

The history of Turkey's application for the EEC membership dates back to 1959 when Turkey applied for associate membership and lasts until today. With the aim of integrating Turkey into a customs union with the EEC, the Ankara Agreement/the Association Agreement, "Agreement Creating An Association between the Republic of Turkey and the European Economic Community" was signed on 12 September 1963. Despite of a huge amount of controversies and rejections, finally, on 12 December 1999, Helsinki European Council officially recognized Turkey as an equal candidate for full membership. After reforms in Turkey, on 3 October 2005, the EU-Turkish negotiations on acquis chapters were started. However there were some countries such as Austria and Germany that preferred the privileged partnership with Turkey to her full EU membership. 15 acquis chapters out of 35 are frozen by the EU Council,

France and Cyprus, 15 chapters are open to discussion and only 1 chapter (Science & Research (June 2006)) is closed.³

When it comes to the dynamic of the Europeans opinion on Turkey's application, there is a controversial process. According to 2005-2013 Eurobarometer surveys held in the European countries, in spite of the accession negotiations started from 2005 and reforms in Turkey, the support for Turkish membership is not only low, but also in decline.

As the negotiation process between Turkey and EU is rich in ups and downs and the realization of Turkey's EU membership loses its credibility, the study analyses and explains the European public opinion on Turkey's accession bid in both theoretical and practical frameworks in the thesis.

1.1 Methodology

The research is conducted under the hypothesis that *EU decisions on enlargement policy including Turkey's accession consider European public opinion as well. The approvalal rate of Turkey's EU membership differs both between and inside the member states. The variations in Europeans' attitudes can be explained with the legal membership requirements and some unofficial factors.*

"What do Europeans think of EU's enlargement to Turkey and why?" is the main question that this research tries to deal with by making arguments, conducting analyses, providing with proofs, and developing predictions. Some secondary questions as following are also developed:

How and why public opinion is important in the EU?

How do European citizens view Turkey's accession to the EU?

How do European elites view Turkey's accession to the EU?

What factors affect European public opinion on Turkey's EU membership?

What says the related theoretical approaches?, etc.

³ 'Turkey-EU Relations.' <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-the-european-union.en.mfa>

After defining the research and secondary questions the methodology should be designed accordingly. It usually includes the methods of researching and data collecting.

In the development of this thesis, to conduct profound study, both qualitative and quantitative research methods are applied. The method of documentary analysis that means to acquire data from existing related documents is mainly referred to for describing and explaining facts and ideas in this case. A large set of documents with applicable graphs and tables are referred to in order to conduct analysis and arrive at conclusions.

Interviewing as a widely applied qualitative research method is also used to base on direct first hand information on the research question. An unstructured interview with open questions and a randomly-selected respondent enabled observation of how a European think and feel regarding the research subject. It gives the chance to test, to some extent, the reliability of the acquired data in a real situation. The man from the Netherlands, a professor, disposed an educated, high-skilled, employed Dutch's attitudes concerning the research question that the existing documents describe. In his approach, he does not differ from their elites at all.

1.2 Data collection

The research rests on some data collecting methods like self-report, documentary analysis and interview.

Using the method of self-report, the researcher refers to her background in order to outline the general scheme of thoughts. It also assists to choose the research topic.

Documentary analysis is the main method of data collecting of the current research. Freely-accessible documents by both Turkish and Non-Turkish authors, favouring and arguing Turkey's membership to the EU are objects to the analysis due to avoid biased information and sound neutral. Not to lose actuality and use out-of-dated information, the referred literature largely involves recently issued documents. Analyses of different documents with various approaches regarding the research

question contribute to brain-storming and hypothesis developing processes. It pays way to some arguments and contra-arguments and challenge of ideas.

The method of collecting data via communication with the respondents, interviewing, is also referred to aiming at getting first hand information. The reliability of the data collecting via one or two respondents is not guaranteed.

1.3 Theoretical background

1.3.1. A. M. Ruiz-Jimenez and J. I. Torreblanca: the three hypotheses⁴

A large amount of literature debating on how Europeans patterns of behaviour are shaped refers to three-fold analysis by A. M. Ruiz-Jimenez and J. I. Torreblanca that claims that, Europeans decision on this case highly depends on whether they give priority to cost-benefit calculations, common identity and moral values, or the fulfillment of accession criteria by the candidate country. A. M. Ruiz-Jimenez and J. I. Torreblanca conduct the analysis of Eurobarometer survey of 2006 which asks Europeans whether:

- Turkey partly belongs to Europe by its geography (geography);
- Turkey partly belongs to Europe by its history (history);
- Turkey's accession to the EU would strengthen the regional security (security);
- cultural difference between Turkey and the EU member states are significant not to allow Turkey in (cultural differences);
- membership of Turkey with nearly 76 million population would contribute to the rejuvenation of an ageing Europe (rejuvenation);
- there would be any large immigration from Turkey to the more developed EU countries (immigration);
- Turkey would fully respect human rights after her accession to the EU (human rights);
- Turkey's accession would largely improve the state economy (economy).

⁴ Ruiz-Jimenez A. M. & Torreblanca J.I. (2007) 'European Public Opinion and Turkey's Accession Making Sense of Arguments for and against.' *European Policy Institutes Network*, No. 16, pp. 1-48.

In conclusion of a large-scale survey on European public attitude on Turkey's membership in some EU countries, A. M. Ruiz-Jimenez and J. I. Torreblanca suggest three hypotheses to explain the attitude of EU people:

Identity/value-based/'moral' hypothesis

According to this approach, public opinion rests on considerations whether Turkey is a part of Europe and belongs European identity or not. Europeans give priority to preservation of common moral European values and identity as well as belonging to Europe or not when they decide on enlargement. "Identitarian"/"value-based" view perceives the EU as a geographically limited entity or a community with a strong sense of common identity, history, culture and traditions. For those who share this point of view, both the decisions and political discourses on enlargement should be acceptable morally: the more a candidate is related to European geography, history, culture, or so on, the more likely its membership would be supported or otherwise. It means that people may consider some decisions legitimate that they do not directly benefit from but just because they are adopted by the community which they feel they belong to.⁵

In Turkey's case, Europeans take into account Turkey's geography, religion, history, incompatibility between Islam and democracy, etc. when they make their opinion towards her membership. To phrase in a sentence, this approach argues that the more Europeans are conceived of the differences between Turkish and European cultures, the less they support Turkey's EU accession. Europeans are more Turcophile or Turkosceptic if they are convinced of historical, geographical and cultural commonalities or differences and contradictions respectively. Consequently, one can find a positive relation between the belief in comprehension of European and the Muslim values of Turkey after the accession comes into reality and support to Turkey's membership to the EU. Both realistic, perceived (misperceived) and predicted concerns of Europeans are evaluated as the 'hard factors', persistent but influential, to shape European public attitude towards Turkey in the literature.

⁵ Canan-Sokullu, Ş. E. (2011) 'Italian Public Opinion on Turkey's EU Accession: Utilitarian Calculations, Identitarian Evaluations or Perceived Threats?' *PERCEPTIONS*, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 47-70.

Accordingly, the thesis guesses that economic disadvantages turn into advantages or vice versa as time goes on whereas political and social concerns, the ‘hard factors’ are not only remarkable but also rather persistent. In compliance with European perceptions, largely, culturally, religiously and geographically different Turkey does not have a place in the EU or Europe. Europeans perceive Turkey as a non-European country with a distinct culture, large Muslim populace and a unique geographic position. Both most Europeans and many Turks claim for a constant incompatibility between Turkish and European values as well as societies. An extensive proportion of Europeans believe in important differences regarding culture and respect for human rights between Turkey and the Union, but are not so sensitive to common geography and history.

Utilitarian/instrumental hypothesis

This approach argues that public opinion is formed as the result of cost-benefit calculations (political, economic and social considerations) by European public. Antonia M. Ruiz-Jimenez and Jose I. Torreblanca ensure evidence to their hypothesis:⁶

Evidence 1: In 2006-2007, support for enlargement increased related to the recovery of European economy.

Evidence 2: After the financial crisis of 2008-2009, the support is in decline.

“Utilitarian”/“instrumental” arguments based on a cost-benefit analysis (a rational calculus of costs and benefits) sound pragmatic: the more the Europeans benefit or expect to benefit from EU policies in terms of economy, policy or security, the more they support it or otherwise. “Materialistic” model claim that if European citizens think that the costs will outweigh the benefits regarding political, security, institutional or economic matters at European, regional, national or personal level they will oppose EU policies as well as future enlargement. Perception of the costs/benefits is heterogeneous not only among citizens inside member states, but also among member states themselves. Europeans make macro-level and personal-

⁶ Ruiz-Jimenez A. M. & Torreblanca J.I. (2007) ‘European Public Opinion and Turkey’s Accession Making Sense of Arguments for and against.’ *European Policy Institutes Network*, No. 16, pp. 1-48.

level calculations to form their opinion on enlargement. Macro-level calculations take into account the costs or benefits of EU expansion on national economies, belief in the economic growth of the candidate country and the Union, and predictions about security issues after enlargement. Europeans also calculate personal-level threats and benefits. For example, they think of predicted rise of unemployment rate.

Consequently, it seems that Europeans are relatively more Turcophile when the enlargement seems costless, when they would financially less suffer without any reduction in financial aid, or when the enlargement is considered beneficial for the candidate country. The more Europeans believe in material benefits that Turkey's membership will bring, the higher they are supportive of this enlargement. Otherwise, it feeds Turcosceptic attitudes.⁷ From utilitarian point of view regarding Turkey's EU membership, economic and security benefits such as extension of the EU market, rejuvenation of aging European labor market, contribution to EU neighborhood policy, more peace in near-abroad and the EU's image as a global and multicultural power are often articulated. For utilitarians, an economically highly developed and a more democratic Turkey is less dangerous for Europeans advantages.

Post-civic /post-national/rights-based hypothesis

Post-civic/rights-based/'ethical' hypothesis claims that public opinion takes into consideration whether Turkey can fulfill the accession criteria. For the third, "rights-based"/"post-national" vision, the EU is a 'post-national' or 'civic' Union. European integration and enlargement should rest on a set of universal principles and values, such as democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Accordingly, those who hold such beliefs, regardless of a high degree of cultural differences and traditions, support enlargement processes if they believe that the applicants respect this set of values and principles. In other words, they consider that a full democratic and prosperous country in terms of 'Copenhagen criteria' of 1993 has a place in EU.

In conclusion of their analysis of Eurobarometer surveys of 2006, Antonia M. Ruiz-Jimenez and Jose I. Torreblanca define 'moral' approach more relevant for opposition

⁷ Canan-Sokullu, Ş. E. (2011) 'Italian Public Opinion on Turkey's EU Accession: Utilitarian Calculations, Identitarian Evaluations or Perceived Threats?' *PERCEPTIONS*, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 47-70.

to Turkey's EU accession. 'Instrumental' approach is less relevant to explain European public opinion towards Turkey's accession to the EU. Turkey's EU membership comes true in case the rights-based approach prevails. Therefore, a wide European-level debate on Turkey including post-national arguments to justify Turkey's membership is hugely needed. Antonia M. Ruiz-Jimenez and Jose I. Torreblanca points to the fact that the identitarian approach generally fits public opinion in old member states whereas cost-benefit calculus and post-civic dimension relevant for new member states.

Although lots of these arguments reflect the common wisdom about European public opinion on Turkey's membership, it is possible to develop some contra-arguments. The interviews conducted with some Europeans during the activity on the eve of the first European Games in 2015 in Baku show to some extent that:

- Cost-benefit calculus and identity mainly shape Europeans attitudes towards Turkey's membership to the EU;
- Turkey is perceived geographically, culturally and historically different from Europe;
- In cost-benefit calculus, accession of Turkey would be rather costly and the management of any economic and financial crisis would be complicated further;
- According to Europeans, Turkey's accession would not cause rejuvenation in Europe. Because on the one hand claims about the aging Europe is abstract, on the other hand young Turks would bring their families together themselves;
- Most of Turks in Europe are characterised as uneducated people who work at places where they use their hands instead of their brains (technologies);
- Post-civic hypothesis sounds more unrealistic (According to Eurobarometer surveys of 2005-2013, Turkey is the least preferred country. "Does a fully democratic and prosperous Turkey have a place in EU?" (2008: 22% say 'no').⁸

⁸ Dagdeverenis, D. (2014) 'EU Public Opinion and Turkey's EU Membership.' *EU-Turkey Dialogue Initiative Working Paper*, No. 2, pp. 1-22.

1.3.2. The Social Identity Theory (1972) by Henri Tajfel and John Turner⁹

The Social Identity Theory (1982) by H. Tajfel and J. Turner is also applied on explanation of opposition to Turkey's EU membership. H. Tajfel and J. Turner develop the theory in order to find out psychological foundation of intergroup discrimination.

H. Tajfel (1979) suggests that the groups that we belong to like family, social class and team are significant source of pride and self-esteem and we perceive our sense of social identity from these groups.

Tajfel and Turner push forward three mental stages in formulation of in- and out-groups, in other words, social identity:

Social Categorization → Social Identification → Social Comparison

- The first mental and cognitive process is to categorize objects (peoples) to understand and identify them. It is the process of social categorization. By using a range of social categories such as colour, nationality, religious affiliation and profession, we categorize people as well as ourselves. Categorization into groups allows us to understand the social environment that we belong to and behave accordingly. We behave under the norms of groups that we belong to. We can belong to many different groups (I am a sister/daughter, a student, a citizen, Azerbaijani, Muslim, white, etc.-the researcher).
- Social identification is the second mental stage. After putting ourselves in a group in the process of social categorization, we admit the identity of that group. If you categorize yourself as a student you adapt to the student's identity and behave as a student does. Our self-esteem will be defined in accordance with the membership to the group.
- The third stage of formulation of social grouping is social comparison. Given we have made social categorization and put ourselves in a group and adopted the identity of the group that we belong to, then we will begin to compare the group

⁹ McLeod, S. (2008) 'Social Identity Theory.' <http://www.simplypsychology.org/social-identity-theory.html>

that we belong to with other groups. We will positively regard our group in order to provide our self-esteem. It also explains how prejudice against other groups appears. Social comparison creates rival groups. We will compete to enhance the self-esteem of the group that we put ourselves into. We begin to believe that our group is different from the others and 'we' are distinct (group distinctiveness). We start to compete for the resources and claim to have most part of them. We increase our personal image, self-image, by increasing the status of the group that we belong to or discriminating against 'out' groups. Discrimination by in-group against out-group in order to increase its self-image will happen. To enhance its self-image, in-group will also seek for negative characteristics of out-group. Prejudice against out cultures sometime results in racism or even genocide (Prejudice against Jews in Germany brought to genocide of them).

According to the authors who apply this theory on Turkish membership bid, suggest that:

Europeans in the EU has defined them and 'us' and the others as 'them' or 'other'. They adopted European identity based on Christianity and democratic values. They compare themselves with the 'other' like Turks and claim that there exist apparent differences in European and Muslim/Turkish culture and values that do not allow Turks access EU. Europeans claim that Muslim Turkey is different from the Christian Europe; Democracy and Islam are incompatible; Turks are the 'other' for Europe.

Europeans appreciate their group as distinct from the other. Group members perceive the 'other'/'out-group' in Europe as a threat to their European identity. They argue that the group which they belong to should get most of the resources as well as materialistic resources as the dominant group in this society. In order to enhance its self-image, Europeans in the EU also seek for negative characteristics of Turks. Turks are undemocratic, radical, extremist and poor, in a word, 'problematic', in Europeans' comparisons.

1.3.3. The Contact Hypothesis

This study makes a reference to the Contact Hypothesis (Intergroup Contact Theory) by Gordon W. Allport (1954) in order to explain the mostly apparent direct relationship between the presence of Turkish immigrants and the level of support to Turkey's membership in a host country.¹⁰

In his hypothesis G. W. Allport claims that *direct intergroup contact* under a favorable condition contributes to the reduction of prejudice between two groups. Thanks to interpersonal communication between groups and mutual exchange of views, groups' members may understand each other. In this way, stereotypes and discrimination decrease.

G. W. Allport argues that equal status of groups, intergroup cooperation for common goals, respect for laws and customs, and informal personal relations make the contact effective.

However, sometimes, group members use the opportunity to communicate to discriminate and fight against the other group. G. W. Allport finds out that an unfavorable condition, including irrelevant usage of contact and in some cases a short term of communication, lead to a *negative contact* between groups. Negative contact under unfavorable conditions, may extend prejudice and tension, and inner- or out-group categorization. It will lead to material, political or cultural inter-group conflicts. Direct intergroup contact between the citizens and Turkish immigrants, inter-group cooperation between the groups with equal status conducted on shared common goals, in a host EU country is more likely to lessen prejudice and favor support for the Turkey's membership. Negative contact between the citizens and Turkish immigrants, a host EU country may extend prejudice and tension, and inner- and out-group categorization. It will lead to conflicts in material, political or cultural contexts.

¹⁰ Everett, J. A. C. (2013) 'Intergroup Contact Theory: Past, Present and Future.' *The Inquisitive Mind*, Issue 2. <http://www.in-mind.org/article/intergroup-contact-theory-past-present-and-future>

1.4 Scope and Limitations of the thesis

This thesis provides the historical background of Turkey's application for EU membership, the dynamics of European public opinion on it. It also makes predictions and suggestions. The scope of research includes the period from Turkey's application for EU membership until now. It analyses public opinion on Turkey's accession to the EU in 28 member states. Due to avoid obsolete and invalid data and unilateral approach, the study mostly refers to the literature (books, journal articles, news, etc.) developed by Turkish and non-Turkish, including European, researchers in the 2000s. Rising hopelessness about Turkey's EU membership raises claims in academic circles that it is not worthy to analyze the case further. Taking into account that in spite of the official negotiations since 2005 there is little success and more confusion in Turkish case, the study aims at making contributions to related discussion. Originating from a profound study, the thesis reflects the arguments both for and against Turkey's accession to the EU, the approaches of European and non-European researchers and providing with historical background from 1950s and aims at enriching the existing concerning literature.

Nevertheless, the thesis suffers from the reliability of the secondary data acquired from existing documents. To what extent interviews with one or two respondents provide reliable information is another limitation of the study.

1.5 Literature review

The existing related literature discussing the European public opinion on Turkey's EU membership and the factors in effect can be divided into subjective and neutral ones. They are against or for Turkey's accession to the EU by taking materialistic, identitarian or post-civic dimensions into account.

The article 'Accession of Turkey to the European Union—A Question of Advantage?' by Lutz Paul Sommer argues that the perceived advantages or disadvantages (primarily, wealth-oriented in nature) of a candidate's accession as well as of the member state's own membership effect European citizens' opinion

about any enlargement. In his study L.P.Sommer claims that as economic/utilitarian calculations have a lot to do with European citizens' decision on enlargement, highly developed countries are perceived less dangerous for their own advantages: they pay more to the EU and need less. The article categorizes "Economic Group" of member countries whose position regarding EU enlargement or the advantages of EU membership is shaped due to the economic reasons and the "Residual Group" for whom economic advantages are supposed insufficient to decide on enlargement. They take political, social, and other concerns into account as well. It also distinguishes "new" and "old" member states regarding enlargement issue and argues that new member states of Eastern Europe view enlargement of the EU as a tool for becoming a global trade partner and support expansion. However the member states who oppose enlargement do not accept this vision. The study outlines eight key criteria for Turkey's EU membership (Turkey's economic situation, predicted immigration from Turkey to EU member states, rejuvenation of EU's aging population, safety matters, respect for human rights, cultural differences, historical affiliation, and geographical position) set by the EU (Copenhagen, 1993) and questioned in public opinion surveys.

Another related literature by Adam Szymański, "EU Pre-accession Process of Turkey – Determinants and Prospects" is developed under the hypothesis that the factors in Turkey are of great essence for bilateral relations with the EU, but the factors in the Union and its member states are decisive in the pre-accession process. In other words, the political and economic dimensions within the EU, dynamic of European public opinion and the interests of locomotives of the EU lead to interruption or continuation in the process. By making some references to the interviews made from 2011 to 2013 with the EU representatives in Ankara and Brussels, the study defines factors at three levels:

- both economic and political situation of the EU that shapes Europeans position towards enlargement, in general and Turkey, in particular, and the changes within the institutions of the EU such as the EU Council, European Commission (EU-level);

- the geographical size and geopolitical location, amount of population, cultural difference, the role of religion, economic condition, the consensus among the major political forces and public opinion related to the EU membership, nationalist and conservative rise and sensitiveness about the national sovereignty, Turkish army's great influence on the political system, the lasting differences between the national legislation and the EU law and Turkey's foreign policy (candidate-level);
- member states-level factors;

A. Szymański links the pace of the pre-accession process to political configurations (The new political configuration has made the negotiations to be opened on the 23th and 24th acquis chapters.) and the elections or appointments to the positions within the EU institutions (the EU Council).

Serdar Ş. Güner, in his study 'Alternative Futures for the European Union-Turkey Accession Negotiations' finds Turkey's accession process as a unique case and notes that meeting membership criteria does not mean the end of the process for Turkey. When it comes to Turkey's membership, the cultural and religious differences, the large population, improvement of democracy and minority rights in Turkey, the changes in her new foreign policy, the Cyprus issue, the emergence of the alternative 'privileged partnership' and the open-ended character of the accession process have much to do with the failure of negotiations. Despite these facts the negotiations are on track. The negotiations and relations between Turkey and the EU member states can be explained with the mutual interactions. It is one of the papers that point to the shift in its foreign policy while the shift is yet underway: the new Turkish policy that is often coined as "soft Euroasianism" and 'zero-conflict with neighbours', and the recent transitions in Turkey's foreign policy orientation from the Western one to an independent and unstable one. Unlike other existing studies, it indicates Turkey's new foreign policy goals of being a power as not its departure from the EU bid, but being more attractive and beneficial for the EU. In other words, S. Ş. Güner assumes that a more powerful Turkey would successfully work out its problems without any EU engagement. According to S. Ş. Güner, the new Turkish foreign policy can fail or

succeed. Its failure would strengthen the objections and undermine the supporters while its success would be indifferent for objectors, but worthy for supporters. In sum, he argues that a more economically, democratically and politically powerful Turkey would not surely be an EU member, but it can cooperate with them. S. Ş. Güner claims that the supporters cooperate and negotiate not because they help its accession but because they do not want to seem as opposing ones and they want to benefit from the mutual relations. Evaluations about the present and future payoffs or costs by each supporter can differ. Despite this fact, if the general evaluations of the current and future values of the cooperation are higher than the value of defection or Turkey's unilateral exit they cooperate. Accordingly, if the latter outweighs the former they will defect. In other words, they cooperate if the future less concerns them. Actually, both the objectors and supporters seek for a Turkish decision to give up the accession process. As Turkey loses all its beliefs in support in addition to the payoffs to the cooperation it gives up the accession process.

The article "Why Turkey should join the European Union: Arguments in favour of Turkish Membership" by V. Modebadze and F. M. Sayın place integration to European Union among Turkey's major foreign policy goals and claim that the rise of right-wing political parties as well as the influence of Christian democratic and conservative parties in European countries (especially, France, Austria and Germany) increases opposition to enlargement with any candidate. That's why democratic reforms in hopeless Turkey are still uncompleted. To disapprove the concerns that Turkey is too poor in economy and her accession to the EU will be rather costly, the authors argue that Turkish economy is on rise while lots of European countries suffer from financial crisis and, in fact, Turkey's accession would widen the European market and raise its competitiveness. Turkey's geopolitical location is described as a bridge between Asia and Europe that would broaden economic, trade as well as cultural ties of Europe with the Middle East, Central Asia, Caucasus and even China, contribute to diversification of energy roots further and greatly reduce dependence on insecure energy supply by Russia contribute to EU's energy security. In terms of Turks migration to EU states, it claims that regarding Turkey's case, not only Europe

would be invaded by Turkish citizens, but also many of Turks in European countries would return back. She would also attract lots of Arabic migrants in Europe. Thus, immigration of young and energetic workforce would reduce the labor shortage in European countries, rejuvenate Europe and help to demographic crisis and social contract between the generations there. Germany has already used Turkish immigrants to settle its labor shortage. All these contribute to the argument that immigration from Turkey would be advantageous in terms of economic growth and demographic conditions. Another advantage of large young and energetic Turkish population is to strengthen military security in Europe. Lack of information, misperception and negative stereotypes draw the profile of culturally and religiously too different Turkey in Europe. Nevertheless, Turkey is a democratic, secular, tolerant and pro-western country where rule of law is in force and the government respects the rights and freedoms. The acceleration of accession process would complete the democratic reforms in Turkey on the one hand. On the other hand, it will make Europeans more tolerant towards different religious communities as well as Muslims and the contradictions between Europeans and Muslims would be reduced. Full transformation in Turkey due to the EU membership could lead to the democratization, freedom and development of all Muslim countries. Otherwise, EU can lose Turkey in favour of non-democratic, totalitarian countries. The EU can absorb Turkey and Europeans uninformed of Turkey's EU membership can benefit from her accession.

Three types of problems of Turkey's membership including problems within the member states regarding harmonization between two civilizations, problems within the Union after the accession of Turkey with a large territory and high amount of population, last but not least, the external effects of it are perceived by H.Arnold who is generally against this enlargement. H.Arnold largely claims for geographical limits, European and Turkish uncertainties (serious internal socio-cultural and political uncertainties on the one hand and confusion between Turkish elites on defining Turkey's future role as an actor of international arena on the other hand) and the negative effects of membership of Turkey. In his article 'Political Arguments against

Turkey's Accession to the European Union', he argues against Turkey's membership whom he does not consider a part of Europe. Arguments for the role of the military power in Turkey supporting secularism, interrupted Europeanization policy in the country and the flow of Turkish immigrants to EU member states are also backed by the author. Pointing to US pressure on EU and member states concerning Turkey's accession to the EU, H. Arnold acknowledges 'buy time' policy of the EU. On contrary to the studies that interpret Turkey's role as a bridge between Asia and Europe, he characterizes Turkey like a self-interested mediator with great ambitions. Given Turkey was accepted in, the border of the EU would extend to Georgia, the South Caucasus, Iran, Iraq, Syria and be a part of the Middle East. Turkey having more voices in decision-making and conducting active pro-Arab policies in the Middle East would influence on the EU's foreign policy activities. Turkey is a country with a long history moving sometimes in European and sometimes in other direction. All in all, these mean a serious threat to the security. With respect to acceptance of Turkey's application, the author also blames European uncertainties such as inability of the member states to develop a common position on Turkey's membership application as well as the principle of subsidiarity, the effects of globalization and various approaches towards cooperation and integration by EU member states. H. Arnold predicts that if Turkey was accessed to the EU once, to prevent membership applications from the outside of European borders would be impossible. More likely, US-backed Israel's application for membership that also means to push the EU into the Israeli-Palestinian conflict seems rather predictable. The number of members of an organization is in contrast with its influence. When the number increases the organization becomes more fragile. All in all, Arnold expresses all plausible fears of Europeans.

1.6 Structure of the thesis

The thesis is organized into introduction, three main sections and conclusion. After including the methodology, data collection methods, theoretical background and literature review in introduction Turkey's application and Turkish-EU negotiations,

Europeans' opinion on Turkey's EU membership and the factors effecting European public opinion on Turkey's accession to the EU are discussed accordingly in the following sections.

In the relevant subsections of the first section outlines Turkey's EU accession path from 1950s to 2005 when the negotiations with Turkey on acquis chapters were started, official/legal requirements for accession by the EU, and the negotiations between the EU and Turkey on acquis chapters. The study finds out that the open-ended character of the negotiating process, both legal and additional criteria for accession of Turkey make the application process as the longest and most complicated one.

The discussion is extended into the dynamics of Europeans' opinion on Turkey's full EU membership in the second section. In its three subsequent subsections, the thesis presents the findings about how and why the public opinion is important in the EU, how do European citizens view Turkey's accession to the EU and how do European elites view Turkey's accession to the EU and adds related generalizations. Building on the 2005-2015 Eurobarometer surveys held in the European countries, accession process includes some political considerations like European public opinion and an increasing opposition towards Turkey's accession to the EU interrupts pre-accession negotiations and bilateral relations. The section finds a spillover between the attitudes of European citizens and elites who are in a 'give-take' relationship, a never-ended periodical process.

Resting on the analysis of all primary and secondary data, the four subsections of third section make grouping of the factors effecting European public opinion on Turkey's accession to the EU. The section arrives at the conclusion that Europeans opinion on Turkey's EU accession is shaped under the influence of Turkey-, EU-, country- and individual-specific factors.

All the findings of the study regarding the research questions and its suggestion for increasing public support the final section are presented in the final section of the thesis.

II TURKEY'S APPLICATION AND TURKISH-EU NEGOTIATIONS

2.1. Turkey's EU accession path: timeline.

The history of Turkey's application for the EEC membership dates back to 1959 when Turkey applied for associate membership (the one who is a member of a club, but has only partial rights and privileges or subordinate status) in the European Economic Community.¹¹

On 12 September 1963, The Ankara Agreement/the Association Agreement, "Agreement Creating an Association between The Republic of Turkey and the European Economic Community" was signed and came into effect in December 1964. It was devised to integrate Turkey into a customs union with the EEC. The agreement pushed forward three stages of integration of Turkey to the EU: preparatory, transitional and final stages. According to the agreement, the transitional stage ends with the completion of the customs union.

In November 1970, "Additional Protocol" considering a timetable for the abolition of tariffs and quotas on goods traded between Turkey and the Community was signed. The Protocol provided the provisions and obligations for the transitional stage.¹²

In April 1987, Turkey applied for formal membership in the European Community.

In March 1995, Customs Union between European Union and Turkey Customs Union was agreed on and entered into force on 1 January 1996. As the Ankara Agreement planned, the Customs Union led to a high degree of integration between Turkey and EU.¹³

The Luxembourg EU Council of 1997, because of poor relations with Greece, Cyprus conflict, economic and political situation in Turkey, started accession talks with the CEECs with the exclusion of Turkey.¹⁴

¹¹ Young, H. Q. (2013) 'Turkish Accession to the European Union: Shaped by Perception or Reality?' *Claremont-UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the European Union*, Vol. 2013, Article 11, pp. 143-161.

¹² 'Turkey-EU Relations.' <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-the-european-union.en.mfa>

¹³ Tocci, N. (2014) 'Turkey and the European Union: A Journey in the Unknown.' *Center on the United States and Europe (CUSE)*, Policy Paper, No. 5, 1-17.

¹⁴ 'Accession of Turkey to the European Union.' home.aubg.edu/faculty/didar/EUR406/Overview-Turkey's%20EU%20Deal.doc

Despite of a huge amount of controversies and rejections, finally, on 12 December 1999, Helsinki European Council officially granted the status of equal candidate country for full membership to Turkey.

In March 2001, the European Council passed the first Accession Partnership.¹⁵

After the Commission's Recommendation on Turkey's Progress towards accession in October 2004, the conditions for the opening of accession negotiations were defined by the Council in December 2004.¹⁶

In June 2005, the Commission adopted a Communication on the civil society dialogue between EU and candidate countries.

As the European Council confirmed the fulfillment of the Copenhagen political criteria by Turkey in December 2004, negotiations on acquis chapters were started on 3 October 2005.

From time to time, the Council adopts revised Accession Partnerships for Turkey (2001, 2005, 2007, 2008).¹⁷

2.2. Official and legal requirements for accession by the EU

There are some official/legal requirements for accession by the EU according to the Treaty of Rome, Maastricht Treaty and the 'Copenhagen Criteria' of 1993.

According to the Treaty of Rome, '... any European state may apply to become a member of the Community'.¹⁸

Under Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), the EU is open to all European states that adhere to the principles of Article 6(1) of the TEU, freedom, democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.¹⁹

There is another requirement in the Maastricht Treaty (TEU), '...member states shall have systems of government founded on the principle of democracy'.²⁰ In other section, it states that any European country that demonstrates respect and

¹⁵ 'Accession Partnership with Turkey adopted' (2001), *European Commission Press Release Database* ec.europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-01-332_en.htm

¹⁶ 'EU-Turkey Relations.' http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/candidate-countries/turkey/eu_turkey_relations_en.htm

¹⁷ 'EU-Turkey Relations.' http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/candidate-countries/turkey/eu_turkey_relations_en.htm

¹⁸ Massai, L. (2011) 'The EU Enlargement.' *ASSER PRESS* . www.springer.com

¹⁹ Massai, L. (2011) 'The EU Enlargement.' *ASSER PRESS* . www.springer.com

²⁰ 'Treaty of the European Union.' http://europa.eu/eu-law/decision-making/treaties/pdf/treaty_on_european_union/treaty_on_european_union_en.pdf

commitment for the promotion of the democratic values the European Union builds on may apply for membership.²¹

Any country that wants to be accessed to the EU must comply with ‘Copenhagen Criteria’ of 1993, which consist of three parts: ²²

- having stable democratic institutions ensuring democracy, the rule of law, human rights, respect for and protection of minority rights (political criteria);
- possessing a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the European Union (economic criteria);
- ability to take on and implement the obligations of a Member State rising from the law and policies, the *acquis*, of the EU, including adherence to the aims of economic, political and monetary union.

After the enlargement round of 2004 with the accession of ten CEECs the absorption (integration) capacity of the EU became another key element of any enlargement in 2006.²³ According to the definition of absorption capacity of the EU by the European Commission, the EU institutions and candidates must be fully prepared for membership. It calls for the necessity of the public support to the enlargement both in the member states and the candidate states.

The Negotiation Framework between the EU and Turkey set out on October 3 2005 defines three other requirements for Turkey’s membership:²⁴

First additional criterion for Turkey’s membership requires Turkey to take unequivocal commitment to good relations with her neighbours and resolution of any well-known border disputes in accordance with the principle of peaceful settlement that the United Nations Charter defines. It also includes the possibility of jurisdiction by the International Court of Justice.

Second additional criterion calls for the necessity of uninterrupted support by Turkey to efforts for effective settlement of the Cyprus issue within the United Nations

²¹ ‘Understanding Enlargement: The European Union’s Enlargement Policy.’ www.fpc.state.gov

²² ‘The European Union Explained Enlargement’ (2013) www.europa.eu.com

²³ Chaturvedi, A. (2013) ‘Turkish Accession Prospects to the EU in the Current Scenario.’ *A Policy Brief*, pp. 1-14.

²⁴ Chaturvedi, A. (2013) ‘Turkish Accession Prospects to the EU in the Current Scenario.’ *A Policy Brief*, pp. 1-14.

framework and the founding principles. It appreciates success in normalisation of bilateral relations of Turkey with all EU member states. As the Greek Cyprus is an EU member, Turkey is required to conduct normal bilateral relations with it.

Third additional criterion demands Turkey the implementation of the obligations that she took by signing the Association Agreement and its Additional Protocol. Turkey still rejects the recognition of the Republic of Cyprus and refuses opening its sea and air ports to Cypriot vessels on the contrary to the agreement on customs union.

2.3. Negotiation process on *acquis* chapters

Turkey may become a member of the EU when negotiations between Turkey and the European Commission on *acquis communautaire* chapters are successfully completed and there is a unanimous agreement of the EU member states. As the European Commission describes, accession negotiations with a candidate country are designed for full and effective adoption of the EU *acquis*, the total body of the EU law, to its own legal system. The EU *acquis* is about the EU founding treaties, the amendments to these treaties, and the legislation by the EU bodies (EU Council, EU Commission, European Community and EU Court of Justice). Negotiations should be held on 33 chapters out of 35 chapters of the *acquis*, 2 chapters do not require any negotiation. Regarding Turkey's accession process, screening on *acquis* chapters started in October 2005 and was completed in September 2006. This process checks how the candidate country is ready to the EU membership.²⁵

15 chapters are opened ("Free Movement of Capital"; "Company Law"; "Intellectual Property Law"; "Information Society & Media"; "Food Safety, Veterinary & Phytosanitary Policy" (2010); "Taxation"; "Statistics"; "Enterprise & Industrial Policy"; "Trans-European Networks"; "Regional Policy & Coordination of Structural Instruments"; "Science & Research"; "Environment and Climate Change"; "Consumer & Health Protection"; "Financial Control", "Economic & Monetary

²⁵ Chaturvedi, A. (2013) 'Turkish Accession Prospects to the EU in the Current Scenario.' *A Policy Brief*, pp. 1-14.

Policy” (14 December 2015)) to discussion and only 1 chapter (“Science & Research” (June 2006)) is closed.²⁶

Negotiations with Turkey on 17 chapters out of 35 had been frozen by the EU Council, France and Cyprus (“Free Movement of Goods”; “Freedom of Movement for Workers”; “Right of Establishment for Companies & Freedom To Provide Services”; “Financial Services”; “Agriculture & Rural Development”; “Fisheries”; “Transport Policy”; “Energy”; “Economic & Monetary Policy”; “Regional Policy & Coordination of Structural Instruments” (June 2007) (was opened on 5 November 2013); “Judiciary & Fundamental Rights”; “Justice, Freedom & Security”; “Education & Culture”; “Customs Union”; “External Relations”; “Foreign, Security & Defence Policy”; “Financial & Budgetary Provisions”; “Institutions”).²⁷ Negotiations on two chapters (“Regional Policy & Coordination of Structural Instruments” (2013); “Economic & Monetary Policy” (2015)) are unfrozen.²⁸

Turkey has refused to recognize the Republic of Cyprus and rejected to open its ports and airports to traffic by ships and planes from Cyprus. Turkey rejection to apply the Additional Protocol to Cyprus resulted in the EU Council’s decision to freeze negotiations on 8 chapters in December 2006 (“Free Movement of Goods”; “Right of Establishment for Companies & Freedom To Provide Services”; “Financial Services”; “Agriculture & Rural Development”; “Fisheries”; “Transport Policy”; “Customs Union”; “External Relations”).²⁹

In 2007, France decided unilaterally to prevent opening of negotiations on 5 chapters (“Agriculture & Rural Development” ; “Economic & Monetary Policy” ; “Regional Policy & Coordination of Structural Instruments”; “Financial & Budgetary Provisions”; “Institutions”) that were considered directly related with membership by France.³⁰

In 2009, Greek Cyprus stated its unilateral blockage on opening of 6 chapters (“Freedom of Movement for Workers”; “Energy”; “Judiciary & Fundamental

²⁶ ‘Turkey-EU Relations.’ <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-the-european-union.en.mfa>

²⁷ ‘Turkey-EU Relations.’ <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-the-european-union.en.mfa>

²⁸ ‘Turkey-EU Relations.’ <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-the-european-union.en.mfa>

²⁹ ‘Turkey-EU Relations.’ <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-the-european-union.en.mfa>

³⁰ Chislett, N. (2015) ‘Turkey’s 10 Years of EU Accession Negotiations: No End in Sight.’ *Elcano Real Institute, Working Paper 14/2015.* <http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org>

Rights”; “Justice, Freedom & Security”; “Education & Culture”; “Foreign, Security & Defence Policy”).³¹

Launch of the "Positive Agenda" with Turkey by the EU in 201

2 was estimated to give pace to negotiating process. However, it failed due to Gezi Park demonstrations handling in June 2013 that raised concerns about respect for human rights and freedoms in Turkey and fed Turkoscepticism in Europe.³²

Despite of ups and downs in the pre-accession process, on the negotiations on acquis on the 22nd chapter of the acquis (Regional Policy and Coordination of Structural Instruments) was opened on November 5, 2013 at Brussels after France removed its blockage (17 February 2013).³³

After France lifted its blockage, negotiations on "Economic & Monetary Policy" were unfrozen and opened on 14 December 2015. According to the chapter, Turkey will be brought in line with the economic and monetary policy of the EU and the independence of the Central Bank will be guaranteed.³⁴

However, there are three chapters (‘Agriculture’, ‘Financial and Budgetary Provisions’, ‘Institutions’) that are blocked by France until Turkey will implement the Additional Protocol of Ankara Agreement and open her borders to ‘the Republic of Cyprus’.

The EU and Turkey signed a readmission agreement expressing visa free travel of Turkish citizens to the EU countries in 2013. They have started liberalisation dialogue on removal of visas for the citizens of Turkey since that time.

³¹‘Turkey-EU Relations.’ <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-the-european-union.en.mfa>

³² Chaturvedi, A. (2013) ‘Turkish Accession Prospects to the EU in the Current Scenario.’ *A Policy Brief*, pp. 1-14.

³³ Chaturvedi, A. (2013) ‘Turkish Accession Prospects to the EU in the Current Scenario.’ *A Policy Brief*, pp. 1-14.

³⁴ ‘Turkey to Relaunch EU Membership Bid with Economic Talks.’ (2015) www.af.reuters.com

III EUROPEANS' OPINION ON TURKEY'S EU MEMBERSHIP

3.1. How and why the public opinion is important in the EU?

Accession process is not just a simple technical, but also a political one including some political considerations (human rights; highly predictable immigration to more developed countries in the EU; the regional security; Kurdish and Cyprus issues; French and Dutch “nays” on the European Constitution referendums and etc.). European public opinion is one out of these political concerns that has an indirect role in EU policy choices and decisions taken by the EU.

Building on the EU acquis, “EU has the right to decide when accession of new members will take place and admittance of new members is done with the unanimous consent of the member-states”³⁵. It defines an unavoidable additional condition, the ability of the EU to integrate new members, “EU’s absorption capacity”. Related studies, find this notion more significant after the accession of countries with lots of problems and rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in referendums. European elites should take into account the negative experience with Bulgaria and Romania which became EU members despite the fact that the conditions required under the Copenhagen criteria of 1993 were poorly ensured by them and the European public stood against their accession.

Conventional wisdom argues about the direct cause-effect link between the historic decision by the European Council on 17 December 2004 to open accession negotiations with Turkey and the French and Dutch ‘nays’ on the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty in May/June in 2005. The French and Dutch publics’ “nays” on the 2006 Constitutional Treaty are often interpreted as the public’s reaction to “an increasingly elitist EU project”³⁶.

The concerned literature argues that the fifth round of enlargement with less developed European states and French and Dutch ‘nays’ on the EU Constitution put an end to elitist government and gave significance to public opinion in decision-

³⁵ Chaturvedi, A. (2013) ‘Turkish Accession Prospects to the EU in the Current Scenario.’ *A Policy Brief*, pp. 1-14.

³⁶ Young, H. Q. (2013) "Turkish Accession to the European Union: Shaped by Perception or Reality?," *Claremont-UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the European Union*: Vol. 2013, Article 11, pp 143-161.

making. In this context, the ability of the EU to integrate new members, in popular words, “EU’s absorption capacity”, and fear of political cost make public opinion to be taken into consideration by political elites.

It is also hard to avoid the fact that the governments taking responsibilities before their electorate should to act in accordance with the public wish in order not to lose its legitimacy.

In addition to these, French and Austrian intentions and announcements about compulsory ratification of enlargement either through national parliaments or referendums (e.g. France has said that will hold a referendum on Turkey’s EU membership) are described as another tool to exaggerate the importance of public opinion as well as their perceptions and sentiments in postelitist decision-making. As José Manuel Barroso, President of the European Commission, stated, it is now Turkey’s responsibility to “win the hearts and minds of those European citizens who are open to, but not convinced of Turkey’s European destiny”.³⁷

In the related literature it is called as the shift from “permissive consensus” to “constraining disensus” since the Maastricht Treaty which means that decisions are not taken only by technocratic elites and EU citizens’ opinion seems to gain much more importance. It is referred to as an indicator of the rise of populist movement in Europe³⁸.

The rise of right-wing (the extreme rights) that is mostly against globalization, multiculturalism, much or less, ultranationalist, authoritarian, radical, populist and xenophobic in EU institutions and member states decreases public support to Turkey’s membership.

The ability of the EU to integrate new members, “EU’s absorption capacity” is a rather popular notion articulated by EU elites when Turkey’s membership is on the agenda. It is mostly assumed to be developed to prevent Turkey’s membership.

The researchers argue that while the Accession Treaty with Turkey will require ratification through parliament or the national referendums public support for

³⁷ Young, H. Q. (2013) "Turkish Accession to the European Union: Shaped by Perception or Reality?," *Claremont-UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the European Union*: Vol. 2013, Article 11, pp 143-161.

³⁸ Ruiz-Jimenez A. M. & Torreblanca J.I. (2007) ‘European Public Opinion and Turkey’s Accession Making Sense of Arguments for and against.’ *European Policy Institutes Network*, No. 16, pp. 1-48.

Turkey's accession which is now in decrease will say the final word in this case. They are hopeless of a referendum supporting Turkey's membership to the EU in Turkosceptic Europe (e.g. in France, Austria).

- Support for Turkey's membership in EU countries is eroding. It means that even if the negotiations are closed successfully by the EU bodies such as the Council of Europe and European Parliament a veto on the accession treaty with Turkey by any national parliament of member states during the ratification process will prevent her accession. In countries like Austria and France where instead of national parliaments citizens will ratify the accession treaty in popular referendums public opinion makes a great sense.
- Any referendum saying 'no' to the accession treaty on Turkey's membership who met membership criteria would not only prevent this enlargement, but also it would diminish the bilateral relations. Turkish people who waited at the door of the EU for a long time would hold negative attitudes towards the Europeans.
- To avoid such a situation the political elites can convince the citizens of the advantages/benefits rather than disadvantages/costs like influx of immigrants, financial and cultural concerns that Turkey can bring to Europe. The politicians can take some measures like limits on freedom of movement in order to remove such concerns.

All this factors bring the conclusion together that public opinion is a main determinant in formation and an increasing opposition interrupts bilateral relations.

3.2. How do European citizens view Turkey's accession to the EU?

Eurobarometer surveys of 2005-2013 conducted by European Commission show that public support for Turkey's accession to the EU is not only low, but also shrinking as a result of a dual process: there is an increase in the rate of opposition while the level of support has remained stable since 2000. This is related to some transitions from 'don't know' to 'No'³⁹. Approximately, more than 55% of Europeans are against, 30% is for Turkey's accession. And 11% does not know. In more details, some Europeans

³⁹ Ruiz-Jimenez A. M. & Torreblanca J.I. (2007) 'European Public Opinion and Turkey's Accession Making Sense of Arguments for and against.' *European Policy Institutes Network*, No. 16, pp. 1-48.

who had not come to any conclusion whether support or protest Turkey's accession are now against it or some supporters are now in opposition since 2000 (See Table 1).⁴⁰

Building on these surveys, Austria, France, Germany, Belgium, Denmark, have the higher percentage of opposition. Because of trade relations and the desirable level of integration, the UK, Italy and Spain favour Turkey's accession. In Greece, elites support Turkey despite the negative poll. In the countries accessed to the EU in 2004, except Luxembourg and Cyprus, people generally do not oppose Turkey's membership. Luxembourg (~7-10%, support) and Cyprus (~8-10% support) with a negative public attitude towards Turkey's accession differ from other new members.⁴¹

Eurobarometer survey of 2008 under the question 'Does a fully democratic and prosperous Turkey have a place in EU?' provides an interesting result. 22% of respondents say 'no' to the accession of a full democratic and prosperous Turkey complied with all membership criteria.⁴²

The official attitude of EU member states regarding Turkey's membership to the EU is mainly formulated in electoral campaigns in these countries. The government and the electorate are in 'give-take' relations. In electoral campaigns, the candidate's/party's platform is designed to 'give' the electorate whatever it need in order to attract their voices and win the election. Consequently, the candidate/party 'takes' most of the voices and forms the government. Then the government tries to 'give' what it had promised not to lose its legitimacy. It is a spillover. To sum up, legitimate democratic governments take responsibilities before their electorate. In some cases, the government 'gives' more than the need of the electorate and overloads it. The government, elites, uses the mass media, political discourses and debates, as well as electoral campaigns as the tools of propaganda. They provide

⁴⁰ Dagdeverenis, D. (2014) 'EU Public Opinion and Turkey's EU Membership'. *EU-Turkey Dialogue Initiative Working Paper*, No. 2, pp. 1-22 .

⁴¹ Sommer, L. P. (2015) 'Accession of Turkey to the European Union—A Question of Advantage?' *International Business and Management*, Vol. 10, No. 3, pp. 12-20.

⁴² Dagdeverenis, D. (2014) 'EU Public Opinion and Turkey's EU Membership'. *EU-Turkey Dialogue Initiative Working Paper*, No. 2, pp. 1-22 .

people with less, exaggerated or misinformation. All of these negatively damage Turkey's image and her country brand. Sometimes electoral campaigns as well as the government are under the influence of non-state actors. The non-state actors help the candidate to come to power, 'give', and then manipulate on the government policy, 'take'. For example, French government policy during the presidency of *Nicolas Sarkozy* was highly regulated by Armenian lobby in France.

3.3. How do European elites view Turkey's accession to the EU?

This part refers to the statements taken from the speeches of French, German and UK officials. As France and Germany have been main opposers of Turkey's EU membership, the UK, on the contrary, supports Turkey's accession to the EU. This fact allows claim that the grouping of member states under supporting 'new' and opposing 'old' states regarding Turkey's accession is not always consistent. The negative attitude towards Turkey's accession in Luxembourg, a 'new' member state provides another proof for this argument.

French elites' attitudes towards Turkey's membership to the EU can be explained in two periods: France under the presidency of *Nicolas Sarkozy* from a right-wing party and of *François Hollande* from a left-wing party.

In the duration of *Nicolas Sarkozy's* presidency, France led the opposition towards Turkey's accession. French ex-president *Nicolas Sarkozy* highlighted identity-based differences between Turkey and Europe and stated in his speech: "I do not believe that Turkey belongs to Europe, and for a simple reason: because it is in Asia Minor. ...what I wish to offer Turkey is a true partnership with Europe, but not integration into Europe".^{43 44} Apart from his rightist character the French government under *Nicolas Sarkozy* was under apparent influence of non-state actors, especially lobbies like Armenian lobby in France. The lobby not only suspended accession negotiation by blocking talks on some acquis chapters, announcing to hold referendums on

⁴³ Francesco-Mayot, S. 'Turkey's EU Membership: Opportunities and Challenges.' Monash Europe and EU Centre. www.artsonline.edu.au

⁴⁴ Garcia, B. L. (2011) 'European Political Elites' Discourses on the Accession of Turkey to the EU: Discussing Europe through Turkish Spectacles?' *Journal on European Perspectives of the Western Balkans*: Vol. 3, No. 2 (5), pp. 53-73.

Turkey's accession and raising issues related to 'Armenian genocide', but also interfered elections in France.

The French president in power *François Hollande* does not hold such a radical negative attitude towards Turkey as Sarkozy. He gives priority to instrumental calculations, Turkey-EU relations and regional security. He called to open talks with Turkey on chapter related to EU support for region.

One of the countries which proposed 'privileged partnership' with Turkey rather than granting her full membership and opening accession negotiations in 2005 was Germany. Germans resistance to Turkey's accession still lasts. German chancellor *A. Merkel* from a right wing party has always been the most prominent defender of the 'Privileged Partnership' as an alternative to full membership of Turkey. *She* stated in 2011: "We are against the full EU membership of Turkey but we don't want to lose such an important country".⁴⁵

Turkish officials insistent rejection of any alternative to full membership, their statements pointing to Turkey's plausible accession to another organization and her economic revival on the one hand, economic crisis in EU, political and security crisis in the Middle East and the 'Arab Spring' on the other hand called for effective Turkish-EU relations. Consequently, *A. Merkel* stated in 2013: "...Although I am sceptical have approved the continuation of membership discussions. We are engaging in this with an open result". "... I am in favour of opening a new chapter..."⁴⁶

The UK support Turkey's candidacy. The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom *D. Cameron* promised to 'fight' for Turkey's EU membership in his speech in 2010. According to *his* speech, EU without Turkey is "not stonger but weaker... not more secure but less... not richer but poorer".⁴⁷ The UK's favorable attitude towards Turkey's EU membership differs from two 'old' EU member states that are already discussed above. The distinctions between the UK and them can be explained in two ways:

⁴⁵ 'Merkel Lehnt EU-Mitgliedschaft der Türkei ab' (011) *Die Welt Edition* www.welt.de

⁴⁶ 'Merkel Launches Busy Trip at Site of Patriots' (2013) *Hurriyet Daily News*. www.hurriyetdailynews.com

⁴⁷ 'Common Anger at Slow Pace of Turkish EU Negotiations.' (2010) www.bbc.com

Firstly, the UK perceives the EU as the project of economic integration based on mutual advantages and EU seems significant for the UK as long as EU membership benefits it. The EU membership loses its attractiveness. The UK preserves its currency still. The UK has recently declared to hold a referendum on its EU membership. In Turkey's case, the UK already benefits from bilateral trade with Turkey aims at conducting extended bilateral relations.

Secondly, the UK has also suffered from membership bid for some years. Maybe, it is the common destiny that favors Turkey's accession to the EU.

3.4. Generalizations

There is a five-layer division on the European public opinion: opinion of 'top' and 'down' opinion; 'old' (EU-15) and 'new' (EU-28) member states; countries with large and small Turkish population; 'The European Project' of deep political integration and a federal state or economic union and mutual benefits; extreme-right and nationalist parties on the one hand and Liberals, Greens and the European United Left on the other hand.

In some countries, the attitude towards Turkey's accession by 'top' (elite) differs from the 'down' (public): In Greece, elites support but negative opinion poll. In other countries, elites and the public are in the same opinion (France).

The 'old' (EU-15) with political, economic and geopolitical ambitions and concerns are rather negative about Turkish case than the small 'new' (EU-28) member states.

Countries with large Turkish population have a higher percentage of opposition (Germany, Austria) and offer 'privileged partnership' while the countries with small Turkish people (Poland) are more supportive of Turkey's EU membership.

Defenders of 'the European Project' of deep political integration and a federal state are often reject Turkey's accession to the EU while the defenders of economic union and mutual benefits support it (the UK).

In and outside the European Parliament, generally extreme-right and nationalist parties strongly oppose Turkey's EU membership. The European People's party is

divided regarding Turkey's accession. Liberals, Greens and the European United Left hold a favourable attitude.

IV FACTORS EFFECTING EUROPEAN PUBLIC OPINION ON TURKEY'S ACCESSION TO THE EU

Resting on the analysis of the related literature as well as the Eurobarometer surveys between 2005 and 2013 held in the European countries that it includes, the thesis tries to overview the factors that shape European public opinion on Turkey's membership. The analysis show that Europeans' attitudes towards Turkey's accession to the European Union (EU) are largely shaped under the influence of perceived, misperceived, really existing or highly predicted factors. It means that European public opinion on Turkey's membership to the EU is not only about the misperceptions, but also true perceptions or rational predictions and calculations. In addition to official membership requirements, unofficial obstacles are also at play to shape Europeans opinion Turkey's accession. The related literature often groups those factors into the general and particular ones. It usually describes Europeans view of the EU and a growing negative trend against enlargement policy as the general factors, and the country's specific features like religion, culture, amount of population and geographical location as particular ones. Going a little further, the thesis groups them into Turkey-, EU-, country- and individual-specific factors that are of great influence in explaining the variation in Europeans' attitudes towards Turkey's EU membership. For the European mind under the manipulation of these factors, Turkey's accession to the EU means that EU would import all these problems.

4.1. Turkey-specific factors

The issue of *identity* is usually in the center of the debates over Turkish case. Some Europeans claim for a unique heterogenous deep and broad integration after Turkey is acceded to the EU. They also appreciate the Europeanization process in Turkey who tries to have a European identity. According to other point of view, Turkey's

identity is a threat to or incompatible with the European identity.⁴⁸ They are doubtful of the social, cultural and political harmonization between Turkish and European civilizations and societies.

Comparison of the European Values Surveys of 1999-2008 presents three elements of European identity that form perceptions about Turkish identity:⁴⁹

- *Democracy*: Democratic values of Turkish and EU citizens are not wholly incompatible. Turkey seems less democratic than France, the UK, Austria but relatively more authoritarian than Romania, Bulgaria and Greece, Orthodox member states.
- *Tolerance*: EU as a community comprised of many different ethnic, religious, sexual, etc. groups are more tolerant than Turkey towards its minority groups.
- *Gender relations and equality between men and women*: Turkey still cannot entirely get rid of the view of women at home contrary to European view of women at workplace and with more independence.

According to these surveys, differences in regards to tolerance and gender relations are more visible than in terms of religion and democracy.

The role of *religion* in Turkey and how religious is she? Supporters of Turkey argue that religious values play great role within Turkish society, but it does not differ from Orthodox societies in Europe.⁵⁰ This group guesses that Turkey's accession to the EU would also remove the definition of the EU as a 'Christian club'. Other Europeans in opposition justify their attitude with a reference to the influence of religion on state governance in Turkey and incompatibility between Islam and democracy. They assume that with a dominant Islamic character Turkey is the 'other' (99% Muslims in Turkey, 3% in Europe) and fear that after her accession EU would be open to Islamic World.⁵¹

⁴⁸ Dagdeverenis, D. (2014) 'EU Public Opinion and Turkey's EU Membership'. *EU-Turkey Dialogue Initiative Working Paper*, No. 2, pp. 1-22 .

⁴⁹ Young, H. Q. (2013) "Turkish Accession to the European Union: Shaped by Perception or Reality?," *Claremont-UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the European Union*: Vol. 2013, Article 11, pp 143-161.

⁵⁰ Young, H. Q. (2013) "Turkish Accession to the European Union: Shaped by Perception or Reality?," *Claremont-UC Undergraduate Research Conference on the European Union*: Vol. 2013, Article 11, pp 143-161.

⁵¹ Saz, G. (2011) 'Turkophobia and Rising Islamophobia in Europe: A Quantification for the Negative Spillovers on the EU Membership Quest of Turkey'. *European Journal of Social Sciences*, Vol. 19, Number 4, pp. 479-491.

Religious affiliation also seems significant in the analysis of respondents' attitude in this case. Muslim respondents are more supportive of Turkey's accession than those without any religious affiliation and the Christians.

Cultural differences are always hotly debated regarding Turkey's EU membership. For some Europeans, EU is not only based on economic and political criteria. They also care how the cultural environment will change after enlargement. Expressed concerns derived from Poland's membership put forth that even Christianity is not sufficient for EU membership. In this regard, what about Turkey's membership?

A higher proportion of Europeans insist on the existence of significant cultural differences between Turkey and EU member states that prevent her accession. They affirm the description of Turkey as a culturally '*torn*' country by S. Huntington and claim that because of the unfinished Europeanization initiatives since the 1920s on Turkey cannot be defined as a European state.⁵²

They also predict for the changes the increased immigration would bring to their culture as well as daily lives and claim for a '*clash of civilizations*' as S. Huntington argues. A lower amount of Europeans views Turkey's membership as a successful example and experience of multiculturalism. This group guesses that it would also remove the definition of the EU as a 'Christian club'.

Regarding European public opinion, *geographical dimension* can be interpreted in two ways: geographical location (whether Turkey partly belongs to Europe by its geography or not) and land size of Turkey that will give her more voices in EU decision-making after accession. For supporters, Turkey is a part of Europe and Istanbul relates Asia to Europe. For opponents, her territory (99%) is located in Asia.

Historical dimension asks whether Turkey partly belongs to Europe by its history or not. Supporters of Turkey's accession, point to the history of coexistence contrary to the others who claim for the public fear in the EU countries against Turkey - the historical legacy of the Ottoman Empir.⁵³ The contradictions on "Armenian genocide" are referred to as other negative example of historical legacy. Some EU member

⁵² Toghil, J. (2011-2012) 'Are the official economic and political obstacles to Turkey's EU accession merely a 'fig leaf' covering real unofficial cultural and religious reservations?' *'POLIS' Journal*, Vol. 6, Winter 2011/201, pp. 1-39.

⁵³ Bayazit, Ö. (2014) 'Privileged Partnership: As an Alternative Way to the Turkey's European Union Membership Bid'. *Law & Justice Review*, Issue 9, pp. 277-339.

states like France, Belgium, Slovakia require Turkey to recognize Armenian genocide before accession to the EU.⁵⁴

Large Turkish population creates fear for Europeans. Europeans calculate some existing/realistic and predicted costs. On the first hand, there should be changes in the EU institutions after Turkey's accession. Turkey with a large amount of population would have more voices within the EU in decision-making. On the second hand, the accession of a less developed member state of over 78 mln (78,741 mln) population with lots of social and economic problems is seen as another burden for Europeans. The Europeans should pay more for reforms in Turkey. On the third hand, Europeans predict for extended immigration from Turkey to EU member states after Turkey is granted the unlimited freedom of movement of persons/workers.⁵⁵

Membership of Croatia with small population and territory was calculated less costly than Turkey.

Would there be any large immigration from Turkey to more developed EU countries? According to Europeans predictions, full freedom of movement adding continuous instability and internal problems in the country would lead to large immigration to the member states. They predict for economic, social and political concerns after Turks' immigration. Large flow of cheap work forces into the Eurozone would create or increase unemployment rate and lead to redistribution of resources in EU member states. Turkey's supporters present immigration of Turkish workers as flow of young and cheap labour force. This argument is mostly expressed in Turkish academic circles rather than in Europeans calculations.

Coexistence with Turkish people that are different from themselves in social and political issues, values, is regarded very problematic by Europeans. Turkish immigrants are poorly integrated and create their communities in the host country. Great number of poorly integrated Turks would be a threat to their national identity. They think over would Turkish people in Europe give some of their identity up and

⁵⁴ Servantie, A. (2007) 'European Public Opinion on Turkey.' *The Bridge*, pp. 1-7.

⁵⁵ Bayazit, Ö. (2014) 'Privileged Partnership: As an Alternative Way to the Turkey's European Union Membership Bid'. *Law & Justice Review*, Issue 9, pp. 277-339.

become citizens of the countries they are migrated to or live in a parallel society in the host country.⁵⁶

For supporters of Turkey, accession of ‘young’ Turkey would rejuvenate ‘old’/ageing Europe.⁵⁷

Some researcher assumes that, firstly, because of the further social and economic developments in Turkey only a few part of the population will need to migrate to Europe after accession to the EU. Secondly, the member states can put restrictions on migration from Turkey.

Would Turkey’s accession to the EU strengthen the regional *security and stability* or put it under threat is another dimension to explain how Europeans decide on Turkey. Turkey’s geopolitical location is considered beneficial to the EU by some Europeans. Turkey’s military capacity, her multilateral foreign policy, role of bridge between Asia and Europe including the Middle East, the Balkans, Asia and Africa and influence in Arabic states is interpreted differently in terms of security and stability issues. Firstly, it means to get stability in the neighbourhood of the EU and deal with the security thrats from the Middle East in a more fruitful way, take the supervision over the economic and moral developments in the region, have a broaden economic, trade as well as cultural ties of Europe with the Middle East, Central Asia, Caucasus and even China. Full transformation in Turkey due to the EU membership could lead to the democratization, freedom and development of all Muslim countries. Otherwise, EU can lose Turkey in favour of non-democratic, totalitarian countries.⁵⁸ Secondly, the EU would improve its energy security using Turkey’s transit role and diversify its energy roots through Turkey.

Interpretation of Turkey’s role as a self-interested mediator instead of a bridge is often expressed by the opponents of Turkey’s EU membership: being a bridge means to mediate between the EU and the Muslim countries with committing itself to neither of them. They evaluate her membership as a model for democratization in

⁵⁶ Arnold, H. (2007) ‘Political Arguments against Turkey’s Accession to the European Union’. *IPG*, pp. 101-123.

⁵⁷ Hatipoğlu, E., Müftüler-Baç, M. & Karakoç, E. (2014) ‘Explaining Variation in Public Support to Turkey’s EU Accession, Turco-Scepticism in Europe: A Multi-Level Analysis.’ *MAXCAP Working Paper Series*, No. 4, pp. 1-26.

⁵⁸ Modebadze, V. & Sayın, F. M. (2015) ‘Why Turkey Should Join the European Union: Arguments in favor of Turkish Membership.’ *Journal of Liberty and International Affairs*, Vol.1, No. 2, pp. 1-9.

nondemocratic Muslim countries, but the ground for the further membership applications from those countries. They argue that the foreign and security issues only constitute two or three *acquis* chapters. For some Europeans, as a NATO member Turkey is already makes sense in Europe's security and foreign policy. Europeans for whom the EU is economic-based and uses soft power Turkish military power loses its significance to some extent.

The argument that Turkey's membership would make EU a part of the conflicts in the Middle East is highly articulated today. Turkey is combating with terrorism and her national security is under the threat. EU member states are closing their doors to refugees from the Middle East. Turkey's new foreign policy aspirations, her internal instability and growing Muslim refugees in Europe give essence to security concerns and make Turkey less desirable for Europeans.⁵⁹ The war over the Middle East between Turkey, Russia, Saudi Arabia, US and other states and consequent crisis of internal security financed abroad popularizes Turkey's 'aggressor', 'imperialist', 'expansionist' and 'insecure' profile. The unstable region is also seen a useful zone for drug trafficking.

Reforms in Turkey during the pre-accession process significantly effect Europeans opinion on Turkey. Incomplete reforms and democratic deficits in Turkey favor negative attitudes towards Turkey.

Turkey experienced a fast and deep process of transformation between Helsinki European Council of 1999 when Turkey was officially granted the status of equal candidate country for full membership and 2005 as accession negotiations was launched. During that time both major part of Turkish elites and public saw a vital link between the processes of Europeanization and democratization. They evaluated the advantages of Turkey's EU membership in terms of economy, democracy and Turkey's international role. Taking into account all of these, support to EU membership was high (~ 70%) in Turkey at that period.⁶⁰

⁵⁹ Arnold, H. (2007) 'Political Arguments against Turkey's Accession to the European Union'. *IPG*, pp. 101-123.

⁶⁰ Alessandri, E. (2011) 'Turkey's Future Reforms and the European Union.' *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, Vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 69-78. http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi_turkey_tpq_vol10_no1_Emiliano%20Alessandri.pdf

Between 2001 and 2004 some amendments concerning a range of issues such as gender equality as well as gender equality in marriage, women empowerment, protection of the freedom of expression and abolition of death penalty (2004), domestic violence on women and torture, etc. was made to Turkish Constitution drafted in 1982 under the military rule ⁶¹

Although EU membership dream encouraged the reforming process in Turkey, due to the reduced credibility of EU membership in Turkey, resistance to transformation (not want to change and seek for protection of interests) produced by the reforms, imbalance of power and evaluation of “Europeanization” and “democratization” between old and new elites in Turkey (AKP), the aims under “Europeanization” and “democratization” began to differ in some sense. The latter became a more popular trend in Turkey backed by elites in power.⁶²

Turkey should continue the democratization process to have an effective and democratic judicial system and the system of checks and balances. It is also necessary in terms of the pace of Turkey-EU negotiations on *acquis* chapters.

Launch of the "Positive Agenda" of 2012 on Turkey by the EU was regarded as an initiator of a new ‘up’ in negotiation process. However, Gezi Park demonstrations of June 2013 raised concerns about respect for human rights and freedoms in Turkey. Europe became Turkosceptic again.⁶³

Why democratization is still On the agenda?

Transformation has been initiated under the influence of Turkish people who still want more democratization in the country in the period of globalisation and integration after the Cold War: As western countries become more democratic Turks also struggle for enjoying more democracy in their country. Another fact that keeps

⁶¹ Alessandri, E. (2011) ‘Turkey’s Future Reforms and the European Union.’ *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, Vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 69-78. http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi_turkey_tpq_vol10_no1_Emiliano%20Alessandri.pdf

⁶² Alessandri, E. (2011) ‘Turkey’s Future Reforms and the European Union.’ *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, Vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 69-78. http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi_turkey_tpq_vol10_no1_Emiliano%20Alessandri.pdf

⁶³ Chaturvedi, A. (2013) ‘Turkish Accession Prospects to the EU in the Current Scenario.’ *A Policy Brief*, pp. 1-14.

democratization on track is incomplete transfer in balance of power in Turkey despite some reduction in the influence of the military on the state.⁶⁴

Recent developments in Turkey's EU accession process and democratization also seem intertwined again. On the one hand, Turkey continues her democratic reforms. The "New EU Strategy of Turkey" was declared in September 2014. The New Strategy deals with the political reforms and social-economic transformation in Turkey. It also includes Communication Strategy with the EU and creation of new channels and speed the reforms up. The Communication Strategy was developed to strengthen the support to Turkey's accession to the EU both by Turks and Europeans and achieve mutual confidence. Building on the New EU Strategy, Turkey prepared her "National Action Plan for the Accession to the EU". The plan is in the form of a roadmap for reforms and transformation in Turkey covering 2014-2019.⁶⁵

Nowadays, Turkish government is also working on a new more democratic constitution for some time. It has become the major issue of the government's agenda. However, polarization between political parties and domestic instability make it a hard task.

In his New Year speech (31 Dec. 2015), Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu announced of a new constitution under the preparation by his government that targets "advanced democracy" in Turkey. The Prime Minister described it as political contract to be proudable for every citizen of Turkey.⁶⁶

Will Turkey fully respect *human rights* after EU accession? According to Commission reports, elite opinions and Eurobarometer surveys on public opinion, human rights issue is a leading dimension for opposition and delay in the accession. Turcophile authors argue that although the reforms have brought significant changes to Turkish economy, military and political institutions as well as political culture, the accession process has not sped up. However, in fact, the reforms in human rights during the accession process are incomplete and more apparent on paper than in

⁶⁴ Alessandri, E. (2011) 'Turkey's Future Reforms and the European Union.' *Turkish Policy Quarterly*, Vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 69-78. http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi_turkey_tpq_vol10_no1_Emiliano%20Alessandri.pdf

⁶⁵ 'Turkey-EU Relations.' <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-the-european-union.en.mfa>

⁶⁶ 'Turkish PM Vows 'Advanced Democracy' with New Constitution in New Year Message.' (2016) <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com>

reality according to Europeans' perceptions. They claim for less respect for religious and ethnic minority rights (Kurds) including difficulties in using their languages, lack of gender equality, violence, discrimination against women, lack of social rights, limited freedom of speech and press in Turkey. Some of them even do not hesitate to argue that Muslims in the EU enjoy more rights than Christians or other ethnics do in Turkey. The recent processes took place in Turkey flamed debates some steps backward, especially with regard to the freedom of press in this country. The slow implementation of reforms or deficits regarding human rights and freedoms leads to suspensions and favor opposition to Turkey's EU membership. Europeans wonder whether the changes after reforms would be in force after the accession.

Will Turkey's accession largely improve the state *economy*? Economic dimension is explained from two aspects. Firstly, Turkey's economic condition, secondly, the benefits of her accession. Economically highly developed Turkey is less costly and dangerous for Europeans perceptions. She would pay more to the EU and need less. The more Europeans believe in the economic gains of Turkey's entry, the less they see cultural distinctions, the higher will be the rate of support to her. Economic advantages of EU membership like to reduce unemployment and poverty is stressed to outweigh political or social ones in evaluations of some Europeans. Thus, the term of advantages of membership to the European Union is sometimes linked with the term of prosperity. Predicted wealth-oriented advantages or predicted threats to existing economic advantages manipulate approval of enlargement. This hypothesis mostly relevant for new member states of the EU.⁶⁷

To be a beneficiary or benefactory economy and the amount of immigrants highly influence on the attitudes. Citizens in beneficiary countries and the ones with lower proportion immigrants usually think of Turkish accession in a more positive way than the opposite side.⁶⁸

⁶⁷ Sommer, L. P. (2015) 'Accession of Turkey to the European Union—A Question of Advantage?' *International Business and Management*, Vol. 10, No. 3, pp. 12-20.

⁶⁸ Gerhards, Jürgen, & Silke Hans (2011) 'Why Not Turkey? Attitudes towards Turkish Membership in the EU among Citizens in 27 European Countries'. *Journal of Common Market Studies* 49, No. 4, pp. 741–766.

According to the supporters, Turkey is one of the most rising economy. Turkey has regulated her financial markets and banking systems, succeeded in economic integration with the EU, diversified her trade relations. Turkey is the largest trade partner of the EU. ⁶⁹

All in all, in comparison with the enlargement of 2004 and 2007, the economic circumstances seem relevant for membership. To add more, this membership can revive European and Asian markets. The accession of Turkey with a large economic potential (the 7th largest economy in Europe and 18th in the world)⁷⁰ will widen the European market and make it more competitive to fight against economic challenges. The opposition argues that Turkey's GDP per capita is under European standards. The membership of Turkey with a large agricultural sector and population over 70 million will bring some changes in budget allocation for the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and reinforce influx of less-skilled labor immigration.

Both developed and developing countries suffer from *regional inequalities*. However, this concern is more evident in less-developed countries like Turkey.

Because of geographical, historical, socio-economic, cultural and other reasons, Turkey is inequally developed. The west of Turkey is rich in natural resources, advantageous climate, and means of communication and workforce, close to European market, highly invested by the western capital and modernised. However, the east and south-east of Turkey builds on "ashiret" structure, suffers from the lack of educated, high-skilled human forces, modernization, sufficient profit, material capital, GDP per capita, developed social institution and services.⁷¹

Confusion between Turkish elites over defining Turkey's future role as an actor of international arena also blurs Europeans mind and raises disapproval rate of Turkey's accession. Vision of Turkey as an international actor by Turkish elites differs. The Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP)) have always had aspirations for Europeanization and EU membership for some years.

⁶⁹ Toghil, J. (2011-2012) 'Are the Official Economic and Political Obstacles to Turkey's EU Accession Merely a 'Fig Leaf' Covering Real Unofficial Cultural and Religious Reservations?' *POLIS Journal*, Vol. 6, pp. 1-39.

⁷⁰ 'Economic Outlook of Turkey' www.mfa.gov.tr

⁷¹ Özel, M. (2008) 'Avrupa Birliği'ne Uyum Sürecin'de Türkiye'de Bölgesel Dengesizlikler.' *The Journal of SBF*, pp. 166-199.

Despite being accused of Euroscepticism, the Republican People's Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP)) sounds pro-EU nowadays.⁷² ⁷³ The Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Haraket Partisi (MHP)) calls for preservation of Turkish nationality as well as national unity and rejects the impact of Westernization on Turkish identity.⁷⁴ The protection of human rights and freedoms, particularly freedom of expression and freedom of press in Turkey is evaluated under EU standards by the People's Democratic Party (Halk Demokratik Partisi (HDP)).⁷⁵

In order to provide accurate information, it is useful to make a reference to the parties' election manifestos of June 2015.

The election manifestos of the major political parties made for the general elections in Turkey provide a considerable reference to analyze Turkish elites view over Turkey's future role as an international actor and her EU membership. It is relevant to pick the Justice and Development Party (AKP), the Republican People's Party (CHP), the Nationalist Action Party (MHP) and the People's Democratic Party (HDP) up and discuss the place of the EU in the elections of June 2015.

The AKP's policies related to Turkey's foreign policy issues is organized under the "Visionary and Leader State" within the election manifesto.⁷⁶ The election manifesto of the Party made in 2015 and before sounds favorable in terms of Turkey's EU membership. The AKP, the leading party, has continuously presented Turkey's membership to the EU as a strategic foreign policy goal. The AKP leaders has often expressed that Turkey's economy is in rise and the EU needs Turkey to handle its internal economic crises. They evaluate EU membership as a part of Turkey's foreign relations, not an alternative to the relations with other countries.⁷⁷

Within their election manifesto, the social democrat party, CHP, presents foreign policy issues in the chapter "Citizens and Value Based Foreign Policy". CHP is the

⁷² Gumrukchu, S. B. (2015) 'Reading Manifestos: European Union in Turkey's June 2015 Elections.' www.reflectionsturkey.com

⁷³ 'CHP's Vision for the EU Membership.' (2012) www.chpbrussels.org

⁷⁴ Danishman, S. (2015) 'General Elections in Turkey: Where is the EU?' www.futurelabeurope.eu

⁷⁵ Gumrukchu, S. B. (2015) 'Reading Manifestos: European Union in Turkey's June 2015 Elections.' www.reflectionsturkey.com

⁷⁶ Gumrukchu, S. B. (2015) 'Reading Manifestos: European Union in Turkey's June 2015 Elections.' www.reflectionsturkey.com

⁷⁷ Danishman, S. (2015) 'General Elections in Turkey: Where is the EU?' www.futurelabeurope.eu

party that gave place to these matters in the first chapter of the party manifesto and sounds pro-EU accession. In its manifesto, it claims that Turkey under its governance can be granted EU membership. Like AKP it also points to economic and security advantages for the EU of Turkey's accession.⁷⁸

The chapter under the title "Foreign Policy" of the centre-right nationalist party, MHP, confirms the fact that relations with other Turkic states come before Turkey-EU relations in the Party's view. The Party, the third political force in the country, poses a clear Eurosceptic profile in its manifesto. MHP defines Turkey as a "regional power" and a "global power" independent of EU membership. It mentions the open-ended and uncertain character of Turkey's membership that it does not approve. MHP expects the EU to respect Turkey's national interests. The Party with national ideology calls to protect the national unity. It argues that Turkey's relations with Greece, Cyprus and Armenia and threat of terrorism should be settled in order to continue accession negotiations with EU.⁷⁹

In its short manifesto, the fourth political force in Turkey, HDP sums foreign policy issues up under the "Equalitarian, Emancipatory and Peaceful Foreign Policy". In accordance with its domestic policy priorities, the Party backs the principles pushed forward by the EU. It is insistent on the lack of protection of human rights, rule of law, separation of power and democracy that the EU membership criteria include.⁸⁰

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Therefore, it sounds realistic that the major political forces attitudes towards the place of EU membership in Turkish foreign policy contradict and sometimes are confused. Loss of popularity of EU membership in Turkey also becomes obvious. The contradiction and confusion among main political forces regarding Turkey's orientation decrease support to EU membership by Turkish public and are highly related with the interruptions in reforms.

⁷⁸ Gumrukchu, S. B. (2015) 'Reading Manifestos: European Union in Turkey's June 2015 Elections.' www.reflectionsturkey.com

⁷⁹ Gumrukchu, S. B. (2015) 'Reading Manifestos: European Union in Turkey's June 2015 Elections.' www.reflectionsturkey.com

⁸⁰ Gumrukchu, S. B. (2015) 'Reading Manifestos: European Union in Turkey's June 2015 Elections.' www.reflectionsturkey.com

⁸¹ Danishman, S. (2015) 'General Elections in Turkey: Where is the EU?' www.futurelabeurope.eu

The problems over the *Cyprus issue* also effect Europeans opinion on Turkish case. They blame Turkey in “occupying” the northern part of and not to recognize Greek Cyprus that is a member of the EU since 2004. This conflict favors Turkey’s image as an occupant country that the Ottoman legacy had already drawn in European mind. Accordingly, the problems in the customs union after Turkey’s accession are highly predicted by Europeans.

This conflict is not only significant in shaping attitudes of ordinary citizens, but also causes to the crucial stumbling blocks in negotiation process on chapters with Turkey. However the Cyprus problem was not a prerequisite for the membership of Cyprus, in addition to Copenhagen criteria for membership, the Negotiation Framework between the EU and Turkey set out on October 3 2005 includes three other requirements for Turkey’s accession:⁸²

- First additional criterion for Turkey’s membership requires Turkey to take unequivocal commitment to good neighbourly relations and resolution of any well-known border disputes in accordance with the principle of peaceful settlement that the United Nations Charter defines. It also includes the possibility of jurisdiction by the International Court of Justice.
- Second additional criterion calls for the necessity of uninterrupted support by Turkey to efforts for effective settlement of the Cyprus issue within the United Nations framework and the founding principles. It appreciates success in normalisation of bilateral relations of Turkey with all EU member states. As the Greek Cyprus is an EU member, Turkey is required to conduct normal bilateral relations with it.
- Third additional criterion demands Turkey the implementation of the obligations that she took by signing the Association Agreement and its Additional Protocol. Turkey still rejects the recognition of the Republic of Cyprus and refuses opening its sea and air ports to Cypriot vessels on the contrary to the agreement on customs union. Turkey’s rejection to apply the Additional Protocol to Cyprus resulted in the EU Council’s decision to freeze

⁸² Chaturvedi, A. (2013) ‘Turkish Accession Prospects to the EU in the Current Scenario.’ *A Policy Brief*, pp. 1-14.

negotiations on 8 chapters in December 2006 (“Free Movement of Goods”; “Right of Establishment for Companies & Freedom To Provide Services”; “Financial Services”; “Agriculture & Rural Development”; “Fisheries”; “Transport Policy”; “Customs Union”; “External Relations”).

The ‘*Armenian genocide*’ is another popular stumbling-block in Turkey’s accession to the EU. It is a ‘Turkey-specified’ issue in this case.

After the independence of Armenia the Armenian factor, in the form of Armenian claims and Turkish-Armenian relations, became a topic of disputes on Turkey’s EU membership. From time to time, European officials make proposals to put the recognition of the ‘systematic massacres of Armenians in 1915’ as a precondition for Turkey’s accession to the EU despite it is not reflected in the Copenhagen Criteria.

At the institutional level, there are differences in stance of EU. Nevertheless, the resolution that the European Parliament adopted in 1987 is always referred to by Europeans. The European Parliament has usually had the most open stance towards ‘genocide’ claims of Armenians among EU institutions. The European Parliament passed a resolution on June 18 1987, only after three months from Turkey’s membership application. In its resolution on a political solution to the Armenian question the European Parliament recognised the tragic events of 1915-1917 involving the Armenians settled in the territory of the Ottoman Empire as a genocide.

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The European Parliament directly relates the possibility of Turkey’s full EU membership with the recognition of the ‘genocide’ by Turkey. It calls Turkey to recognize the ‘genocide’ and defines the recognition as a prerequisite to EU accession.⁸⁴

⁸³ Kasım, K. (2014) ‘Avrupa Birliği ve Ermeni Sorunu: Türkiye’nin Üyelik Süreci Bakımından Değerlendirme’. Yeni Türkiye (60), pp. 1-11.

⁸⁴ Kasım, K. (2014) ‘Avrupa Birliği ve Ermeni Sorunu: Türkiye’nin Üyelik Süreci Bakımından Değerlendirme’. Yeni Türkiye (60), pp. 1-11.

In its turn, European Commission focuses not on Armenian claims to ‘genocide’, but situation of minorities in Turkey and Turkish-Armenian relations in its progress report on accession process.⁸⁵

France, Greece and Greek Cypriots are the major supporter of it. In 1996, Greek Parliament recognized 24 April as the memorial day of the ‘genocide’ of Armenians of Turks. In 1998 and 2001, French Parliament adopted a decision expressing that France openly recognizes the ‘Armenian genocide’. In 2006, French National Parliament proposed a draft on criminalization of the denial of ‘Armenian genocide’ and defined punishment up to 5 years and 45000 Euro. Although the draft was accepted by the Senate, due to the appeal of other member states that insisted on the contradiction between the draft and the Constitution, the Constitution Council cancelled it. The denial of ‘Armenian genocide’ is criminalized in Cyprus. Belgium Senate took a decision requiring (asking) Turkey to recognize the ‘genocide’ in 1998 and 2015. Italy also criminalized denial of the ‘Armenian genocide’. In 2004 the Netherland and Slovenia, in 2005, Poland, Lithuania and Germany, in 2010 Sweden recognized the ‘genocide’. Denial of the ‘genocide’ was criminalized with punishment up to five years in prison in 2011 in Slovakia. The Netherland passed bills recognizing the ‘genocide’ in 2004 and 2015. In 2015 Germany, Bulgaria, Austria, Czech Republic and Luxembourg recognized the “genocide”.⁸⁶

The activities of Armenian diaspora and lobby are particularly effective factors in shapeing Europeans attitudes and policies related to Turkey.

The Turkish government reject and does not accept the requirement for recognition as a part of EU accession criteria. The European Parliament voted against such a formal proposal in 2006 and 2011 as well.⁸⁷

EU institutions’ and member states’ attitudes, policies as well as decisions on Armenian issue impact Turkey-EU relations and bilateral relations between Turkey and member states.

⁸⁵ Kasım, K. (2014) ‘Avrupa Birliği ve Ermeni Sorunu: Türkiye’nin Üyelik Süreci Bakımından Değerlendirme’. Yeni Türkiye (60), pp. 1-11.

⁸⁶ ‘Armenian Genocide Recognition’ www.wikipedia.org

⁸⁷ Kasım, K. (2014) ‘Avrupa Birliği ve Ermeni Sorunu: Türkiye’nin Üyelik Süreci Bakımından Değerlendirme’. Yeni Türkiye (60), pp. 1-11.

In some evaluations whether conducted by Europeans or not, Turkey's EU membership bid cannot be removed before the resolution of 'Armenian issue'.

The conflicts over this issue are subject of elites' and citizens' debates over Turkey. It sounds as an elitist matter rather than populist. Going into the details, the elites are rather engaged in this matter and increase its significance for citizens.

The other part of Europeans are concerned of *Turkey's uncertainties*, the recent changes in Turkey's policy, economy and religion, and have difficulties to predict what is next. The gap between Turkey's expectations and capabilities, in other words, deficits, instable internal developments and external relations that every change in government has brought to Turkey make her membership prospects fail.⁸⁸ A great amount of Europeans is concerned of the risks related to immigration, employment, political reforms and so on. According to some circles, the recent transitions in Turkey's foreign policy orientation from the Western one to an independent and unstable one contradicts with her EU membership prospects. On the one hand, the new Turkish policy that is often coined as 'Euroasianism' raises suspicions about the disappearance of Turkey's aims for EU membership.⁸⁹

The most crucial dimension is the *image* of the candidate country in EU member states. So that the image and perception of Turkey, its brand plays a rather great role in formation of the European public opinion on her accession. The significance of all these abovementioned factors changes in accordance with the image of Turkey in the member states. Having a 'negative country brand' leads respondents' opposition and suspicions regarding the membership of even a more democratic Turkey.

How is Turkey's image in Europe shaped? Turkey's image in Europe is shaped in European cities like Berlin, London, Paris and Amsterdam, not in Istanbul or even in the US cities. Whatever Turks do or success in Turkey is of minimum influence on the formation of the image of Turkey in Europe. In Europeans evaluations, any big success that Turks make in relation with other countries can be removed away by any

⁸⁸ Grigoriadis, I. N. (2015) 'Turkey between EU Membership and Global Aspirations.' *Bilkent University*, pp. 1-28.

⁸⁹ Güner, Ş. S. (2013) 'Alternative Futures for the European Union-Turkey Accession Negotiations'. *Central European Journal of International and Security Studies* Vol. No. pp. 40-59.

aggression that a Turk do (success) in Europe. Less-educated Turks in Europe say more of Turkey to Europeans than a highly educated Turkey. There are also favorable samples of practice with Turks in Europe, but a range of factors reduce the influence of “good” Turks in shaping Turkey’s image.⁹⁰

The mass media, political discourses and debates, electoral campaigns, non-state actors like Armenian diasporas and lobbies in Europe, less or misinformation, poor experience with Turk immigrants and perceived threats to national identity, Euroscepticism, Turkophobia and Islamophobia flamed by terrorism, radicalism and instability are at play in shaping Turkey’s present country profile.

Europeans are evaluated as “Turcosceptic”, but Turks as “Eurosceptic”. “*Euroscepticism*” in Turkey is the sample of distrust between the Europeans and Turks or felt threat to Turkish national identity. A dual process goes on: the rise of “Turcoscepticism” in Europe raises “Euroscepticism” in Turkey, or vice versa. Europeans claim that Euroscepticism in Turkey interrupts reforms and Europeanization policy in Turkey, and, consequently, declines support to Turkey’s accession by Europeans.

4.2. EU-specific factors

Contradictions on the definition of the European integration project and preferences concerning the European integration process also suspend Turkey’s accession. Europeans have dispute over the future role of the EU whether as a strong political entity or a common market. Some studies present it as the conflict of a ‘thick’ idea/perception of Europe rooted in identity-based terms and a ‘thin’ idea of Europe rooted in normative and legalistic terms (such as democracy, human rights and rule of law, etc.).⁹¹ According to these studies, the controversial character of Turkey’s bid for membership stems from the complex intersection of these two opposite views of the EU. They find a ‘thin’ EU favoring Turkey’s accession. It means that after complying with all Copenhagen criteria and adopting the EU’s *acquis*, Turkey can be granted

⁹⁰ Balci, K. (2004) ‘Türkiyenin AB Yolculuğun’da ihmal edilen üç faktör.’ www.zaman.com.tr

⁹¹ Dostal, P., Akcali, E. & Antonsich, M. (2011) ‘Turkey’s Bid for European Union Membership: Between “Thick” and “Thin” Conceptions of Europe’. *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, 52, (2), pp. 1-37.

full-fledged membership. On the contrary, the ‘thick’ EU rooted in identity and culture is supposed to challenge Turkey’s membership. To sum up, the member states seeking for extension of the common market or possessing the ‘thin’ idea of Europe are usually for Turkey’s accession and claim to have more international influence if Turkey is in. However, other Europeans take into account Turkey’s unstable geopolitical location and foreign policy that is sometimes very hard to make predictions on. They consider it as a choice of quantity or quality.

In addition to Turkish uncertainties *European uncertainties over political and geographical limits of EU* also raise opposition to Turkey.⁹² Turkey’s membership to the Union is considered as a violation of its founding treaties like historical and legal aspects, geographical limits.

In some studies, *the EU’s one-fit all strategy*, the strategy of applying the same accession policy to different countries is also perceived as a reason to failure of enlargement policy.⁹³ As long as enlargement fails any further expansion irritates the public. The EU is called to apply individual accession policy on any candidate country.

EU’s readiness to enlargement at the political, economic and institutional level is another crucial factor to change the public opinion. Firstly, EU should be ready in order to settle difficulties that the enlargement will bring. Secondly, European people should be well-informed and conceived of this readiness. There are two possible scenarios: EU is ready to the enlargement but citizens are unaware of it; EU is unready to the enlargement but citizens are convinced of or subjectively perceive its readiness; EU is ready and the citizens are aware of it because of direct exchange of information between them; EU is unready and citizens know this fact because of direct exchange of information between them. In Turkey’s case, the second and third scenarios favor her membership whereas the second one is more costless for both EU and Turkey.

⁹² Arnold, H. (2007) ‘Political Arguments against Turkey’s Accession to the European Union’. *IPG*, pp. 101-123.

⁹³ Saz, G. (2011) ‘Turkophobia and Rising Islamophobia in Europe: A Quantification for the Negative Spillovers on the EU Membership Quest of Turkey’. *European Journal of Social Sciences*, Vol. 19, Number 4, pp. 479-491.

EU's internal economic, fiscal and identity crises push Turkey's membership out of the centre of EU agenda. Politicians engage in domestic problems rather than putting enlargement in public agenda. Political, economic and identity crises of Europe (like crisis of distribution, crisis of political representation and the crisis of identity, growing global economic uncertainty, immigration) give rise to the extreme-rights in many Western countries.⁹⁴ Because of these facts the elite consensus between mainstream parties on exclusion of the extremist parties from the political arena gradually came to an end and they leave more places to the extremists. The extreme-right parties successfully use media and tend to come to centre in order to represent the majority of the electorate.⁹⁵ The debate on Turkey's accession to the EU flames the crisis of European identity and definition of Europe. In its turn, the debate on European identity is ratherly focused on what Europeaness is not, rather than what it is".⁹⁶

According to a prominent number of concerned studies, the acceptance of the membership application of Turkey, a prominent energy transit hub, an ally of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, an effective one to cooperate in the Middle East, the Black Sea region and the Caucasus, and the launch of negotiations was backed by the US Congress. The US viewed the EU enlargement process as a way to spread the stability and development in Europe.⁹⁷ They accuse the EU members of *being unable to develop a common policy* and remove this pressure. Uncertainties in the case are explained with the character of transatlantic relations rather than EU-Turkish. These studies, by Turkish or European researchers, refer to 'buy time policy' as the main goal of the EU in launching pre-accession negotiations with Turkey.

Ukraine crisis is also another fact revealing the weakness and deficits of EU foreign policy including the enlargement policy. The crisis reconfirmed that not Turkey's membership but the third actors and Ukrainians have much to do with Ukraine's

⁹⁴ Öner, S. (2012) 'The Rise of Extreme-Right in Europe: The Cases of Germany and Austria and the Question of Turkey's Membership to the EU'. *Euroacademia International Conference: Re-Inventing Eastern Europe*.

⁹⁵ Öner, S. (2012) 'The Rise of Extreme-Right in Europe: The Cases of Germany and Austria and the Question of Turkey's Membership to the EU'. *Euroacademia International Conference: Re-Inventing Eastern Europe*.

⁹⁶ Toghil, J. (2011-2012) 'Are the Official Economic and Political Obstacles to Turkey's EU Accession Merely a 'Fig Leaf' Covering Real Unofficial Cultural and Religious Reservations?' *POLIS Journal*, Vol. 6, pp. 1-39.

⁹⁷ Morelli, V. (2013) 'European Union Enlargement: A Status Report on Turkey's Accession Negotiations'. *CRS Report for Congress*, pp. 1-18.

membership. The EU under the influence of the policy of the third actors may access Turkey one day. Here raises another question that any further research can rest on: is Turkey's accession prevented by any third actor (s)?

The researches claim for an eroding US support because of the recent changes in Turkey's foreign policy⁹⁸. Because of the last political changes and conflict of interests in the Middle East, to revive US backing of Turkey's EU membership and Turkey's EU membership would be a way to keep her under supervision.

It is hotly debated whether opposition to Turkish membership is related especially to Turkey, or a general negative trend towards enlargement, in other words, *enlargement fatigue*. Respondents' negative attitudes towards Turkey's accession are often due to the opposition to EU's enlargement policy. Europeans do not want EU to expand further and import additional problems. Domestic problems and unfavorable experiences with previous rounds of enlargements of 2004 and 2007 make enlargement undesirable.⁹⁹

The open-ended character of the accession process that the EU Council's decision on Turkey rased scepticism and hopelessness, and led to the loss of credibility of her membership prospects. All began to think of Turkey's candidacy as a 'specific case'. It is the very 'specificness' that complicates candidacy of Turkey. To attach an open-ended character removed guarantee of membership. On the one hand, Turks felt to be unfairly treated cannot calculate the costs and benefits of the process surely: do the costly transformation will definitely end in accession? On the other hand, Europeans confident of their elites percieve it as a caution and become more sceptic towards Turkey's accession. Both these facts slow the transformation and negotiation process down.

Alternatives to Turkey's full EU membership such as the Privileged Partnership (PP) also reduce credibility of the accession. The project of PP with Turkey (2002) proposes expansion of the Customs Union into the free movement of goods, services and capital without free movement of persons. It is generally considered as imperfect

⁹⁸ Arnold, H. (2007) 'Political Arguments against Turkey's Accession to the European Union'. *IPG*, pp 101-123.

⁹⁹ Bayazit, Ö. (2014) 'Privileged Partnership: As an Alternative Way to the Turkey's European Union Membership Bid'. *Law & Justice Review*, Issue 9, pp. 277-339.

project with shortages devised to replace the full membership and keep the relations on without including or excluding Turkey. The European Parliament supports the PP as a form of promoted neighborhood policy without the freedom of movement of persons. Some Europeans predicted for a difficult and unfair competition with Turkey in a single market. Turkish officials oppose the costly PP (in terms of implementation of the *acquis*) without any participation in decision-making and predicts for the hardship in management: cost exceeds benefits in Turkish calculations.

According to a set of academic circles, economic (expansion of the existing borders of European market), security (to have a buffer zone, Turkey, between two continents and combat illegal immigration and terrorism, diversify energy supply to the EU countries) reasons and declining public support for enlargement, in other words, enlargement fatigue are the main factors lying behind the offer of PP. They describe the strategic partnership through the PP as a way to have another buffer zone between Asia and Europe, integrate the Turkish and EU military power and eliminate any military threat from Turkey.

The PP offer is also criticized for being limited to economic and security matters, leading to slow-down in reforms, diminishing Turkish public wish for EU membership and failing to provide the reason of complying with the *acquis* without granting membership.¹⁰⁰

Negative assessments of the pre-accession negotiations by the EU also impact on formation of European decisions regarding the membership of Turkey. 2012 progress report of the EU Commission on Turkey's pre-accession process largely focused on democratic deficits in the country and Cyprus problem is considered to be "the harshest" and "unbalanced" one by Turkish officials. Harsh criticism by the EU institutions leave less hope for Turkey's EU membership supporters and create such a

¹⁰⁰ Güner, Ş. S. (2013) 'Alternative Futures for the European Union-Turkey Accession Negotiations'. *Central European Journal of International and Security Studies* Vol. No. pp. 40-59.

perception that both the EU and Turkey are not as interested in membership as they were before.¹⁰¹

European's 'phobia', in other words *Turcoscepticism and Turcophobia* are perceived as hostility towards Turks, Turkic culture, Ottoman Empire and Turkey. Sometimes Turcophobia is presented as a historical process taking its roots from Turkish occupation in the fifteenth century. Some Turkish authors even do not hesitate to claim that it is Turcophobia and Islamophobia that created the EU which Turkey tries to access now. They argue that the idea of EU appeared after the occupation of Istanbul by Turks. At that time, its defenders targeted to ensure peace and exclusion of Turks from Europe.¹⁰²

According to some Europeans, the "other" in Europe has transformed from the Jews and communists to Muslims. The new "other" of Europeans is the "enemy from within", usually a Muslim immigrant.¹⁰³ The rise of radical Islamophobia in the post-9-11 era leads to Turcophobia in Europe and it, in its turn, leads to Euroscepticism in Turkey ('negative spillovers').¹⁰⁴ Turkish membership to the EU is sometimes perceived as an instrument of Islamization of Europe. Paris terror attacks of 2015 and flow of Syrian refugees due to the war in Syria that broke out in the form of civil war and turned into regional war led by internal and external forces escalated the level of 'Islamophobia' in Europe.

The rise of right-wing parties and rightwing propaganda in member states will also raise Islamophobia, or specifically "Turcophobia" across Europe.¹⁰⁵

Both Islamophobia and Turkophobia in Europe have become the most dangerous modern tendencies threatening the success in Turkey's application. Some political elites and academic studies with anti-Islam or anti-Turkish propaganda and mutual

¹⁰¹ Morelli, V. (2013) 'European Union Enlargement: A Status Report on Turkey's Accession Negotiations'. *CRS Report for Congress*, pp. 1-18.

¹⁰² Saz, G. (2011) 'Turkophobia and Rising Islamophobia in Europe: A Quantification for the Negative Spillovers on the EU Membership Quest of Turkey'. *European Journal of Social Sciences*, Vol. 19, Number 4, pp. 479-491.

¹⁰³ Saz, G. (2011) 'Turkophobia and Rising Islamophobia in Europe: A Quantification for the Negative Spillovers on the EU Membership Quest of Turkey'. *European Journal of Social Sciences*, Vol. 19, Number 4, pp. 479-491.

¹⁰⁴ Saz, G. (2011) 'Turkophobia and Rising Islamophobia in Europe: A Quantification for the Negative Spillovers on the EU Membership Quest of Turkey'. *European Journal of Social Sciences*, Vol. 19, Number 4, pp. 479-491.

¹⁰⁵ Öner, S. (2012) 'The Rise of Extreme-Right in Europe: The Cases of Germany and Austria and The Question of Turkey's Membership to the EU'. *Euroacademia International Conference: Re-Inventing Eastern Europe*.

distrust also contribute to Euroscepticism in Turkey and Turcophobia in Europe. It means that realistic and misperceived considerations affect European opinion.

In European perceptions, if Turkey is accessed to the EU once, to prevent membership applications from the outside of European borders will be impossible.¹⁰⁶

The thesis calls it ‘enlargement disease phobia’.

4.3. Individual-specific factors

The result of the analysis on Eurobarometer Surveys of the 2000s reveals the fact that the respondents are also influenced by individual-specific factors in discussing Turkey’s membership. There are other factors at play such as people's levels of education, age, gender and ideological affiliation to make generalizations over the different attitudes towards this enlargement.

Not only really-felt concerns and rational calculations, but also *individual perceptions* about the country’s features shape Europeans’ attitudes towards Turkey’s EU accession. Differences in respondents’ attitudes towards the same Turkey-, EU- and country-specific factors are explained with the fact that they conform to reality or reflect individual perceptions. The perception of factors by individuals is subjective or objective. These concerns are sometimes misperceived, exaggerated or lower estimated.

It is also relevant to use *individual beliefs* concerning Turkish and European commonalities or distinctions, the benefits or costs of membership for Turkey and the EU sometimes explain variations in Europeans’ attitudes. The less the individuals believe that Turkey and Europe share the same cultural norms, history and geography, the more they are supportive of Turkey’s accession. The stronger the individuals are convinced of that Turkey’s membership will bring benefits to the EU, the more likely they support Turkey’s accession. The stronger the respondents believe that Turkey will benefit from the EU, the stronger they will support Turkey’s accession.

¹⁰⁶ Arnold, H. (2007) ‘Political Arguments against Turkey’s Accession to the European Union’. *IPG*, pp. 101-123.

There are contradictions in academic circles over individual's attitudes towards Turkey and their *level of education*. Some argue that more educated individuals are more supportive of Turkey's accession contrary to those who claim for the negative relation between these variables.¹⁰⁷ It seems rather relevant that the less educated respondents are more supportive of Turkey's EU accession than well-educated ones. It is mainly due to the higher level of information and the degree of analytic capacity of well-educated respondents.

Although accession of an economically less developed country is perceived as a threat to their wealth by Europeans, dilemma on the type of relation between *personal economic position/personal wealth* and individual's opinion on Turkey is also evident. Some researchers argue that the rich and employed individuals are relatively more supportive of Turkey's accession than the poor and unemployed ones. It can be explained with the assumption that the rich and employed, high-skilled Europeans are in comfort and economically secure. However, this study finds it appropriate to the accession of a highly developed country where the high-skilled citizens hope for new job opportunities. Actually, in some cases personal economic position and attitudes towards Turkey's accession are negatively related. The individuals with a better economic position feel threat to their wealth and worry more than the individuals who have less to lose (it is indifferent to them). This scenery can vary in different individuals, because of subjectively perceived economic position or national economic preferences.

Age of respondents also helps to explain the variations in Europeans behavior. Younger respondents, who place themselves mostly in the left of the political spectrum, are more predicted to support Turkey's accession. The older, who seems themselves on the right, usually hold nationalist sentiments. They are for the preservation of European project of political integration and European identity unlike the younger who seek for materialistic benefits and peaceful coexistence.

¹⁰⁷ Hatipoğlu, E., Müftüler-Baç, M. & Karakoç, E. (2014) 'Explaining Variation in Public Support to Turkey's EU Accession, Turco-Scepticism in Europe: A Multi-Level Analysis.' *MAXCAP Working Paper Series*, No. 4, pp. 1-26.

The analysis of surveys makes it apparent to make a generalization building on another dimension, *gender affiliation*. Considering the effect of other factors as well, the women seem more in favor of Turkey's membership than the men.¹⁰⁸ Firstly, this study relates it to the differences in masculine and feminine characters and, secondly, to their role and interest in politics.

In terms of *ideological affiliation*, individuals on the political right-wing are more likely to oppose Turkey's admittance. As was mentioned in the study before, they view the EU as a 'Christian club' and political project with the final goal of federation of European states. Apart from it, they consider the accession of Turkey as the threat to European identity and redistribution of their wealth. The rights predict to give up some European identity in order to live with Turks who are not Europeans. They consider that Europe is only for Europeans.¹⁰⁹ Individuals who place themselves on the left-wing of the political spectrum are materialistic than the rights. They view the EU as an economic project and seek for additional resources.

Nowadays, the right-wing parties are winning national elections in EU member states. It can be interpreted as the flame of nationalism, Islamophobia, Turcoscepticism and anti-enlargement attitudes in Europe.

Due to the religious commonality Muslims in Europe support Turkey membership rather than Christians or people without any *religious affiliation*. The Christians oppose more than religiously indifferent ones.

Being informative of Turkey and EU specific factors positively or negatively influences on support to her accession. Having entire information about the problems or costs raises opposition to Turkey while being aware of the progress in Turkey and benefits of her accession increases support to her EU membership. Sometimes misinformation about the EU, its enlargement policy and Turkey are the factors that make Europeans oppose enlargement. Some Europeans do not have detailed information about the EU as well as its institutions, functions and enlargement policy.

¹⁰⁸ Hatipoğlu, E., Müftüler-Baç, M. & Karakoç, E. (2014) 'Explaining Variation in Public Support to Turkey's EU Accession, Turco-Scepticism in Europe: A Multi-Level Analysis.' *MAXCAP Working Paper Series*, No. 4, pp. 1-26.

¹⁰⁹ Hatipoğlu, E., Müftüler-Baç, M. & Karakoç, E. (2014) 'Explaining Variation in Public Support to Turkey's EU Accession, Turco-Scepticism in Europe: A Multi-Level Analysis.' *MAXCAP Working Paper Series*, No. 4, pp. 1-26.

4.4. Country-specific factors

Apart from Turkey-, EU- and individual-specific factors, country-specific factors such as country's economic performance, the amount of Turkish migrants also have much to do with the level of public approval/disapproval rate of Turkey's EU membership in an EU member state. Interaction between integration and national political, economic and social settings produce diverse combinations of incentives, expectations and fears.¹¹⁰

Considering the *contradictions over the view of EU and its enlargement policy* by the member states, most related researches make groupings of “old” (EU 15) and “new” (EU 25-27) member states and claim that in the former ones support for Turkey's EU membership is low, while in latter ones support is relatively high. Citizens in old EU-15 member states (especially, Austria, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Greece, France and Finland) more oppose Turkey's accession than in the ten new member states.¹¹¹ “Old” member states view the European integration project as political unification based on common European identity contrary to the “new” member states for which the union is based on materialistic benefits. In identity based perspective, this unification in the form of enlargement should not consider Turkey who belongs to Asian identity. In a materialistic perspective, the internal problems caused by economic, financial and security crises made EU enlargement policy less attractive for Europeans. In other words, a new member seems extra burden for the “fathers of EU” to deal with. In an institutional perspective, the “old” members enjoy the right to supervise on EU policy. Accession of Turkey with large population will give more voices to her in EU decision-making. The interest of Turkey with a pro-Arabic foreign policy orientation will contradict with other member states. The “new” member states evaluate Turkey's accession as the expansion of common market and inclusion of new materialistic resources, like a boost in exhausted EU

¹¹⁰ Arnold, H. (2007) ‘Political Arguments against Turkey's Accession to the European Union.’ *IPG*, pp. 101-123.

¹¹¹ Dagdeverenis, D. (2014) ‘EU Public Opinion and Turkey's EU Membership’. *EU-Turkey Dialogue Initiative Working Paper*, No. 2, pp 1-22.

economy. That is why economic circles are usually keen supporters of Turkey's membership.¹¹²

*The contrast between the amount of Turkish population/migrants in an EU member state (e.g. Germany, Austria and Netherlands with the highest percentage of Turkish immigrants), a host country, and the rate of public support to Turkey's accession raises another dilemma: the higher the percentage of Turks living in a country, the more the population is likely to oppose Turkey's accession.*¹¹³ In this regard, Europeans' experience with Turkish immigrants who often find it difficult to integrate into the societies of host countries, the cultural difference between Turkey and the EU, misinformation about Turkey and Turkish community, social image of Turkey and the Turks in Europe (largely stemmed from the lack of Turks' educational and vocational qualifications, low-paying unskilled jobs, family relations, loyalty to traditions and so on) contribute to disapproval rate of its accession to the EU.¹¹⁴

Evaluations of the financial costs that Turkey's EU membership will bring to EU member states also influences on public opinion regarding her accession. *To be a beneficiary or benefactory economy* highly influence on the attitudes. Citizens in recipient/beneficiary countries are more supportive of Turkey's accession than the citizens in benefactory countries. On the one hand, those who are conceived of the profits that their country get from EU membership favor Turkish accession than those who do not see significant profit in their own membership.¹¹⁵ On the other hand, citizens of these countries focused on the benefits that EU membership gives them rather than on the possible costs that Turkey's membership can bring together.

National political context, certain macro-level political variables (such as government ideology or the economic health of the country) and political elites' role

¹¹² Canan-Sokullu, Ş. E. (2011) 'Italian Public Opinion on Turkey's EU Accession: Utilitarian Calculations, Identitarian Evaluations or Perceived Threats?' *PERCEPTIONS*, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 47-70.

¹¹³ Hatipoğlu, E. & Müftüler-Baç, M. & Karakoç, E. (2014) 'Explaining Variation in Public Support to Turkey's EU Accession, Turco-Scepticism in Europe: A Multi-Level Analysis.' *MAXCAP Working Paper Series*, No. 4, pp. 1-26.

¹¹⁴ Saz, G. (2011) 'Turkophobia and Rising Islamophobia in Europe: A Quantification for the Negative Spillovers on the EU Membership Quest of Turkey.' *European Journal of Social Sciences*, Vol. 19, No. 4, pp. 479-491.

¹¹⁵ Gerhards, Jürgen, & Silke Hans (2011) 'Why Not Turkey? Attitudes towards Turkish Membership in the EU among Citizens in 27 European Countries'. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 49, No. 4, pp. 741-766.

have unavoidable impact on individual preferences or perceptions in this case: a right-wing government usually holds Turkosceptic attitudes. In other words, support to Turkey's accession is in decline in EU members where right-wing governments are in power. The growing influence of extreme-right parties which are conservative about protection of national identity and redistribution of social benefits poses threat to Turkey's EU membership. The largely sounded concerns of ultranationalist, authoritarian, radical, populist or xenophobic extreme-right parties related to anti-immigrant attitudes could be categorized into moral (identity-based) and material ones. The extreme-rights oppose pluralist democracy and division of social benefits among these groups: the dominant group should get most of the benefits and leave restricted choices for immigrants. Extreme-right parties with their anti-immigration, anti-globalization, anti-multicultural and Islamophobic views boost restricted citizenship regulations, flame violence against immigrants and increase opposition towards Turkey's membership. They argue that these countries do not need immigrant workers any more.¹¹⁶ They portray Turks as a new "other" in Europe.

Because of influential extreme-right parties, Germany and Austria show the lowest rate of support for Muslim and less-developed Turkey's membership, an instrument of Islamization of Europe. They flame the fear of influx of further immigrants if Turkey becomes a member of the EU.¹¹⁷

As long as right-wing parties control the debate over Turkish accession and use European media as a policy tool EU citizens will hold negative attitude towards Turkey. In order to change the scenery in Turkey's favour, the debate must concentrate on post-national and instrumental arguments rather than identitarian or cultural ones.

How the ideology of the government effect citizens' opinion on Turkey's EU membership? Actually, in some European countries, national governments and ideologies decrease the rate of public support to Turkey's accession whereas in other

¹¹⁶ Öner, S. (2012) 'The Rise of Extreme-Right in Europe: The Cases of Germany and Austria and The Question of Turkey's Membership to the EU'. *Euroacademia International Conference: Re-Inventing Eastern Europe*.

¹¹⁷ Öner, S. (2012) 'The Rise of Extreme-Right in Europe: The Cases of Germany and Austria and The Question of Turkey's Membership to the EU'. *Euroacademia International Conference: Re-Inventing Eastern Europe*.

European countries political elites act according to the public will and tend to be more attractive for the voters or party members.

Bargaining power of the member states is a prominent factor that effects the relations between the member and candidate states of the EU. From time to time member states bargained against or for candidate states in previous enlargements. It is considered most relevant for Turkey's case by pointing to lots of turning points in the pre-accession process.¹¹⁸

Greece is accused of using its bargaining power in favor of its own foreign policy goals since it was accessed to the the EU. Ruquirement for unanimity and veto power of member states in EU decision-making process on external relations in accordance with Luxembourg compromise (1966) allows bargain.

Using the institutional structure of the EU, Greece created obstacles in decisions regarding Turkey's accession. Luxembourg Summit in 1997 decided on the candidacy of the applicant states, including Cyprus, with exclusion of Turkey. During 1998 Greece used its bargaining power and prevented any new proposals for Turkey by the UK and Germany. Only two years later, Helsinki Summit of 1999 granted candidat status to Turkey despite the absence of any important development in Turkey. Greece did not oppose the decision of Helsinki Summit. Because, firstly, Cyprus conflict was Europeanized and Grece received guarantee from the EU for the membership of Cyprus in 2004 during the fifth round of enlargement despite it was Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus who backed the Annan Plan for Cyprus. (In additon to the bargaining power of Greece, instrumental calculations also favord the accession: Cyprus is a country of small population and territory). Secondly, EU had to deal with Turkey's requirements. Thirdly, Abdullah Ocalan, PKK leader, was captured in Greece Embassy in Kenya in the same year. Fianally, reapprochment between Greece and Turkey also contributed to approval of Turkey's candidacy to the EU membership in 1999.

¹¹⁸ Cihangir, D. (2010) 'Multilateral Framework of the EU Enlargement Process and Public Opinion: The Case of Turkey.' *Economic Development Foundation Working Paper*, No. 2, pp. 1-18.

Despite the fact that the bargaining power of Greece, a member state, was not the only reason in Turkey's EU membership bid, it was a tool for EU members who wanted to 'buy time'. That is why Europeanization of Turco-Cypriot conflict prevented Turkey's candidacy to the EU. Bargaining member states carried this conflict to decision-making of the EU.

The ups and downs in the pre-accession negotiations are also sometimes explained with the bargaining power of Greece. The EU Council has decided to freeze negotiations on 8 chapters in December 2006. According to the statement by the Council of the European Union in December 2006, as long as the free movement of goods by ships and planes registered in Cyprus is restricted Turkey will not be able to fully implement the *acquis* concerned these chapters.¹¹⁹ Following decisions of French and Cypriot governments to block negotiations on *acquis* chapters between Turkey and EU are other out-standing examples to prove bargaining power of member states. Negotiations between EU and Turkey on 17 chapters out of 35 had been frozen by the EU Council, France and Cyprus. Negotiations on 2 chapters ("Regional Policy & Coordination of Structural Instruments" (2013); "Economic & Monetary Policy" (2015)) are unfrozen.¹²⁰¹²¹ Turkey's refusal to recognize 'the Republic of Cyprus' and rejection to open its ports and airports to traffic by ships and planes from Cyprus as the Additional Protocol required resulted in the EU Council's decision to freeze negotiations on 8 chapters in December 2006 ("Free Movement of Goods"; "Right of Establishment for Companies & Freedom To Provide Services"; "Financial Services"; "Agriculture & Rural Development"; "Fisheries"; "Transport Policy"; "Customs Union"; "External Relations").¹²²

Bargaining power of France under the presidency of Nicolas Sarkozy is also supposed to effect Turkey's accession to the EU. An example that one can refer is France's decision of 2007 to prevent opening negotiations on 5 chapters ("Agriculture & Rural Development" ; "Economic & Monetary Policy"; "Regional

¹¹⁹ Cihangir, D. (2010) 'Multilateral Framework of the EU Enlargement Process and Public Opinion: The Case of Turkey'. *Economic Development Foundation Working Paper*, No. 2, pp. 1-18.

¹²⁰ 'Turkey-EU Relations.' <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/reasons-between-turkey-and-the-european-union.en.mfa>

¹²¹ Moore, J. (2015) 'EU to Open New Chapter in Membership Talks with Turkey.' www.newsweek.com

¹²² 'Turkey-EU Relations.' <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/reasons-between-turkey-and-the-european-union.en.mfa>

Policy & Coordination of Structural Instruments”; “Financial & Budgetary Provisions”; “Institutions”) that were considered directly related with membership by France.¹²³

Another EU member state, Cyprus, also applies its bargaining power against Turkey’s accession. By using its bargaining power Greek Cyprus vetoed opening negotiations on 6 chapters (“Freedom of Movement for Workers”; “Energy”; “Judiciary & Fundamental Rights”; “Justice, Freedom & Security”; “Education & Culture”; “Foreign, Security & Defence Policy”) in 2009.¹²⁴ Because of these and other facts, one *acquis* chapter has been discussed and closed (‘Science and Research’).

By using their bargaining power member states causes long delays in Turkey’s accession process to the EU.

The preferences of the EU member states, governments’ preferences in their domestic politics and also the demands and preferences of domestic and social groups in the member states hold significant importance in both ups and downs in Turkey’s pre-accession process: the membership of post-soviet states and decision on Turkey’s candidacy was the result of political changes of that time. Additionally, the term “privileged partnership” instead of full membership was articulated by Angela Merkel, the leader of the German Conservative Party (CDU) in 2004 because of both domestic politics and the impact of social groups in Germany, which oppose Turkish membership. French people with less opposing attitudes towards Turkey’s membership in the period of Jacques Chirac’s presidency or more opposing French people under the presidency of Nicolas Sarkozy are other two indicators of this approach.¹²⁵

Some Turkish researchers argue that the supporters *cooperate and negotiate not because they help Turkey’s accession, but because they do not want to seem as opposing ones* and benefit from the mutual relations. Calculations about the present

¹²³ ‘Turkey-EU Relations.’ ‘Turkey-EU Relations.’ <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-the-european-union.en.mfa>

¹²⁴ ‘Turkey-EU Relations.’ <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-the-european-union.en.mfa>

¹²⁵ Cihangir, D. (2010) ‘Multilateral Framework of the EU Enlargement Process and Public Opinion: The Case of Turkey.’ *Economic Development Foundation Working Paper*, No. 2, pp. 1-18.

and future payoffs or costs by each supporter can differ. Despite this fact, if the general evaluations of the current and future values of the cooperation are higher than the value of defection or Turkey's unilateral exit they cooperate. Accordingly, if the latter outweighs the former they will defect. In other words, they cooperate if the future less concerns them. Actually, both the objectors and supporters seek for a Turkish decision to give up the accession process. The new Turkish foreign policy can fail or succeed. Its failure would strengthen the objections and undermine the supporters while its success would be indifferent for objectors but worthy for supporters. A more developed Turkey is more attractive for supporters to cooperate.¹²⁶

¹²⁶ Güner, Ş. S. (2013) 'Alternative Futures for the European Union-Turkey Accession Negotiations.' *Central European Journal of International and Security Studies* (2/2013), pp. 40-59.

V CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS

In a large context, further enlargement of the EU and, in a narrow context, Turkey's EU accession is a rather debatable and popular issue. Despite Turkish membership efforts since 1950s, it remains the longest and most complicated application process of all times. The history of Turkey's application for the EEC membership dates back to 1959, only 1 acquis chapter (Science & Research (June 2006)) out of 35 is closed.¹²⁷

When it comes to the European public support on Turkey's accession, the accession negotiations and reforms in Turkey go on while the support for Turkish membership is not only low, but also in decline. Due to either spontaneous or artificial deficits Turkey fails in fully meeting the membership criteria. Enlargement is more than a technical procedure of meeting the Copenhagen criteria. Both really-felt concerns and rational calculations, and the evaluations of Turkey-, EU-, country-specific factors shape Europeans' attitudes towards Turkey's EU accession. Because of the two previous practice preceding WWI and WWII, the recent economic and financial crisis makes arguments about a further large-scale war very actual. It threatens international and national security. That is why in Turkey's accession, there are two new groups of concerns. The first new group of concerns is derived from failed and expensive enlargement policy of the EU in example of the Ukraine crisis. The second new group of concerns emerged from the recent changes in the Middle East brought lots of refugees to Europe and made enlargement of the EU less desirable for Europeans. In academic circles, it is mostly linked to Turkey's new foreign policy orientation and strategy. Europeans' traditional concerns rose from the internal instability and security problems, democratic deficits in Turkey are now in escalation.

Turkey's EU membership sounds unimaginable and highly costly, but rather urgent. Recent migration and security issues are often regarded as a challenge to both EU and Turkey. Turkey hosts about 2 mln refugees emigrated from Syria because of the war in their country. The EU, in its turn, has to cope with the crisis in the Mediterranean.

¹²⁷ 'Turkey-EU Relations.' <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-the-european-union.en.mfa>

Therefore, they need each other. There exists additional common challenge: ISIS and terrorism, threat to security. Now Turkey is ‘the sick man of Europe’ suffering from political security and stability while Europe is also ‘sick’, especially in terms of economy. Any significant change regarding Turkey’s EU membership process could repair political stability and security in Turkey and economic security in Europe. Otherwise, the West can lose Turkey in favor of Russia as it did in the 1920s or Turkey’s possible expansion to the Arabic world would result in emerging of a new polar in the international system. Even if the latter does not come true in a short-term perspective, it raises security concerns. The EU also realizes all of these and restarts negotiations. Turkey locates in the neighborhood of Middle East that is rich in oil. None of the parts conflicting over the Middle East want to lose Turkey in favor of the other side. It multiplies threats to security in Turkey.

Any enlargement, as well as Turkey’s EU membership is the task of elites. None of the rounds of enlargement have occurred under the intense public aspirations. European citizens unsatisfied with the economic condition they live in and irritated by the migrant refugees in their country are doubtful of the further existence of EU itself. Under this condition, elites have to take public opinion into consideration in decision-making. However, the elites in Europe are able to impact on Islamophobic and Turcophobic citizens’ opinion.

As European elites claim, public opinion is a major determinant in Turkey’s accession process and bilateral relations. In addition to analyze the significance and level of public support to Turkey, the literature also makes some suggestions in order to change the situation and reverse the negative trend of EU public opinion in favor of Turkey:¹²⁸

- Calls for an entire discussion on the process and mutual benefits of Turkey’s accession. It argue that as long as right-wing parties control the debate over Turkish accession and use European media as a policy tool, EU citizens will hold negative attitude towards Turkey. In order to change the scenery in Turkish favor,

¹²⁸ Dagdeverenis, D. (2014) ‘EU Public Opinion and Turkey’s EU Membership.’ *EU-Turkey Dialogue Initiative Working Paper*, No. 2, pp. 1-22.

EU citizens must be accurately informed about Turkey and a balanced EU-level debate over Turkey's membership must take place. That's why Ruiz-Jiminez and Torreblanca and Hannah Q. Young calls for a wide European-level debate on Turkey concentrated on post-national and instrumental arguments rather than identitarian or cultural ones. It is as a way of justification of Turkey's membership. To highlight the identity issues in discussions regarding Turkish accession by challenging stereotypes and perceptions is assumed to improve Turkey's image and "brand".

- Public diplomacy, extended interaction and cooperation at civil society level between EU and Turkish citizens is also considered appropriate to improve Turkey's image in Europe. A positive or negative 'country brand' says much about the country for Europeans. Direct relations and cooperation between these societies can reduce some misinformation or misperception and Turcophobia.
- Improved integration of Turkish citizens living in EU member-states is often presented as a way to reduce differences while a poor, unsuccessful integration of Turks and Turkish communities in European countries further worsens Turkey's image. Turks in EU member states are often criticized for being poorly integrated to the society of the host country and creating their Turkish community there. This fact raises concerns on whether Turks will integrate and give up some of their identity or live in a parallel society and threaten European identity.
- Calls for the necessity of conducting new researches on Turkey's accession while the European public are increasingly sceptical about integration and enlargement. Some researches find a thorough study of the EU attitudes and perceptions of Turkish accession more useful for better understanding of the factors favoring support or opposition to Turkey's EU accession. It can be conducted by civil society actors (e.g. university institutes, research centers, think-tanks, etc).
- Highlighting the possible contributions of a European-level dialogue on the future of Europe and the place of Turkey conducted by wider societal levels and not just elites, (especially in the civil society level) can more or less impact on stereotypes and negative opinion.

- Argue that political elites have apparent role in shaping European public opinion. Political elites can convince the citizens of the advantages/benefits rather than disadvantages/costs like influx of immigrants, financial and cultural concerns that Turkey can bring to Europe. The politicians can take some measures like limits on freedom of movement in order to remove such concerns.
- Turkish diaspora's effective activities in European states are also able to draw a positive profile of Turkey and Turks and reduce propaganda against themselves.

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APPENDIX

	2005	2006	2008	2010
For	31	28	31	30
Against	55	59	55	59
Don't Know	14	13	14	11

Table 1. European public opinion on Turkey's EU accession¹²⁹

¹²⁹ Dagdeverenis, D. (2014) 'EU Public Opinion and Turkey's EU Membership.' *EU-Turkey Dialogue Initiative Working Paper*, No. 2, pp. 1-22.

TABLE A¹³⁰

<u>Acquis chapter</u>	Screening Started	Screening Completed	Chapter Frozen	Chapter Unfrozen	Chapter Opened	Chapter Closed
1. Free Movement of Goods	16 January 2006	24 February 2006	11 December 2006	–	–	–
2. Freedom of Movement For Workers	19 July 2006	11 September 2006	8 December 2009	–	–	–
3. Right of Establishment For Companies & Freedom To Provide Services	21 November 2005	20 December 2005	11 December 2006	–	–	–
4. Free Movement of Capital	25 November 2005	22 December 2005	–	–	19 December 2008	–
5. Public Procurement	7 November 2005	28 November 2005	–	–	–	–
6. Company Law	21 June 2006	20 July 2006	–	–	17 June 2008	–

¹³⁰ ‘Accession of Turkey to the European Union.’ www.wikipedia.org

7. Intellectual Property Law	6 February 2006	3 March 2006	–	–	17 June 2008	–
8. Competition Policy	8 November 2005	2 December 2005	–	–	–	–
9. Financial Services	29 March 2006	3 May 2006	11 December 2006	–	–	–
10. Information Society & Media	12 June 2006	14 July 2006	–	–	19 December 2008	–
11. Agriculture & Rural Development	5 December 2005	26 January 2006	11 December 2006	–	–	–
12. Food Safety, Veterinary & Phytosanitary Policy	9 March 2006	28 April 2006	–	–	30 June 2010	–
13. Fisheries	24 February 2006	31 March 2006	11 December 2006	–	–	–
14. Transport Policy	26 June 2006	28 September 2006	11 December 2006	–	–	–

15. Energy	15 May 2006	16 June 2006	8 December 2009	–	–	–
16. Taxation	6 June 2006	12 July 2006	–	–	30 June 2009	–
17. Economic & Monetary Policy	16 February 2006	23 March 2006	25 June 2007	14 December 2015	14 December 2015	–
18. Statistics	19 June 2006	18 July 2006	–	–	25 June 2007	–
19. Social Policy & Employment	8 February 2006	22 March 2006	–	–		–
20. Enterprise & Industrial Policy	27 March 2006	5 May 2006	–	–	29 March 2007	–
21. Trans- European Networks	30 June 2006	29 September 2006	–	–	19 December 2007	–
22. Regional Policy & Coordination of Structural Instruments	11 September 2006	10 October 2006	25 June 2007	12 February 2013	5 November 2013	–
23. Judiciary & Fundamental	7 September	13 October 2006	8 December	–	–	–

Rights	2006		2009			
24. Justice, Freedom & Security	23 January 2006	15 February 2006	8 December 2009	–	–	–
25. Science & Research	20 October 2005	14 November 2005	–	–	12 June 2006	12 June 2006
26. Education & Culture	26 October 2005	16 November 2005	8 December 2009	–	–	–
27. Environment and Climate Change	3 April 2006	2 June 2006	–	–	21 December 2009	–
28. Consumer & Health Protection	8 June 2006	11 July 2006	–	–	19 December 2007	–
29. Customs Union	31 January 2006	14 March 2006	11 December 2006	–	–	–
30. External Relations	10 July 2006	13 September 2006	11 December 2006	–	–	–
31. Foreign, Security & Defence Policy	14 September 2006	6 October 2006	8 December 2009	–	–	–

32. Financial Control	18 May 2006	30 June 2006	–	–	26 July 2007	–
33. Financial & Budgetary Provisions	6 September 2006	4 October 2006	25 June 2007	–	–	–
34. Institutions (Nothing to adopt)	–	–	–	–	–	–
35. Other Issues (Nothing to adopt)	–	–	–	–	–	–
Progress	33 out of 33	33 out of 33	17 out of 33	2 out of 17	15 out of 35	1 out of 35